Providence Journal Co. v. Sundlun

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WEISBERGER
• Citation: Providence Journal Co. v. Sundlun, 616 A.2d 1131 (R.I. 1992)
• Decision Date: 25 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-430-A,91-430-A
• Parties: 21 Media L. Rep. 1085 PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY et al. v. Bruce G. SUNDLUN et al. ppeal.

Page 1131

616 A.2d 1131

21 Media L. Rep. 1085

PROVIDENCE JOURNAL COMPANY et al. v. Bruce G. SUNDLUN et al.

No. 91-430-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 25, 1992.

Michael P. DiBiase, Joseph Cavanagh, Jr., and Karen Pelazarski, Blish & Cavanagh, Providence, for petitioner.

Gerard P. Cobleigh, Cobleigh, Sprague & Giacobbe, Warwick, Jean Rosiello, Terrence Tierney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Sheldon Whitehouse, and Judith Savage, Office of the Governor, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

This case comes before us on the defendants' appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs by a justice of the Superior Court. In this suit for the disclosure of certain records under the Access to Public Records Act, G.L.1956 (1990 Reenactment) chapter 2 of title 38 (APRA), the trial justice found that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the records in question were subject to disclosure under the APRA and ordered the defendants to release the documents. We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court with directions to modify the original judgment. The facts insofar as pertinent to this appeal are as follows.

On or about March 1, 1991, the Providence Journal Company and Russell Garland, a staff reporter (plaintiffs), made an oral request of Bruce G. Sundlun, in his capacity as Governor, to allow them access to certain state-government records. The records in question would have revealed the "names and positions of the 129 non-union state employees who were being laid-off." Thereafter, on or about March 5, 1991, plaintiffs made a second oral request for the "names and positions of the 492 state employees who were members of a union and who were being laid-off." On both occasions the Governor refused to give plaintiffs access to the records showing the employees selected for the proposed layoff (the requested records).

On March 6, 1991, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court against the Governor and the State of Rhode Island (defendants), alleging that defendants' refusal to make the requested records available for inspection was a violation of the APRA. The plaintiffs' complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the requested records were public documents and, therefore, not exempt from disclosure under the act. In response, defendants moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the requested records were not exempt from disclosure pursuant to § 38-2-2(d)(1) of the APRA.

The parties were heard on their respective motions by a justice of the Superior Court on June 25, 1991. The justice denied defendants' motion to dismiss, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and directed defendants to release the records sought in plaintiffs' complaint. The trial justice stayed his order for ten days to allow defendants to request a stay from this court.

Prior to the expiration of the ten-day stay, some confusion arose between the parties in respect to the exact records within the purview of the trial justice's order. The defendants contended that the order actually encompassed three separate and distinct groups of state employees. The distinction among the groups, they asserted, was critical to the issue of whether the lists were subject to disclosure under the APRA.

It appears from the record that at the time plaintiffs filed their suit in March 1991, the Governor had concluded that a particular group of state employees would receive layoff notices (list No. 1). The Governor, however, never implemented that first wave of contemplated layoffs. Subsequent discussions with labor unions representing affected employees resulted in pay cuts in lieu of the proposed layoffs.

Four months later, the Governor generated a second and different list of state employees who were in turn issued layoff notices (list No. 2). As a direct consequence of the Governor's action, in respect to list No. 2, a course of action ensued referred to in the labor community as the "bumping process." The bumping process allows employees receiving layoff notices to exercise their rights to displace fellow employees with less seniority and to accept lower-level positions within state government.

The record before us indicates that the bumping process was on-going at the time of the hearing before the trial justice, as well as at the time the parties argued before this court. Therefore, at the conclusion of the bumping process the third list will constitute the final group of employees who will actually be laid off from state employment (list No. 3). The defendants had difficulty determining to which lists the trial justice's order of disclosure applied.

The defendants sought leave of the Superior Court for clarification of the scope of the trial justice's order. A justice of the Superior Court heard the matter on July 10, 1991, and ruled that the order directed defendants to release not only the names of the state employees "who were laid-off" but also "whatever list [of contemplated layoffs] was in existence, though perhaps not acted upon in March." In addition to clarifying the original order, the justice allowed Rhode Island Council No. 94, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, and the Rhode Island Alliance of Social Service Employees, Local No. 580, to intervene as party-defendants in this matter pursuant to Rule 24 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. ¹ Thereafter, defendant-intervenors (defendants) filed a timely notice of appeal to this court.

This court has had several occasions in the past to interpret provisions of the APRA. In the case at bar the issue before us is straightforward. It is whether the trial justice erred in holding that the records subject to disclosure included both the list that identified the employees proposed to be laid off--but who were never, in fact, separated from state employment--as well as those employees who will be laid off at the conclusion of the bumping process.

On review of a summary judgment order, this court applies the same standards as the trial justice. Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 867 (R.I.1987). If our examination of the pleadings, affidavits and all other admissible evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, reveals no genuine issues of material fact and if we conclude that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we shall uphold the trial justice's granting of summary judgment. Pennsylvania General Insurance Co. v. Morris, 599 A.2d 1042, 1043 (R.I.1991); Violet v. Travelers Express Co., 502 A.2d 347, 349 (R.I.1985); Commercial Union Companies v. Graham, 495 A.2d 243, 245 (R.I.1985).

Turning to the present case, we believe that the Rhode Island General Assembly, in enacting the APRA, enlarged the scope of the public's access to documents in the possession of government agencies. The stated purpose of the APRA is as follows "The public's right to access to records pertaining to the policy-making responsibilities of government and the individual's right to dignity and privacy are both recognized to be principles of the utmost importance in a free society. The purpose of this chapter is to facilitate public access to governmental records which pertain to the policy-making functions of public bodies and/or are relevant to the public health, safety, and welfare. It is also the intent of this chapter to protect from disclosure information about particular individuals maintained in the files of public bodies when disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Section 38-2-1.

This court has long recognized that the underlying policy of the APRA favors the free flow and disclosure of information to the public. Providence Journal Co. v. Kane, 577 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I.1990); Pawtucket Teachers Alliance Local No. 920, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Brady, 556 A.2d 556, 558 (R.I.1989); Hydron Laboratories, Inc. v. Department of Attorney General, 492 A.2d 135, 137 (R.I.1985); The Rake v. Gorodetsky, 452 A.2d 1144, 1147 (R.I.1982). However, in recognizing that policy, we have also concluded that the Legislature did not intend to empower the press and the public with carte blanche to demand all records held by public agencies. Kane, 577 A.2d at 663; Brady, 556 A.2d at 558.

The defendants in the present case argue that the records ordered disclosed by the trial justice are not "public records" as that term is defined by § 38-2-2(d) of the APRA and by this court in Kane and Brady. We agree with respect to those employees designated on lists No. 1 and 2. However, we conclude that list No. 3 will be a public record when finalized, and therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to have access to the list when it is completed pursuant to provisions of the APRA.

Read consecutively, §§ 38-2-2(d) and 38-2-3 set forth the definition of a public record for the purposes of disclosure under the act and mandate that "all records maintained or kept on file by any public body * * * shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect and/or copy such records." Section 38-2-3(a). Embodied in § 38-2-2(d), however, are twenty-two categories of exceptions that were intended to limit the public's access when disclosure would reveal personal or confidential information about an individual. It should be noted, however, that although the legislative intent may have been to protect against the release of personal or confidential information, it implemented this intention by prohibiting the release of all records that would be identifiable to an individual person, whether or not such records might in another context be construed as either personal or confidential.

Pertinent to the case at hand is § 38-2-2(d)(1), as amended by P.L.1991, ch. 263, § 1 which exempts...