Providence Teachers Union, Local 958, American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. McGovern

• Decision Date: 13 May 1974
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO,Nos. 1988-A,s. 1988-A
• Citation: 113 R.I. 169,319 A.2d 358
• Parties: , 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2899, 74 Lab.Cas. P 53,374 PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 958, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,v. David R. McGOVERN, City Treasurer of the City of Providence, State of Rhode Island. PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 958, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the CITY OF PROVIDENCE, Rhode Island. ppeal, 73-2-Appeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 358

319 A.2d 358

113 R.I. 169, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2899, 74 Lab.Cas. P 53,374

PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 958, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO v. David R. McGOVERN, City Treasurer of the City of Providence, State of Rhode Island.

PROVIDENCE TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 958, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF the CITY OF PROVIDENCE, Rhode Island.

Nos. 1988-Appeal, 73-2-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 13, 1974.

Grady & Kaplan Incorporated, James T. Grady, Boston, Mass., Eugene F. Toro, Providence, for plaintiff-appellee.

Louis A. Mascia, City Solicitor, Vincent J. Piccirilli, Providence, for appellant, David R. McGovern.

Vincent J. Piccirilli, Providence, for appellant, School Committee of the City of Providence.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

We have consolidated these two appeals. They are sequels to our decision rendered in the matter of Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. School Committee, 108 R.I. 444, 276 A.2d 762 (1971). In 1968 the Providence Teachers Union, Local 958, American Federation of Teachers, AFLCIO (union) entered into a one-year collective bargaining agreement ¹ with the Providence School Committee then in office. A special election was held in August 1968 in which voters expressed a preference for an 'appointed' Providence School Committee (committee). That body soon thereafter replaced the 'elected' committee which had negotiated the contract with the union.

The bargaining agreement contained severance pay provisions. Eleven teachers who had retired sought to take advantage of such provisions. The committee repudiated the provisions because of an alleged unavailability of funds in the city till. The union challenged the disavowal by invoking the arbitration process set out in the agreement. An extensive hearing was conducted, and a majority of arbitrators ordered the payment of the retirement benefits, i.e., the severance pay. The committee challenged the action of the arbitration panel and the Superior Court affirmed the arbitrators' award. On appeal to this court, we held that the retirement award was a proper provision to be included within the contract, that the alleged lack of funds afforded no legal basis for the committee's unilateral disavowal of the 1968 agreement, and that the Superior Court's affirmation of the arbitrators' award is a judgment ² which must be honored like any other judgment under G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-9-24.

Thereafter, the union made demand upon the city council and/or the city treasurer ³ (treasurer) for the payment of the judgment. After the expiration of 40 days, said judgment remaining unpaid and unsatisfied, the union brought this action in Superior Court pursuant to G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) §§ 45-15-5 and 45-15-6 for debt on the judgment obtained.

After the treasurer filed an answer to the complaint denying its allegations, the union moved for summary judgment pursuant to Super.R.Civ.P. 56. The motion was granted by the trial justice because the issues raised before him presented pure questions of law. The treasurer has appealed from the order granting the motion for summary judgment.

The treasurer argues that the underlying agreement which has given rise to the litigation at bar is void and, therefore, unenforceable in that the contract failed to conform to the requirements of certain sections of the Providence City Charter. The union's response is that, since the earlier committee case has already determined that the agreement was valid and enforceable, the doctrine of res judicata precludes the relitigation of the issue and, therefore, is dispositive. We do not agree.

It is probably more accurate to characterize the effect, if any, that the prior judgment would have on this case as one based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel rather than res judicata. The latter doctrine involves the effect of a final judgment between the parties to an original action and those in privity with such parties; the doctrine would normally be invoked in a subsequent action based upon the same claim or demand. Res judicata bars the relitigation of all the issues that were tried or might have been tried in the original suit. Perez v. Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency, 111 R.I. 327, 302 A.2d 785 (1973); Goloskie v. Sherman, 108 R.I. 730, 279 A.2d 409 (1971). Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, is the doctrine which renders conclusive in a subsequent action on a different claim the determination of particular issues actually litigated in a prior action. We note the reasoning of Chief Justice Traynor in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), wherein the prerequisites for the application of collateral estoppel were set forth as follows: (1) an identity of issues; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) an establishment that the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action. It is evident that since the treasurer was neither a party to nor in privity with a party to the prior litigation, neither doctrine may be applied against him as a bar to his contesting the validity of the agreement. Nevertheless, the treasurer's contention that a collective bargaining agreement, executed by a school committee and covering the terms of compensation of teachers, must conform to provisions of the city charter is without legal merit.

The provision with which we are dealing is Section 5 of the Providence Finance Act, P.L.1945, ch. 1665, which reads as follows:

'All purchases made and contracts executed by the purchasing agent shall be pursuant to a written requisition from the head of the office, department, or other agency whose appropriation is to be charged; and no purcahse order shall be issued or contract executed, nor shall any other agreement purporting to obligate the city be entered into unless and until the controller certifies that there is to the credit of the department, board, commission, bureau, or other city agency concerned therewith a sufficient appropriation balance in excess of all unpaid obligations, to defray the cost of such supplies, materials, equipment, or contractual services; and unless and until the budget director certifies that the purchase is consistent with policies established in the budget.' (emphasis added)

At the time of the execution of the agreement, the Providence School Department was operating with a deficit. Accordingly, the protector of the city's interests argues that Section 5 is applicable to collective bargaining agreements and that the 1968 agreement is null and void ⁴ because of an insufficiency of funds. However, we do not find Section 5 to apply to collective bargaining agreements.

A close reading of Section 5 reveals that the purpose of the section is to require that any purchase made or contract executed by the purchasing agent of the city of Providence be presented to the controller for his certification. Section 4 of the same Act sets forth the duties ⁵ of the 'purchasing agent' and indicates that the said official's duties relate solely to matters concerning supplies and equipment. Read in the context with the rest of Section 4 and 5, the reference in Section 4(a) to 'contractual services' obviously refers to only those 'contractual services' dealing with supplies and equipment.

There is no mention whatsoever of collective bargaining agreements in Sections 4 and 5. Such agreements are not within the purview of a purchasing agent's function as embodied in Section 4 and, therefore, would also not be within the scope of the Section 5 requirements relied upon by the treasurer.

We shall reiterate what was stated in the first School Committee case in respect to the treasurer's agrument that the agreement is void since the elected school committee ⁶ did not have a sufficient appropriation to fund the agreement. The lack of funds affords no legal basis for the committee's unilateral rejection of the 1968 contract. Public Laws 1968, ch. 203, sec. 11 provides as follows:

'Within the limits of the total amount or the individual amounts appropriated by the city council for the purposes of the school department, the school committee shall have the authority and responsibility for the provisions of all public school services; for the establishment of the classification and compensation of personnel; and for the expenditure of all school funds in accordance with law and the provisions of this act.'

Once the city council furnishes the committee with its appropriation, the committee is then free to allocate the sums appropriated to it as it deems fit. The committee may not disregard the obligations it assumed when it took office in 1968.

The money due the retirees is a debt of the city which must be satisfied by its treasurer.

Since the issues presented to the trial justice by way of the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment raised only pure questions of law, the granting of the summary judgment in the matter was correct. We turn now to the committee's appeal.

On July 21, 1970 the union advised the committee by letter that there were 40 other teachers similarly situated as those in the first grievance to whom severance pay was due. By mutual agreement the resolution of the interests of these teachers was held in abeyance to await final outcome of the then pending controversy.

The...