Providence v. Jeremiah

• Decision Date: 08 October 2010
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 2010-1858
• Parties: PROVIDENCE, SC.ELIZABETH BOYER, individually, and by and for her minor son, JEREMY BOWEN; et al. v. JEREMIAH S. JEREMIAH, et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

PROVIDENCE, SC.ELIZABETH BOYER, individually, and by and for her minor son,

JEREMY BOWEN; et al.

v.JEREMIAH S. JEREMIAH, et al.

C.A. No. 2010-1858

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence, SC.

Filed-October 8, 2010

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS

DECISION

CARNES, J. The matter before the Court involves a motion to dismiss brought by the Chief Judge of the Family Court, the Family Court Administrators, and the Magistrates of the Family Court (collectively "Court Defendants") alleging lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Super. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs brought a timely objection, and this matter was heard before the Superior Court on August 3, 2010.

IFacts & Travel

The motions before this Court were filed in response to a putative class action lawsuit brought on behalf of numerous juveniles and parents who participated in the Truancy Court program. Plaintiffs collectively filed suit against various Court Defendants, as well as specific municipalities that participated in the Truancy Court program, alleging system-wide violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the Rhode Island General Laws, the Rhode Island Rules of Juvenile Procedure, and the Code of Judicial Conduct¹ of the State of Rhode Island.

The Truancy Court program was instituted in September of 1999 by Family Court Chief Judge Jeremiah S. Jeremiah. It is essentially "a specialized calendar created to allow magistrates to hold court at schools where truancy was a problem." (Judicial Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Their Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Such an arrangement ensured that students missed as little school time as possible, and also enabled the "collaboration of the court, school, and service providers" to ensure that "the child and parent(s)...receive(d) guidance and services within their own neighborhood quickly, efficiently and effectively." Id

The first Truancy Court was established at Hope High School, in the City of Providence, Rhode Island. Over the next several years, the Truancy Court program expanded rapidly, and Truancy Courts are now present in thirty-three communities, servicing over one hundred fifty schools in forty-three separate locations. In the 2005-2006 school year, 2, 275 juveniles were involved in Truancy Court proceedings.²

According to the Truancy Court rules, "each defendant is given the choice between admitting to a truancy violation, thereby gaining acceptance into the truancy court program, or having a full trial in the Family Court." Id. Truancy is prosecuted as a civil infraction; "children cited as truants under R.I.G.L. § 16-19-6 are defendants in a Family Court proceeding in order to determine if they are wayward." Id. "Acts that may make a child eligible for detention as a wayward youth include: deserting their households, refusing to listen to their parents, being habitually absent from school or failing to follow the rules in school." Id. at 2-3 (citing G.L. 1956 § 14-1-3).

According to Defendants, "[a]dmission to the truancy court program does not in itself lead to the possibility of incarceration." Id. at 3. Children admitted to Truancy Court by admitting violation of § 16-19-1 "are given a sentence of probation, which is stayed pending successful completion of the truancy court's requirements." Id. "It is only when a criminal contempt of an order of the court occurs, and a ruling is made pursuant to both its inherent authority and pursuant to statute, under R.I.G.L. § 8-10-38 and/or R.I.G.L. § 8-10-38.1, that the threat of incarceration may attach." Id.

Defendants further maintain that "decisions and actions of the Truancy Court are not without appeal. Under Rhode Island Family Court Administrative Order 2008-1... the appeal is, in the first instance, heard by the Chief Judge of the Family Court. Should an appellant not gain success, the appellant can further appeal to the Supreme Court under either R.I.G.L. § 8-1-2 or R.I.G.L. § 14-1-52." Id. Furthermore, "the remedies of the various writs (e.g. habeas corpus, writ of mandamus or at a bare minimum certiorari) are always available to plaintiffs in the event that a legal right has actually, and materially, been deprived." Id.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, (hereinafter simply "complaint"), specifically alleges that Defendants Jeremiah Jeremiah, as Chief Judge, and Ronald Pagliarini, and Kevin Richard— as the administrators of and final policymakers with respect to the Truancy Court program— failed to ensure that:

(1) "The Family Court's Intake Department investigates truancy petitions before filing them to determine whether they are legally sufficient on their face and whether further action is in the best interest of the public and the children who are the subject of the petitions, as required by state constitutional and statutory law;"

(2) "Stenographic or other verbatim recordings are made of all Truancy Court proceedings as required by federal and state constitutional law, and state statutory law;" and(3) "Interpreters are provided to all individuals appearing before the Truancy Court who do not speak or understand English with sufficient fluency." (Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 4.)

"Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to each of these three claims." Id. With respect to the Defendant Truancy Court Magistrates, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint specifically alleges that these Defendants:

(1) "Arraign and issue orders against members of the Plaintiff Class over whom personal jurisdiction has not been established, in violation of federal and state constitutional law;"

(2) "Fail to provide the Plaintiff Class the information necessary at arraignment, in violation of federal and state constitutional law and state statutory law;"

(3) "Fail to obtain knowing and voluntary waivers of procedural due process protections by parents and students appearing before the Truancy Court, in violation of federal and state constitutional law;"

(4) "Permit children members of the Plaintiff Class to waive their right to counsel without first consulting with counsel, in violation of federal and state constitutional law;" and

(5) "Engage in ex parte communications with prosecuting school officials regarding members of the Plaintiff Class, in violation of federal and state constitutional law and the Rhode Island Code of Judicial Conduct." Id. at 5.³

"Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief with respect to each claim and injunctive relief with respect to the first claim." Id.

Defendants timely moved to dismiss pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and Super.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), alleging lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively. Specifically, Defendants argue that:

(1) "[T]he particular claims launched require an interpretation and application of chapter 19 of Title 16 of the General Laws of Rhode Island which, by statute, has been completely delegated to the Family Court;"(2) "[P]rinciples of comity require the Superior Court to abstain from hearing this case as the parties, forms of relief and legal arguments are similar to those present in pending cases in Family Court;" and

(3) "[T]he basis of the action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is a federal claim made against the state that is barred by both the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and sovereign immunity, which has not been waived."

Plaintiffs respond that the Superior Court has authority to adjudicate this action because it has general jurisdiction over all cases that the General Assembly has not explicitly directed to another state forum. Chase v. Bouchard, 671 A.2d 794, 796 (R.I. 1996) (citing La Petite Auberge, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 279 (R.I. 1980)). Nothing in the General Laws, rules, or regulations directs that class action lawsuits brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be filed in another forum. Secondly, Plaintiffs argue that principles of comity, abstention, and immunity do not apply because Plaintiffs do not seek to collaterally attack trial court orders or adjudications. Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Eleventh Amendment immunity and federal abstention do not apply because they are only applicable to federal court actions, not state court actions.

This Court will address each argument in turn.

IIStandard of Review

Rule 12(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides for seven defenses that may be made by motion at the option of the pleader. In the case at bar, Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

ARule 12(b)(1)

A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction, questions the Court's authority to adjudicate the matter before it. "It is an axiomatic rule of civil procedure that such a claim may not be waived by any party and may be raised at any time in the proceedings." Pine v. Clark, 636 A.2d 1319, 1321 (R.I. 1994) (citing La Petite Auberge, Inc. 419 A.2d at 280). As the Superior Court of Rhode Island is a trial court of general jurisdiction, deriving its authority from statute, it possesses "subject-matter jurisdiction over all cases unless that jurisdiction has been conferred by statute upon another tribunal." Chase v. Bouchard, 671 A.2d 794, 796 (R.I. 1996) (citing La Petite Auberge, Inc., 419 A.2d at 279). Because the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, it must be addressed prior to reaching the merits of a case.

BRule 12(b)(6)

"The sole function of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint." McKenna v. Williams, 874 A.2d 217, 225 (R.I. 2005) (quoting ...