Providence v. State Of R.I.

• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Writing for the Court: STERN, J.
• Decision Date: 10 August 2010
• Docket Number: C.A. NO. PC 06-0287
• Citation: Providence v. State, C.A. NO. PC 06-0287 (R.I. Super. Aug 10, 2010)
• Parties: PROVIDENCE, SC. FARAH PAUL v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, alias

PROVIDENCE, SC. FARAH PAUL

v.STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, alias

C.A. NO. PC 06-0287

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence, SC.

August 10, 2010

DECISION

STERN, J.Before this Court is an action by the Plaintiff, Farah Paul (herein, "Plaintiff) alleging that injuries sustained as a result of her January 26, 2004 slip and fall at the J. Joseph Garrahy Judicial Complex were due to the Defendant's negligent maintenance of the property. Defendant State of Rhode Island ("State") moves for Summary Judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56, arguing that the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate prima facie negligence on the part of the State, and that the public duty doctrine serves to protect it from any potential liability.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

The present litigation stems from a 2004 incident outside of the J. Joseph Garrahy Judicial Complex. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges that on January 26, 2004, "the premise [sic] outside walkway and stair was covered in ice and in disrepair." (Compl. ¶ 7.) At that time, the Plaintiff allegedly "slipped and fell onto her body causing her injuries." Id at ¶ 11. On February 16, 2004, Plaintiffs attorney sent a letter to the State's Department of Administration wherein the State was notified that the Plaintiff was being represented by counsel. See Def. Ex. A. The letter indicates that the "injury occurred because the brick sidewalk below the stairs was in disrepair... [and] as a result, [the Plaintiff] fell..." Id. Thereafter, Plaintiffs counsel providedthe State with two additional letters one in March of 2004, and one in April of the same year. Both of these letters indicate that the injury occurred because the brick sidewalk was in disrepair. In late April of 2004, Plaintiff's counsel sent another letter to the State and included four photographs of what appears to be a section of a brick patio or walkway in disrepair. See Def. Ex. E. These pictures are of an extraordinarily low quality, making it difficult to determine the state of the stairs, if even pictured.

In 2006, upon filing her Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the fall occurred because "the premise [sic] outside walkway and stair was covered in ice and in disrepair." (Compl. ¶ 7.) Later, in her response to interrogatories, Plaintiff indicated that, "I was on the last stair outside the building, I slipped and fell at the landing. It was covered in ice and was in disrepair or suffered from a frost heave. The area was untreated... I landed on my stomach with my hands flat out. My foot got caught in the crack or frost heave on the stair.... I tried to grab the railing to pull myself up. In doing so, I fell again...." (Def. Ex. F.) At her deposition, the Plaintiff indicated that it was cold and that there was ice on the ground that day. See Paul Depo. 13:6. She also indicated that when she fell, "one foot was on the step and the other foot was down on the ground on the landing," and that she fell because "it was slippery." Id. at 14:7. After she fell, she "tried to get up and grab the railing," but she "didn't fully get up all the way... [and] slipped again and fell on [her] right side." Id. at 48:17-49:3. When asked why she slipped trying to get up, the Plaintiff indicated that "it was icy and those bricks on the floor, they did not help any. They did not look-they were not in good condition and there was no sand or salt on the floor." Id. at 49:18.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

"When a motion for summary judgment has been filed and properly supported, a litigation death knell begins to toll. Unless the opposing parties... can still this doleful dirge by showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, all legal clamor will soon subside into a final judgment for the movant and the opponents' case will be pronounced dead in the water." Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 970 (R.I. 1998). On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to determine only whether a factual issue exists. It is not permitted to resolve any such factual issues. The emphasis is on issue finding, not issue determination. O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. 627, 633, 359 A.2d 350, 353 (1976); Palazzo v. Big G Supermarkets, Inc., 110 R.I. 242, 245, 292 A.2d 235, 237 (1972); Slefkin v. Tarkomian, 103 R.I. 495, 496, 238 A.2d 742 (1968). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial justice must consider affidavits and pleadings in the light most favorable to the opposing party, and only when it appears that no genuine issue of material fact is asserted can summary judgment be ordered. O'Connor v. McKanna, 116 R.I. 627, 633-34, 359 A.2d 350, 353-4 (R.I. 1976) (citing Marandola v. Hillcrest Builders, Inc., 102 R.I. 46, 227 A.2d 785 (1967)).

I. NEGLIGENCE

Because a question of fact remains as to whether the Defendant was negligent in its maintenance of the J. Joseph Garrahy Judicial Complex, summary judgment is inappropriate at this time. "To establish a cause of action for negligence, a complainant must allege facts demonstrating the defendant's legal duty of care owed to the plaintiff, the defendant's breach of that duty of care, injury to the plaintiff as a result of the breach proximately caused by the defendant's negligent conduct, and damage to the plaintiff." Volpe v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 710 A.2d 661, 663 n.4 (R.I. 1998) (citing Lutz Eng'g. Co. v. Indus. Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631, 635 (R.I. 1991)). It is a fundamental principle of law that "[a] defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff." Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005) (citations omitted).

Whether a duty exists in a particular case is a question of law for the trial or motion justice. Id. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has enumerated five guiding, although nondeterminative factors to help determine the level of duty in negligence actions, including: "(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the closeness of connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach." Banks v. Bowens's Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987). The Court should also take into account the factual circumstances surrounding the cause of action. See Bucki v. Hawkins, 914 A.2d 491, 496 (R.I. 2007). "If no such duty exists, then the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a motion for summary judgment must be granted." Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225.

"Premises liability" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed. 1999) as "[a] landowner's or landowner's tort liability for conditions or activities on the premises." Premises liability law in Rhode Island "imposes an affirmative duty upon owners and possessors of property: 'to exercise reasonable care for the safety of persons reasonably expected to be on the premises... includ[ing] and obligation to protect against the risks of a dangerous condition existing on the premises, provided the landowner knows of, or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered, the dangerous condition.'" Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, Inc., 820 A.2d 929, 935 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Tancrelle v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., 756 A.2d 744, 752 (R.I. 2000)).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has recently applied the "Connecticut Rule"¹ to determine the extent of a business invitor's "duty of care to keep a premises safe from naturally occurring accumulations of ice and snow." Berardis v. Louangxay, 969 A.2d 1288, 1291 (R.I. 2009). A business invitor must "use reasonable care to see that the common areas are kept reasonably safe from the dangers created by an accumulation of snow and ice which is attributed to purely natural causes... the invitor, however, must be afforded a reasonable time after the storm has ceased to remove the accumulation." Id. at 1292. "In short, we simply provide[] that during a snow storm, a landlord has no immediate duty to shovel snow, or remove or salt and sand ice, because such duty is postponed for at least a reasonable period after storm has abated." Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 716 (R.I. 1999); see also Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1292 (finding that a business invitor was not liable for not clearing "accumulated ice" from the "exterior entranceway" to his restaurant during a "severe winter storm").

Finally, our Supreme Court has indicated that:

"[I]t is not possible to rest a case upon mere speculation, yet the plaintiff is not required, in all cases, to produce positive and direct evidence of an eyewitness to the alleged negligence. Its negligence may be established by indirect and circumstantial evidence, and by sufficient proof of other facts and circumstances from which such negligence may be fairly and reasonably inferred. Proper inferences from other proven facts, when considered in connection with all of the evidence, may satisfy reasonable minds that they lead to a logical conclusion that the injury resulted from the defendant's negligent acts." Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n., Inc., 713 A.2d 766, 771 (R.I. 1998) (quoting Vrooman v. The Shepard Co., 57 R.I. 445, 449, 190 A. 452, 454 (1937)).

In other words, "causation is proved by inference." Gianquitti v. Atwood Medical Associates, Ltd., 973 A.2d 580, 592 (R.I. 2009) (internal citation omitted). Such "'[p]roof by inference need not exclude every other possible cause...it must be based on reasonable inferences drawn from the facts in evidence.'" Id. at 593 (quoting Seide v. State, 875 A.2d 1259, 1268-9 (R.I. 2005)). This concept does not expand indefinitely, however. In Russian v. LifeCap Tire Services, Inc., 608 A.2d 1145, 1147 (R.I. 1992), the court found that the plaintiff failed to "assert[] sufficient facts to satisfy the necessary elements of his negligence claim" when he did not...