Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. The Sydney and The William Worden

• Decision Date: 04 September 1891
• Parties: THE SYDNEY. v. THE SYDNEY AND THE WILLIAM WORDEN. THE WILLIAM WORDEN. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INS. CO. et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

47 F. 260

THE SYDNEY. THE WILLIAM WORDEN. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INS. CO. et al. v. THE SYDNEY AND THE WILLIAM WORDEN.

United States Circuit Court, S.D. New York.

September 4, 1891

Edward D. McCarthy, for Insurance Company.

Hyland & Zabriskie, for The Sydney and The William Worden.

WALLACE J.

This cause is here upon the settlement of a decree to be entered upon the filing of a mandate of the supreme court. Upon the libel filed in the district court, both vessels were seized under the process issued. The claimant entered into the usual stipulation for costs in the sum of $250, with sureties. The Worden was released upon the filing of a stipulation dated August 28, 1883, by the claimant, with sureties, for $1,000 that sum having been fixed as her value by the consent of the libelants and claimant. The Sydney was sold by order of the court for $2,100, and the proceeds of the sale were paid May 3, 1884, into the registry of the district court. After a hearing upon the merits, there was a decree in the district court dismissing the libel as against both vessels, with costs. The libelants appealed from that decree to this court. After the hearing of the appeal, this court allowed the claimant to reopen the hearing, and introduce further testimony, upon furnishing a bond, with sureties, for additional costs in the amount of $300. Subsequently this court reversed the decree of the district court, and condemned both vessels, awarding the libelants $8,252 damages, and $656 costs. 27 F. 119. The decree provided that unless an appeal should be taken and perfected by the claimant within a specified time, the stipulators for costs and for the value of the Worden, and the sureties in the bond for additional costs, should cause their engagements to be performed, or show cause, within four days after the expiration of the time to appeal, why summary judgment should not be entered into against them. Within the specified time the claimant appealed from that decree to the supreme court and, upon the allowance of his appeal, executed and filed the usual supersedeas bond, with sureties, in the sum of $2,500 conditioned to prosecute the appeal to effect, and answer all damages and costs, 'including just damages for delay, and for the use and detention of the property, and the costs of the suit, and costs and interest on the appeal, awarded against the appellant therein. ' That appeal was dismissed by the supreme court for want of jurisdiction, (139 U.S. 331, 11 S.Ct. 620;) and that court, by its mandate to this court, directed that such proceedings be had herein as according to right and justice, and the laws of the United States, ought to be had, the said appeal notwithstanding.

The same persons were the sureties in the stipulation for costs, in the stipulation for value, in the bond for additional costs, and in the supersedeas bond.

The well-established rule that on a mandate from the supreme court, containing a direction to this court to enter a specific judgment, this court has no authority to do anything but execute the mandate, and enter such a judgment or decree as it directs, has no application to the present case. The supreme court has not considered the merits of the cause, but has refused to consider them, because it was without jurisdiction to do so. The mandate merely informs this court that the appeal is no longer pending, and directs this court to proceed as it should do in view of that fact. This court is therefore at liberty to enforce the engagements of the claimant and his sureties as completely as it could if no appeal had been perfected, and the time for doing so specified in the original decree, had now expired. Like the stipulation for costs and the stipulation for value given upon the release of the Worden, the bond for additional costs and the supersedeas bond are securities taken under the direction of the court for the benefit of the libelants, and constitute a fund to be applied by the court according to the rights of those interested therein. Bonds are, to all intents and purposes, stipulations in the admiralty and the liability of parties thereto is the same whether the instrument is in form a bond or a stipulation. The Alligator, 1 Gall. 145. The power of the court to award summary judgment against the obligors in an appeal-bond given upon an appeal in an admiralty cause from the district court to the circuit court, was treated as unquestionable by the supreme court in the case of The Wanata, 95 U.S. 600; and it has long been the practice in this...