Proviso Tp. High Sch. No. 209 Bd. of Educ. v. Oak Park & River Forest Tp. High School Dist. No. 200 Bd. of Educ.

• Citation: 322 Ill. 217,153 N.E. 369
• Decision Date: 07 October 1926
• Docket Number: No. 17126.,17126.
• Parties: PROVISO TP. HIGH SCHOOL NO. 209 BOARD OF EDUCATION v. OAK PARK AND RIVER FOREST TP. HIGH SCHOOL DIST. NO. 200 BOARD OF EDUCATION.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

322 Ill. 217

153 N.E. 369

PROVISO TP. HIGH SCHOOL NO. 209 BOARD OF EDUCATION

v.OAK PARK AND RIVER FOREST TP. HIGH SCHOOL DIST. NO. 200 BOARD OF EDUCATION.

No. 17126.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1926.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 7, 1926.

Action by the Proviso Township High School No. 209 Board of Education against the Oak Park and River Forest Township High School District No. 200 Board of Education. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; J. C. Eagleton, judge.

Kraft, Kraft & Erskine, of Chicago, for appellant.

Clithero, Van Schaick & Stevens, of Chicago (Guy Van Schaick, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

DE YOUNG, J.

Kenneth Wright, a boy of high school age, residing at River Forest, in the western part of the Oak Park and River Forest township high school district, applied to the county superintendent of schools of Cook county for admission to the Proviso township high school. The county superintendent, by a letter addressed to the principal of the Proviso township high school, assented to the transfer, stating in the letter:

‘As it is much more convenient for him [Kenneth Wright] to attend the Proviso high school, I am giving my approval for his transfer. See section 96, School Law of Illinois. The high school district in which he lives will be obliged to pay his tuition.’

The two high school districts are separated by the Desplaines river. The Proviso township high school is two or three blocks west, and the Oak Park and River Forest township high school is about three miles east, and somewhat north, of the pupil's residence. He attended the Proviso township high school for the school year from September, 1919, to June, 1920. Payment of his tuition was requested of the Oak Park and River Forest township high school board, but the request was refused. The board of education of the Proviso township high school then instituted suit, based upon section 96 of the School Law, to recover the tuition. Upon the trial it was stipulated that the per capita cost of maintaining the Proviso township high school, exclusive of interest on its bonded indebtedness, for the school year in question, exceeded $150, but the defendant contended that section 96 of the School Law was unconstitutional, and for that reason did not authorize the recovery sought. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for $150 and costs, and this appeal by the defendant followed.

Section 96 of an act entitled ‘An act to establish and maintain a system of free schools,’ as amended in 1917 (Laws of 1917, p. 743,) provides in part:

‘Upon the approval of the county superintendent of schools any high school pupil may attend a recognized high school more convenient in some district other than the high school district in which he resides and the board of education of the high school district in which said pupil resides shall pay the tuition of such pupil, provided, said tuition shall not exceed the per capita cost of maintaining the high school attended.’

Appellant asserts that this amended section contravenes section 2 of article 2, article 3, the thirteenth and twenty-second sections of article 4 and section 10 of article 9 of the state Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.

[1] Section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution prohibits the taking of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The high school is a part of the state system of free schools. The board of education of a high school district is an agency of the state created by the General Assembly in obedience to the constitutional mandate to provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education. Taxes are not levied by a board of education for the private benefit of the board, the taxpayers, or the pupils of the district, but to provide public funds for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a system of free schools, and these taxes are public property in the hands of the agents of the state for that purpose, and are subject to the will of the General Assembly. Amended section 96 of the School Law does not, therefore, deprive either the school district or its taxpayers of property without due process of law. Princeton High School District v. Wyanet High School District, 314 Ill. 83, 145 N. E. 169;PEOPLE v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 286 Ill. 384, 121 N. E. 731.

[2] The division of the powers of the state government into three distinct departments by the third article of the Constitution is violated by amended section 96 of the School Law, appellant insists, because it delegates to the county superintendent of schools, an administrative officer, the power, legislative in its nature, to determine when it is more convenient for a pupil to attend one high school than another, without placing any limitations upon or prescribing any rules for the exercise of that power. The General Assembly cannot deal minutely with every particular situation within the provisions of a statute, and the method or manner of executing a law must necessarily be left in a large measure to the reasonable discretion of administrative officers. The transfer of pupils from one high school district to another is an administrative function involving a consideration of details, and is properly left to the determination of the county superintendent of schools. The power conferred upon that officer in that respect is an administrative, and not a legislative, power. Princeton High School District v. Wyanet High School District, supra; Weatherford v. School Directors, 317 Ill. 495, 148 N. E. 244. Hence amended section 96 does not violate article 3 of the Constitution.

[3] The subject-matter of amended section 96, appellant argues, is foreign to that of the same numbered section prior to the amendment, and for that reason violates the provision of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution that no act shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. The amendatory act has as its title ‘An act to amend sections 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 and 96, of an act entitled, ‘An act to establish and maintain a system of free schools,’ approved and in force June 12, 1909, as subsequently amended, and to repeal conflicting statutes.' Laws of 1917, p. 737. A comparison of the original section with the section as...