Prowell v. State of Alabama Dep't of Human Res.
| Decision Date | 05 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 2:10-CV-2993-VEH |
| Parties | FREDERICKA M. PROWELL, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff Fredericka M. Prowell ("Ms. Prowell") initiated this job discrimination and retaliation lawsuit arising under Title VII and § 1981 (by and through § 1983) on November 5, 2010. (Doc. 1). The complaint contains twelve counts: (1) Title VII racial discrimination against the Alabama Department of Human Resources ("ADHR") and Jefferson County Department of Human Resources ("JCDHR") (collectively "DHR"); (2) Title VII retaliation against ADHR and JCDHR; (3) § 1981 racial discrimination against Angela McClintock ("Ms. McClintock"); (4) § 1981 racial discrimination against Amanda Rice ("Ms. Rice"); (5) § 1981 racial discrimination against Terri Beasley ("Ms. Beasley"); (6) § 1981racial discrimination against Joanna Stone ("Ms. Stone"); (7) § 1981 racial discrimination against Vivian Hunter ("Ms. Hunter"); (8) § 1981 retaliation against Ms. Stone; (9) § 1981 retaliation against Ms. McClintock; (10) § 1981 retaliation against Ms. Rice; (11) § 1981 retaliation against Ms. Beasley; and (12) § 1981 retaliation against Ms. Hunter.
Pending before the court are the following six motions: (1) Ms. Hunter's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 48) ("Ms. Hunter's Rule 56 Motion") filed on May 21, 2012; Ms. Beasley, Ms. McClintock, Ms. Rice and Ms. Stone's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) (collectively, "Ms. Stone's Rule 56 Motion") filed on May 21, 2012; (3) ADHR and JCDHR's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) (collectively, "DHR's Rule 56 Motion") filed on May 21, 2012; (4) Defendants' Motion To Strike Affidavit of Fredericka Prowell (Doc. 74) ("Defendants' Prowell Motion") filed on July 5, 2012; (5) Defendants' Motion To Strike Affidavit of Tonya Daniel (Doc. 75) ("Defendants' Daniel Motion") filed on July 5, 2012; and (6) Defendants' Motion To Strike Affidavit of Erica Pearson (Doc. 76) ("Defendants' Pearson Motion") filed on July 5, 2012.
Defendants have filed briefs and evidence in support of their Rule 56 Motions. (Docs. 50, 52-66). Ms. Prowell collectively filed her opposing brief, with attachments, to all Rule 56 Motions on June 21, 2012. (Docs. 69-70). On July 3,2012, Ms. Hunter filed a reply in support of her Rule 56 Motion (Doc. 73), and on July 5, 2012, the other defendants collectively filed their reply. (Doc. 77).
Ms. Prowell filed her opposition (Doc. 78) to Defendants' Prowell Motion, Daniel Motion, and Pearson Motion on July 16, 2012. Defendants followed with their reply (Doc. 79) on July 18, 2012.
Accordingly, all motions are now under submission. For the reasons explained below, the Prowell Motion is due to be granted in part and termed as moot in part, the Daniel Motion is due to be termed as moot, and the Pearson Motion is due to be granted in part and termed as moot in part. Further, DHR's Rule 56 Motion, Ms. Hunter's Rule 56 Motion, and Ms. Stone's Rule 56 Motion are all due to be granted, and Ms. Prowell's lawsuit is due to be dismissed.
At the time Ms. Prowell filed her federal court complaint on November 5,2010, she was employed by ADHR and working for JCDHR classified as a Service Supervisor within the Child Welfare Division of the state merit system. AF No. 2.2 Ms. Prowell's supervisors were the Assistant Director of JCDHR, Ms. McClintock, and the Director of the JCDHR, Ms. Rice, and Ms. Beasley. AF No. 26.
On September 15, 2009, Ms. Prowell had a physical confrontation with one of her minor daughters. AF No. 7. More specifically, Ms. Prowell allegedly used a belt to strike her minor daughter's lower leg three times. AF No. 8.
During the evening of that same date, Ms. Prowell's husband made a report to JCDHR against her for child abuse and neglect ("CA/N") relating to this incident. AF Nos. 6, 9. Because the call came in during the night, Ms. Hunter, as the Night Shift Supervisor, was responsible for the initial investigation of the report, along with Chrislyn Pepper ("Ms. Pepper"), who conducted the initial safety assessment for the JCDHR report. AF No. 6. Additionally, because the report involved a JCDHR employee, Ms. Hunter notified her supervisor, Ms. McClintock. AF No. 10.
Ms. Hunter and Ms. Pepper then interviewed the Ms. Prowell's daughter at hergrandparents' home in Fairfield, Alabama, and determined that she was no longer in danger. AF No. 11, 12. Ms. Hunter and Ms. Pepper returned to the JCDHR office and entered the information into the FACTS reporting system and also sent it by email to the intake section. AF No. 13.
On September 16, 2009, Ms. Prowell met with Ms. McClintock and Ms. Beasley, and Ms. McClintock told Ms. Prowell that she had to go home on leave and use her compensatory time while DHR investigated the allegations of child abuse by her against her daughter. AF No. 16. On that same date, Ms. McClintock called Sherry Pilkington ("Ms. Pilkington"), the Director of St. Clair County DHR. AF No. 17.
Ms. McClintock informed Ms. Pilkington that JCDHR had received a report of child abuse or neglect on a child protective services employee and requested that St. Clair take responsibility for further investigation of the CA/N report. Id. Ms. Pilkington agreed to Ms. McClintock's request, and assigned St. Clair DHR employee, Melinda Fomby ("Ms. Fomby") to handle that task. AF Nos. 17, 18.
Consistent with JCDHR's customary practice, Ms. Rice also decided to transfer Ms. Prowell from the Child Welfare Division to Child Support while the investigation into the alleged abuse of her minor daughter was underway. AF Nos. 20, 21. Ms. Prowell's salary did not change during the time she worked in JCDHR's ChildSupport Division. AF No. 27.
Ms. Prowell maintains that ADHR, JCDHR, Ms. McClintock, Ms. Rice, Ms. Beasley, Ms. Stone, and Ms. Hunter all played a part in placing her on leave and that the only reason they did this was because of her race. AF No. 22. Ms. Prowell also asserts that ADHR, JCDHR, Ms. McClintock, Ms. Rice, Ms. Beasley, Ms. Stone, and Ms. Hunter retaliated against her because of the allegations of child abuse made against her. AF No. 23.
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R . Civ. P. 56(c). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). "Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 'come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" International Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270,1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintains the ultimate burden of proving that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L. Ed. 2d 105 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984). Although the Supreme Court previously established the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof in a disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981); Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 156 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2003), that allocation scheme applies only in cases in which there is no direct evidence of discrimination. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987).3
Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme, a plaintiff first has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination or present sufficient evidence, of any type, for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a "motivating factor" for the employment action, even though the defendant's legitimate reason may also be true or have played some role in the decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02.
"All evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 118 S. Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1997). "An abuse of discretion can occur where the district court applies the wrong law, follows the wrong procedure, bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts, or commits a clear error in judgment." United States v. Estelan, 156 Fed. App'x 185, 196 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Moreover, as the Eleventh Circuit has made clear, not every incorrect evidentiary ruling constitutes reversible error:
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