Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Zelenski
| Decision Date | 24 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 18-1515 |
| Citation | 502 F.Supp.3d 998 |
| Parties | PRUCO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Dan ZELENSKI, Senta Zelenski, and Brandi Sexton solely in her capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Brenda Zelenski, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Mark A. Rowan, Rowan Law Offices, Connellsville, PA, for Defendants Dan Zelenski, Senta Zelenski.
Troy M. Frederick, Frederick Law Group, PLLC, Indiana, PA, for Defendant Brandi Sexton.
W. Scott Hardy, United States District Judge
Presently before the Court is Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff Brandi Sexton's Motion to Dismiss Defendants/Crossclaim Plaintiffs Dan Zelenski's and Senta Zelenski's Amended Crossclaim for Declaratory Judgment and brief in support thereof (Docket Nos. 41, 42), Defendants/Crossclaim Plaintiffs Dan Zelenski's and Senta Zelenski's response and brief in opposition thereto (Docket Nos. 45, 46), and Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff Brandi Sexton's reply brief (Docket No. 47). For the reasons set forth herein, Brandi Sexton's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) will be denied.
On or about August 22, 2014, Plaintiff Pruco Life Insurance Company ("Pruco") issued an annuity to Daniel Zelenski ("Zelenski"), the father of Defendants/Crossclaim Plaintiffs Dan Zelenski ("Dan") and Senta Zelenski ("Senta").1 (Docket No. 1, at ¶ 7). At the time of issuance, Zelenski designated Dan, Senta, and his wife, Brenda Zelenski ("Brenda"),2 as the beneficiaries of the death benefit payable under the annuity (hereinafter, "death benefit"). (Id. at ¶ 8). On or about October 16, 2017, Zelenski submitted a beneficiary change, designating Brenda as the primary beneficiary, and Dan and Senta as contingent beneficiaries, of the death benefit. (Id. at ¶ 9). Zelenski died on March 3, 2018, and Brenda died eight days later, on March 11, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12).
On November 13, 2018, Pruco filed an Interpleader Complaint against the putative beneficiaries of the death benefit, Dan, Senta, and Brenda's daughter, Defendant/Crossclaim Plaintiff Brandi Sexton ("Brandi"), in her capacity as administrator of her mother's estate. (Docket No. 1). On June 12, 2019, District Judge Cathy Bissoon ordered that the amount of the death benefit be deposited with the Court (Docket No. 21), and on July 10, 2019, she entered an order granting interpleader relief and dismissing Pruco from the case (Docket No. 24).
On July 25, 2019, Brandi filed an Answer to Interpleader Complaint and Crossclaim for Declaratory Judgment, arguing that she is entitled to the death benefit in its entirety because her mother was the primary beneficiary under the language of the annuity. (Docket No. 26, at ¶ 24). On July 29, 2019, Dan and Senta filed their Answer to Interpleader and Crossclaim for Declaratory Judgment, arguing that the beneficiary change made in October 2017 is void due to their father's lack of testamentary capacity, and that the Pennsylvania Slayers Act, 20 Pa. C.S. §§ 8801 et seq., bars Brenda from being the recipient of the death benefit. (Docket No. 27, at ¶¶ 21-30). On August 31, 2019, Brandi filed a motion to dismiss Dan and Senta's crossclaim. (Docket No. 30). On March 27, 2020, Judge Bissoon granted Brandi's motion, dismissing with prejudice Dan and Senta's claim based on the Pennsylvania Slayers Act, and dismissing, without prejudice to amendment with sufficient facts to state a claim, Dan and Senta's claim based on Zelenski's alleged lack of testamentary capacity. (Docket No. 35, at 7).
On May 7, 2020, Dan and Senta filed an Amended Crossclaim for Declaratory Judgment ("Amended Crossclaim"), pleading additional facts to support their claim that the beneficiary change is void due to their father's lack of testamentary capacity, and that the death benefit should be paid out as originally designated (divided among Dan, Senta, and Brandi as administrator of Brenda's estate). (Docket No. 40). On, May 26, 2020, Brandi filed a motion to dismiss Dan and Senta's Amended Crossclaim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that it again fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Docket No. 41). The case was reassigned to Judge W. Scott Hardy on September 23, 2020.
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court must " ‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’ " Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," the complaint must " ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ " Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 ().
It should be further noted that, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The standard " ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
As set forth, supra, Dan and Senta allege in their Amended Crossclaim that Zelenski lacked testamentary capacity on October 16, 2017, when he changed the annuity's beneficiary designations to make Brenda his primary beneficiary. (Docket No. 40). Brandi argues in her motion to dismiss that, even with the additional facts that Dan and Senta have pled in their Amended Crossclaim, their claim is not adequately supported and still fails to state a claim upon which relief can by granted.
Under applicable Pennsylvania law, testamentary capacity is presumed, and a person possesses testamentary capacity if he knows " ‘the natural objects of his bounty, of what his estate consists, and of what he desires done with it.’ "
Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 97 A.2d 14, 19 (1953) (quoting In re Franz's Estate, 368 Pa. 618, 84 A.2d 292, 295 (1951) ); see In re Estate of LeVeglia, No. 11-9066, 2013 WL 8538688, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. June 21, 2013). Further, " ‘[t]he determinative time [of such testamentary capacity] to be considered is at the very time of the execution of the will.’ " In re Milleman's Estate, 415 Pa. 261, 203 A.2d 202, 210 (1964) (quoting In re Hall's Estate, 402 Pa. 212, 166 A.2d 644, 647-48 (1961) ). Although "where mental capacity is at issue, the real question is the condition of the testator at the very time he executed" a document, "evidence of capacity or incapacity for a reasonable time before and after the making of the will is admissible as indicative of capacity or the lack of it on the particular day." Williams, 97 A.2d at 19-20 (emphasis added) (citing Aggas v. Munnell, 302 Pa. 78, 152 A. 840, 843 (1930) ; In re Higbee's Estate, 365 Pa. 381, 75 A.2d 599, 601 (1950) ).
In her motion to dismiss, Brandi argues (without citation to legal authority) that the facts that Dan and Senta assert to show Zelenski's testamentary incapacity did not occur within a reasonable time before or after he made the beneficiary change at issue. Brandi further contends (also without citation to legal authority) that—to the extent Dan and Senta do assert facts that occurred reasonably close to the time of the beneficiary change—such facts are simply not sufficient to show testamentary incapacity. Upon review of the Amended Crossclaim, the Court does not agree.
For instance, although Dan and Senta plead that their father had a history of psychological issues beginning at least two years before he made the beneficiary change at issue in this case (including a week-long psychiatric admission in March 2016), the Court notes that they also specifically allege that they noticed a rapid deterioration in his condition starting in July 2017 and accelerating in September 2017. (Docket No. 40, at ¶¶ 27, 31, 54). They further allege that, during this time, Zelenski became obsessed with a false belief that he was dying of cancer, and that he called them at odd hours at which point they tried to convince him that he was not, in fact, dying of cancer. (Id. at ¶¶ 54, 55). Dan and Senta also contend that in September and October of 2017, Zelenski became more withdrawn and obsessed with the idea that he was going to die, and that he failed to respond to their texts and calls (which was unusual for him) and failed to call Senta on her birthday on October 28th (which had never happened before). (Id. at ¶ 34).
Additionally, Dan and Senta allege that on November 1, 2017 (about two weeks after the beneficiary change had been made), their father presented to a medical center reporting a loss of appetite and increased depression over the previous two months. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36). They also assert that Zelenski was seen at that medical center again on November 20, 2017 because of worsening depression and feeling like he was going to die. (Id. at ¶ 37). Dan and Senta state that their father then underwent a second psychiatric admission on November 27, 2017, just over a month after he had made the beneficiary change. (Id. at ¶ 36). They assert that Zelenski's admission information notes that, "Patient's...
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