Pruden v. 1J4GL58KX3W534613, MN License: KJK 096

• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Ross, Judge
• Decision Date: 18 May 2015
• Docket Number: A14-1313
• Citation: Pruden v. One 2003 Jeep, A14-1313 (Minn. App. May 18, 2015)
• Parties: Michael Thomas Pruden, et al., Appellants, v. One 2003 Jeep, VIN: 1J4GL58KX3W534613, MN License: KJK 096, Respondent.

Michael Thomas Pruden, et al., Appellants, v. One 2003 Jeep, VIN: 1J4GL58KX3W534613, MN License: KJK 096, Respondent.

A14-1313

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

May 18, 2015

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

Affirmed

Ross, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CV-13-17252

Max A. Keller, Lexie D. Stein, Keller Law Offices, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Joel Heiligman, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Paul D. Baertschi, Stephen M. Tallen, Tallen and Baertschi, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

ROSS, Judge

Michael Pruden drove while intoxicated after having been convicted of the same crime two years earlier. Pruden's parents, who owned the car he was driving, fought toprevent the arresting agency from taking the car by forfeiture. They based their challenge on the "innocent owner" defense available under Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63, subdivision 7(d) (2014). The district court found that Pruden's parents failed to demonstrate that they lacked constructive knowledge that Pruden would drive while intoxicated. We affirm because the evidence supports that finding.

FACTS

Michael Pruden spent an August 2013 late evening at a bar drinking before he drove away in his parents' 2003 Jeep Liberty. Pruden was quite intoxicated. Medina Police stopped and arrested him and determined from a breath test that he had an alcohol concentration of .26—more than three times the per se intoxication limit. The state charged Pruden with gross misdemeanor impaired driving, and he pleaded guilty. The City of Medina seized the Jeep.

Although Bradley Pruden and Beth Kielty-Pruden own the Jeep, they permitted their son Michael Pruden to be its primary driver. They let Michael drive the Jeep despite knowing that in October 2011 he was convicted of driving the Jeep drunk. And both parents knew that Michael had driven home in the Jeep intoxicated more than once after the 2011 conviction. They attempted to convince him only through conversation that driving while impaired "was probably not the best approach for his life in general," but they put no restrictions on his use of the Jeep and they did not even monitor his use of it. They did not know where Michael was or what he was doing the night of his August 2013 arrest.

After the city seized the Jeep and commenced a statutory forfeiture procedure, the parents demanded its return based on the commonly called "innocent owner" affirmative defense. The district court found that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that they lacked constructive knowledge that the Jeep would be used unlawfully. It also found that they did not establish that they took reasonable steps to prevent Michael from using the car. The district court ordered the Jeep forfeited to the Medina Police Department. This appeal follows.

DECISION

I

The Prudens argue that the district court misinterpreted the affirmative defense to forfeiture set out in Minnesota Statutes section 169A.63, subdivision 7(d). They contend that they need not prove that they lacked constructive knowledge that Michael Pruden would use their car unlawfully and that the burden of proof rests instead on the state. Although they did not raise this burden-of-proof argument in the district court, we will address it in the interest of justice. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04.

The Prudens' challenge raises an issue of statutory interpretation. We interpret statutes de novo. Nielsen v. 2003 Honda Accord, 845 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 2013). And we interpret a statute according to its plain language when the language is unambiguous. Patino v. One 2007 Chevrolet, 821 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Minn. 2012). The burden assignment in the forfeiture statute is unambiguous. A vehicle is "presumed subject to forfeiture" if the state proves that it was used to commit certain offenses, including Michael's impaired-driving offense. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.63, subds. 7(a),9(e) (2014). A statutory affirmative defense prevents forfeiture "if [the vehicle's] owner can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the owner did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used or operated in any manner contrary to law." Id., subd. 7(d). Another provision explains, "A claimant bears the burden of proving any affirmative defense raised." Id., subd. 9(e). The statute is clear. It explicitly places the burden of proof on the unaware owner who seeks to prevent forfeiture.

We are not persuaded otherwise by the Prudens' contention that requiring owners to prove the affirmative defense renders the second sentence of the statutory defense meaningless. That sentence states, "If the offender is a family or household member of the owner and has three or more prior impaired driving convictions, the owner is presumed to know of any vehicle use by the offender that is contrary to law." Id., subd. 7(d). Because the burden-placement subdivision is unambiguous, we need not undertake the exercise of construing the statute based on the Prudens' theory that the plain-language interpretation makes one of its provisions superfluous. Even so, the argument is unavailing because one can read the two relevant sentences of 7(d) giving full effect to both. Each sentence covers different ground than the other. That is, the first sentence informs us that the "owner" is the party who must "demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" that he or she "did not have actual or constructive knowledge that the vehicle would be used or operated in any manner contrary to law," while the next informs us that, in addition to being harnessed with the burden to prove that the offender would not use the car illegally, in specific circumstances the owner will in fact be "presumed to know"that the offender used the car unlawfully. The provisions are complementary and neither renders the other meaningless.

II

The Prudens argue that, as a matter of fact, the record proves their lack of constructive knowledge of their son's unlawful use and that their innocent-owner defense therefore prevails. We will reverse a district court's fact findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Rife v. One 1987 Chevrolet Cavalier, 485 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. June 30, 1992). The findings are not clearly erroneous. The district court found that the parents knew that Michael was previously convicted of impaired driving, that they took no measure to restrict or even monitor his driving, that Kielty-Pruden knew that Michael had driven...