Prudential Cas. Co. v. Curry

• Decision Date: 09 June 1914
• Docket Number: 656
• Citation: 10 Ala.App. 642,65 So. 852
• Parties: PRUDENTIAL CASUALTY CO. v. CURRY.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

65 So. 852

10 Ala.App. 642

PRUDENTIAL CASUALTY CO. v. CURRY.

No. 656

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 9, 1914

Appeal from City Court of Birmingham; H.A. Sharpe, Judge.

Action by Beatrice Curry against the Prudential Casualty Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered for defendant.

David S. Anderson, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Gaston & Drennen, of Birmingham, for appellee.

PELHAM J.

The appellee, being the beneficiary under a policy of accident insurance issued by the appellant to one Jesse McElreath insuring him against death from bodily injuries sustained through "external, violent, and accidental means," brought suit in the trial court to recover of the appellant on the policy. The case was tried before the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment against appellant holding it liable under the terms of the policy.

The evidence was without conflict, and the case was submitted to the court on an agreed written statement of facts. It was shown by this agreed statement of facts that on a certain occasion one Tom Teague in traveling along the public road going home from his place of work passed in front of the home of the insured, Jesse McElreath; that Teague at the time carried in his hands, in plain view, a rifle gun he had just purchased and was taking home. When Teague came in view of McElreath, who was at his home, the latter procured a Winchester rifle from his house, and as Teague in going along the road was passing the house, McElreath stepped out on his front porch and presented his rifle at Teague, having the rifle at the time "cocked and ready to shoot Teague." When thus presenting the rifle in shooting distance, cocked and ready to shoot, McElreath accosted Teague and wanted to know "what in hell he had to do with some women, or words of like character and meaning"; whereupon Teague raised the rifle gun he was carrying and shot McElreath dead, the cocked gun presented at Teague by McElreath falling from McElreath's hands to the ground, where it was picked up and discharged in an attempt to uncock it by the person picking it up.

But one question is presented for our consideration on this appeal and that is: Did the insured, McElreath, under the circumstances shown by the undisputed evidence, the substance of which we have set out, meet his death through "external, violent, and accidental means," within the meaning of that clause of the policy of insurance? In other words, was the violent death which McElreath met at the hands of his slayer, Teague, accidental in the sense used as to McElreath, the insured party?

What constitutes an "accident" within the meaning of an accident insurance policy has been the subject of much discussion by textbook writers, and the courts, both federal and state, have expended much learning, often drawing copiously upon the understanding and skill of expression of lexicographers, in attaching the proper significance and meaning to the word "accidental" in stating a fixed general rule of law on the subject, and attempting to fit it to a concrete case in hand; some of the judges even considering (but not adopting) the meaning of the word as employed in insurance contracts with respect to scholastic philosophy, in which sense nothing is accidental. The Supreme Court of this state has, however approvingly quoted the general definition given in 1 Am. & Eng.Ency.Law (1st Ed.) p. 87, as follows:

"An accident, in its application to insurance policies, has been defined as an injury which happens by reason of some violence, casualty, or vis major to the assured, without his design or consent or voluntary co-operation." Equitable Accident Ins. Co. v. Osborn, Adm'r, 90 Ala. 201, 206, 9 So. 869, 13 L.R.A. 267.

In the second addition of this work (Am. & Eng.Ency.Law), accident in this connection is defined thus:

"An accident, according to the generally received meaning of the term, is defined as the happening of an event without the aid and design of a person, and which is unforeseen, and in this sense the word is to be understood, in the absence of plain, unequivocal exceptions and provisions, in a policy insuring against injury or death caused by accidental means." Volume 1, pp. 291, 292.

As said in Western Com. Trav. Ass'n v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405, 29 C.C.A. 223, 227 (40 L.R.A. 653):

"The significance of this word 'accidental' is best perceived by a consideration of the relation of causes to their effects. The word is descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences. The natural consequences of means used are the consequences which ordinarily follow from their use--the results which may be reasonably anticipated from their use, and which ought to be expected. The probable consequence of the use of given means is the consequence which is more likely to follow from their use than it is to fail to follow. An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by accidental means. It is either the result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence of his deeds."

It is difficult, if not quite impossible, to define the term "accident" as used in a policy of this nature, so as to draw with perfect accuracy a boundary line applicable to all cases between injury or death from accident and from other or different causes, and we shall not attempt to state a definition of universal application. But, as applied to the facts in the instant case, where the conduct of the injured party was voluntary and not characterized by any act of negligence, and where no element of negligence or carelessness can properly enter into the...