Pruess v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Writing for the Court: JOHN F. ROBBENHAAR U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
• Decision Date: 16 March 2022
• Docket Number: Civ. 19-629 DHU/JFR
• Citation: Pruess v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc., Civ. 19-629 DHU/JFR (D. N.M. Mar 16, 2022)
• Parties: DANIA PRUESS, MARY BATEMAN, LINDA VARGAS MARTINEZ, AND DAVID GALLEGOS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. PRESBYTERIAN HEALTH PLAN, INC., and FLUENT HEALTH LLC, Defendants.

DANIA PRUESS, MARY BATEMAN, LINDA VARGAS MARTINEZ, AND DAVID GALLEGOS on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,
v.
PRESBYTERIAN HEALTH PLAN, INC., and FLUENT HEALTH LLC, Defendants.

Civ. No. 19-629 DHU/JFR

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

March 16, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING ATTORNEY FEE AWARD

JOHN F. ROBBENHAAR U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court regarding its recent decision granting Plaintiff's motion to compel and order for costs. See Doc. 138. Plaintiffs have submitted their petition for fees and the matter is fully briefed. Docs. 140, 149, 154. Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees is granted in part. The Court will award $35, 531.33 in attorney's fees.

BACKGROUND

In its recent decision, the Court found that Defendants' withholding of discoverable material, which prompted Plaintiffs to file their motion to compel, was sufficiently culpable to warrant the awarding of costs to Plaintiffs. Doc. 138. In their petition for fees, Plaintiffs explain that they served written discovery on Defendants in April 2021, which was answered by Defendants in early July. The parties then engaged in various communications concerning the

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alleged discovery deficiencies.^[1] The parties appeared before the Court on September 30, 2021 for an informal discovery dispute conference, which led to some agreement on document production, but Plaintiffs explain that Defendants still failed to produce many of the documents prior to the deadline to file the motion to compel. Id. at 2. Plaintiffs then filed their motion to compel, which came before the Court for hearing on January 6, 2022. This Court issued its order on January 12, 2022, granting in part Plaintiffs' motion to compel and authorized the imposition of fees against Defendants. Doc. 138.

Plaintiffs attach to their petition the billing records of three attorneys, which records demonstrate that Plaintiffs have expended “more than 169 hours attempting to resolve the discovery disputes with Defendants and briefing the motion to compel.” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs explain that they have reduced the hours to 97.5, reflecting time expended by two of the three attorneys: Ms. Arendt and Mr. Hedgpeth. Additionally, Plaintiffs explain that they have discounted or eliminated various categories of billed time: time spent trying to obtain emails and other ESI; time spent scheduling and noticing depositions; time spent addressing related deficiencies in Defendants' production; time spent preparing the petition; and time expended by other attorneys and paralegals. Id. at 4-6. Finally, Plaintiffs seek hourly rates of $450/hr for Ms. Arendt and of $600/hr for Mr. Hedgpeth and cite to other cases where courts have found their rates reasonable. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs attach Declarations of attorneys Arendt, Hedgpeth and Seigel, along with detailed timekeeping records of work expended on this matter. Docs. 140-1; 140-2; 140-3.^[2]

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Defendants object to Plaintiffs' petition, claiming that the fees requested are unreasonable, excessive and duplicative since Plaintiffs simply prepared a 12-page motion and a 12-page reply. Doc. 149 at 1; 5-10. Defendants object to Plaintiffs' attorneys' duplicative billing, i.e. billing separately for the same task, id. at 6-7, as well as to non-specific “block billing” which fails to specify whether work being done related to the motion to compel or to general discovery. Id. at 7. Defendants object to fees associated with “time spent performing work that would have been required whether [or not] the motion to compel was filed, such as time spent reviewing supplemental disclosures and document productions.” Id. at 8 (citing Lynn Decl.). Defendants object to fees incurred in the meet and confer process, id. at 9, as the “vast majority of the discovery issues on which the parties met and conferred were resolved and were not included in the motion to compel.” Id. at 9 (citing Lynn Decl.).

Defendants further state that the hourly rates requested are not reasonable in this jurisdiction, and point to other cases from the District of New Mexico where hourly rates far less than those requested by Plaintiffs' attorneys were approved. Id. at 2-5. Defendants claim that the subject of the litigation is not so unusual that only out-of-state counsel would be qualified. Id. at 3. Defendants state that reduced fees are appropriate because their objections were substantially justified, some of their objections were sustained, and the scope of the relief granted was narrower than originally sought. Id. at 10-21 (discovery responses justified based on limited evidentiary value of information sought, the “incredibly burdensome process” to produce the time-stamp data, delays caused by the pandemic and Defendants' primary obligation to provide healthcare services, delays caused by the sheer quantity of materials sought and produced, misrepresentation of the ESI dispute by Plaintiffs to the extent that the matter was not “ripe” in

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October 2021). Defendants request that the Court award “no more than $5, 000 for preparing their motion to compel.” Id. at 1.

By way of their reply, Plaintiffs submit that Defendants' response is a veiled attempt to seek reconsideration, and therefore is beyond the scope of the briefing and should be disregarded. Doc. 154 at 2-4. Plaintiffs state that a document-intensive, hybrid class-collective action case requires far more collaboration among attorneys than most cases, id. at 4-5, that counsel's rates are reasonable, and that the level of specialization and expertise required is such that local counsel doesn't meet that requirement. Id. at 5-8. Plaintiffs claim few other attorneys in the country possess their level of expertise and experience in hybrid class-collective wage and hour cases. Id. at 8.

LEGAL STANDARDS REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES

This Court has discretion to determine the amount of a fee award. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). “To determine the reasonableness of a fee request, a court must begin by calculating the so-called ‘lodestar amount' of a fee, and a claimant is entitled to the presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a ‘reasonable' fee.” Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1281 (10^th Cir. 1998). The lodestar is “ ‘the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,' which produces a presumptively reasonable fee that may in rare circumstances be adjusted to account for the presence of special circumstances.” Anchondo v. Anderson, Crenshaw & Assoc., LLC, 616 F.3d 1098, 1102 (10^th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, and Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 543-44 (2010)). “The party requesting attorney fees bears the burden of proving” the two components used to calculate the fee award: (i) “the amount of hours spent on the case”; and (ii) “the appropriate hourly rates.” United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1233 (10^th Cir. 2000).

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Once the Court makes these two determinations, “claimant is entitled to the presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a ‘reasonable' fee.” City of Edmond, 160 F.3d at 1281.

“To determine what constitutes a reasonable rate, the district court considers the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” New Mexico v. Valley Meat Co., LLC, 2015 WL 9703255, at *23 (D.N.M. Dec. 14, 2015)(quoting Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1224-25 (10^th Cir. 2006)). The party entitled to fees must provide the district court with sufficient information to evaluate prevailing market rates. See Lippoldt, 468 F.3d at 1225. Moreover, the party must also demonstrate that the rates are similar to rates for similar services by “lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation” in the relevant community and for similar work. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). See Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 157 F.3d 1243, 1255-56 (10^th Cir. 1998). Courts may also consider their own knowledge of market rates. See Lippoldt, 468 F.3d at 1225.

Additionally, the party seeking fees “should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. There is no precise rule or formula for a court's adjustment of the lodestar; rather, courts have discretion in making this equitable judgment. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. The court may adjust the lodestar figure to reflect various factors, including the degree of success obtained, the significance of the legal issues involved, and the public interest advanced by the litigation. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 503, 120-22 (1992); also see General Protecht Grp., Inc. v. Leviton Manufacturing Co., 122 F.Supp.3d 1114, 1135 (D.N.M. 2015)(“A district court may also make adjustments to the lodestar figure to reflect a plaintiff's overall success level.”). In awarding fees, the district court should “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for [a] fee award.” Hensley , 461 U.S. at 438.

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ANALYSIS

Defendants' raises three primary objections: (1) Plaintiffs seek fees for work that was unreasonable, excessive and/or duplicative; (2) Plaintiffs' hourly rates are not reasonable in this jurisdiction; and (3) Defendants' objections and the non-disclosure of certain documents were substantially justified, some of Defendants' objections were sustained, and the scope of the relief that was granted was narrower than what was initially sought. Doc. 149 at 1. The Court will address these arguments in order.^[3]

1. WHETHER THE WORK PERFORMED AND BILLED BY PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL WAS EXCESSIVE, DUPLICATIVE OR UNREASONABLE

Plaintiffs have limited their fee request to time spent by attorneys Arendt and Hedgpeth, specifically related to the written discovery request that ultimately resulted in Plaintiff's motion to compel. These two...