Pruett v. Norris, Civil No. PB-C-88-195.
| Decision Date | 24 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. PB-C-88-195. |
| Citation | 959 F.Supp. 1066 |
| Parties | Marion Albert PRUETT, Petitioner, v. Larry NORRIS, Director Arkansas Department of Correction, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Rosalie B. Shields, New York City, Thomas M. Lahiff, Jr., New York City, Timothy O. Dudley, Little Rock, AR, for Petitioner.
Pamela Rumpz, Darnisa C. Evans-Johnson, Arkansas Attorney General's Office, Little Rock, AR, for Respondent.
On September 9, 1982, a jury found Marion Albert Pruett ("Pruett") guilty of capital murder of Bobbie Robertson, and sentenced him to death by electrocution. Pruett appealed his sentence to the Arkansas Supreme Court, raising twenty-one separate points. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in Pruett v. State, 282 Ark. 304, 669 S.W.2d 186 (1984). The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari on October 29, 1984. Pruett v. Arkansas, 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 362, 83 L.Ed.2d 298 (1984).
Pruett sought post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. The petition was denied in Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985).
Pruett then filed an application in the alternative for a writ pursuant to the All Writs Statute or for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, contending that his extradition from Mississippi to Arkansas violated his constitutional rights and seeking an order vacating a proclamation by the Governor of Arkansas setting an execution date for Pruett of April 7, 1988. On application of Pruett, the Court entered an Order staying the execution.
Pruett subsequently amended his petition for writ of habeas corpus to assert constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence in Arkansas.1
On October 12, 1981, the Convenience Corner in Fort Smith, Arkansas, was robbed. Bobbie Jean Robertson, an employee of the store, was abducted and fatally shot. On October 17, 1981, Pruett was arrested for unrelated offenses in Texas. He was subsequently taken as a federal prisoner to Mississippi where he stood trial in state court for the murder of a bank teller and received the death penalty. While in custody in Mississippi, Pruett held a press conference in which he implicated himself in several crimes and referred to himself as "mad dog killer." In addition, while in custody in Mississippi, Pruett made an inculpatory statement relevant to the instant case to Detective Larry Hammond of the Fort Smith Police Department.
Pruett was charged by Information on June 14, 1982, with capital murder, and entered a plea of not guilty. Trial began on August 30, 1982.
Pruett has raised sixteen grounds for relief. In addition, Pruett challenges the constitutionality of his extradition from Mississippi. The Court will discuss each of the grounds raised by Pruett in the order he has presented them in his second amended petition.2
Pruett alleges that juror Richard Earl Allured was mentally incompetent at the time he served on the jury. The State contends that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Pruett did not properly raise it in state court.
Pruett raised this ground in his Rule 37 petition. The Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
Since the issue of Allured's mental competence in 1982 could have been questioned at trial or in a motion for new trial, petitioner has the additional burden of showing that Allured's presence on the jury resulted in a deprivation of some constitutional right so fundamental as to void judgment of conviction....
Even in cases where counsel filed a timely motion for new trial, a post-verdict allegation of juror incompetence will not result in setting aside the judgment unless the defendant produces substantial evidence of incompetence at the time of trial, such as an adjudication of insanity made shortly before or after the trial.
Pruett v. State, 287 Ark. 124, 130, 697 S.W.2d 872 (1985).
In its Order of July 14, 1993, the Court found this claim not to be barred, and that the Court could address it. Pruett's claim, however, is foreclosed by the ruling in Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). There, the Supreme Court found that testimony concerning the juror's mental or physical incompetence is an "internal matter" which is prohibited by Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Furthermore, even assuming that "Rule 606(b) is interpreted to retain the common-law exception allowing postverdict inquiry of juror incompetence in cases of `substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency,'" Pruett has failed to make such a showing. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125, 107 S.Ct. at 2750. The evidence submitted reflects, at the most, that almost two years after the trial, Allured was admitted to the hospital for psychiatric problems. According to medical records introduced at the evidentiary hearing, Allured was diagnosed on June 18, 1984, at St. Edward Mercy Medical Center with acute paranoid disorder and passive dependent personality traits. (E.H. Exhibit 3).3 Prior to his commitment in 1984, Allured did not have a previous documented history of psychiatric problems and treatment. According to Allured's employment records at the time of trial, Allured was gainfully employed and even working overtime. (E.H.162-166).
In sum, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that Allured was incompetent at the time of the trial.
Pruett contends that because of the pretrial media coverage in his case he should have been granted a second change of venue.
Before addressing the evidence regarding the change of venue issue in this action, the Court would call to mind the concept that has been the cornerstone of this nation's system of justice that mandates that all persons accused of crimes are entitled to a fair trial, the innocent as well as the not so innocent. The concept was well expressed in an early case rendered by a state court in Tennison v. State, 79 Miss. 708, 31 So. 421 (1902):
A change of venue, in substance as opposed to form, is one mode that our justice system affords an accused for vindication of this right. Recognizing that the change of venue decision is committed to the trial judge's sound discretion, not his unfettered discretion, the trial judge has an obligation to require more than simply the mere selection of twelve jurors who may survive a challenge for cause. In order to meet this obligation objectively and guard against not only the slightest taint or indication of bias or unfairness, but even against the appearance of unfairness, the trial judge must be informed by evidence during the venue hearing of the impact of the saturation media publicity upon the attitudes of the relevant community. Indeed, if an unbiased jury is not impaneled, it does not matter how fair the remainder of the proceeding may be. More importantly, whatever interest the State of Arkansas may have in proceeding in the county where the offense was committed or the initial transfer of a proceeding, it is, indeed, subordinate to the vested right of an accused to an impartial jury.4
In Cockrell v. Dobbs, 238 Ark. 348, 381 S.W.2d 756 (1964), the Arkansas Supreme Court further emphasized the State's subordinate interest in determining where a criminal proceeding is to be conducted, when a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial is in jeopardy, by ordering the trial judge to conduct a hearing on defendant's motion for a change of venue where the trial judge denied defendant's request for a hearing on the grounds that he could not grant any relief even if the motion had merit because Garland County was the only county in the Judicial District. The Supreme Court made the following significant observation in rejecting the trial court's narrow construction of Section 10 of Article 2 of the Arkansas Constitution:
As late as 1983, the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed this guide or rule of law in making the following observation in the case of Anderson v. State, 278 Ark. 171, 644...
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Pruett v. Norris
...proceedings that extended over a period of some nine years, the district court granted Pruett's habeas petition. See Pruett v. Norris, 959 F.Supp. 1066, 1092 (E.D.Ark.1997). The court vacated Pruett's conviction and sentence and ordered the State to release him or retry him within 120 days.......