Pruitt v. Cote, Case No. 6:12-cv-1038-Orl-28GJK
| Decision Date | 30 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 6:12-cv-1038-Orl-28GJK |
| Parties | STEVEN R. PRUITT, Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS COTE, DAVID MONTFORT, and THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Steven R. Pruitt brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two City of Orlando police officers, Douglas Cote and David Montfort, alleging that the officers unlawfully arrested him and used excessive force against him in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.1 Pruitt also brings claims of failure to protect and, against Cote only, state law claims of battery and false arrest.
The case is now before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 48 & 49) filed by Defendants.2 Having considered the parties' submissions and arguments, the Court concludes that both motions must be granted.
In the early evening of March 11, 2012, twenty-seven-year-old Pruitt and a female friend, Jasmine Shipley,3 drove to downtown Orlando. After parking Shipley's car on the fourth floor of a parking garage on Central Avenue at 7:30 or 8:00 p.m., they visited several bars. Including a beer consumed before arriving downtown, Pruitt and Shipley each had six or seven drinks over the course of the evening. (Pruitt Dep. at 58-59; Shipley Dep. at 24). It is undisputed that Shipley became quite intoxicated, and the last bar the two visited refused to serve her any more alcohol. (Pruitt Dep. at 64; Shipley Dep. at 22, 26, 27).
At around 10:45, Pruitt and Shipley made their way back to the parking garage. They took the elevator to the fourth floor, and when they arrived there Shipley's tube-top dress was pulled down, exposing her black strapless bra.4 (Pruitt Dep. at 68-69). Shipley does not recall how her dress became pulled down, (Shipley Dep. at 30-31); Pruitt testified in his deposition that Shipley, whom he described as "a silly drunk," pulled it down while they were in the elevator, (Pruitt Dep. at 63, 67-68).
When they reached Shipley's car, Shipley—still with the top of her dress down—lay down on the floor of the parking garage behind the car. (Id. at 67, 72, 76). About fifteen seconds after Shipley lay down, and as Pruitt was urging her to get up, three Orlando Police Department bicycle officers—Defendants Cote and Montfort and non-Defendant OfficerAdkins—rode up the garage ramp on patrol and encountered Shipley lying there, with Pruitt next to her. (Id. at 72, 76). Pruitt claims that he was standing next to Shipley holding her arm trying to help her up; the officers assert that Pruitt was on the ground hovering over Shipley, "rubbing her chest bone." (Id. at 76, 81; Montfort Dep. at 10, 23; Cote Dep. at 11).5 Once Shipley saw the police officers, she stood up. (Pruitt Dep. at 78).
Concerned that Shipley was being assaulted or battered by Pruitt, the officers asked what was going on and told Pruitt to move to the side, separating him from Shipley. (Id. at 83-84; Cote Dep. at 50; Montfort Dep. at 34; Shipley Dep. at 37). Officer Adkins went to get one of the parking garage security guards, and he did not witness or have any involvement in the remaining events. (Cote Dep. at 30; Montfort Dep. at 14). According to Cote, Shipley was "very irate and hostile," and the officers were not able to maintain a dialogue with her or obtain any useful information from her. (Cote Dep. at 13-14; Montfort Dep. at 14).
As the officers were attempting to communicate with Shipley, Montfort told Pruitt to sit down, and Pruitt complied. (Pruitt Dep. at 86; Montfort Dep. at 16). After sitting for three or four minutes, however, Pruitt stood up and told the officers his back was hurting and that he could not sit on the ground. (Pruitt Dep. at 86-88; Cote Dep. at 51; Montfort Dep. at 18). Montfort told Pruitt to sit back down, but Pruitt told him he could not sit because he had a bad back. (Pruitt Dep. at 88; Cote Dep. at 16). Montfort told Pruitt two or three times to sit back down, and when Pruitt did not comply Montfort and Cote approached Pruitt and pinnedhim up against a car. (Pruitt Dep. at 89). Cote and Montfort began to arrest Pruitt6; one officer grabbed Pruitt's right wrist and the other grabbed his left. (Id. at 90; Cote Dep. at 19).
According to Cote, Pruitt tensed up and pulled away, (Cote Dep. at 20), and Pruitt agrees that he may have tensed up and may have pulled his wrist back, though he denies "pulling away," which he says was not possible because he was pinned up against the car, (Pruitt Dep. at 90-91). With Pruitt up against the car, Cote then hit Pruitt on the upper left thigh three times with his baton. (Id. at 92-93, 95; Cote Dep. at 23). According to Cote, Cote was not holding Pruitt when he hit him, but Montfort still was. (Cote Dep. at 26). One of Cote's swings missed Pruitt's leg and hit Montfort on the inside of the knee.7 (Pruitt Dep. at 92; Montfort Dep. at 29; Cote Dep. at 23-24).
The "next thing [Pruitt] kn[e]w," Cote shot him in the neck with his taser. (Pruitt Dep. at 95). These events happened in a rapid sequence. (Id.). Cote did not say anything before using the taser. (Id. at 95-96). After being hit with the taser, Pruitt fell to the ground. (Id.). The officers then handcuffed Pruitt, arrested him for resisting without violence, and took him to jail. (Id. at 96-97). Montfort went to a hospital due to swelling, an abrasion, and bruising on his leg from being struck by Cote's baton. (Cote Dep. at 35; Montfort Dep. at 29). Pruitt's face was scratched in the fall, and he also suffered a cut on his knee; both ofthese injuries healed without scarring. (Pruitt Dep. at 113-14). He also had minor bleeding from the taser prongs. (Cote Dep. at 35). Pruitt also claims to have suffered a permanent lower back injury from the incident.8 (Pruitt Dep. at 117).
Pruitt filed this lawsuit on July 6, 2012. (Doc. 1). In the Third Amended Complaint, Pruitt alleges eight counts: claims of Fourth Amendment violations against Montfort (Count I) and Cote (Count II); claims of due process and equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment against Montfort (Count III) and Cote (Count IV); claims of failure to protect against Montfort (Count V) and Cote (Count VI); and state law claims of battery (Count VII) and false arrest (Count VIII) against Cote only. Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). However, when faced with a "properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more thanmere allegations." Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 131 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir. 1997).
Summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Summary judgment may be granted if the non-moving party's evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative." Sawyer v. Southwest Airlines Co., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986)).
"[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Essentially, the inquiry is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Sawyer, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1263 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).
In Counts III and IV, Pruitt alleges that Montfort and Cote, respectively, violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Pruitt does not elaborate on the basis for these claims, nor has he responded to Defendants' arguments that they fail as a matter of law.9 Pruitt's claims of unlawful arrest and excessive force ariseunder the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable seizures—made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment—not under the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (). Pruitt has alleged claims of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment in Counts I and II. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Counts III and IV.
On Pruitt's Fourth Amendment claims, Defendants assert entitlement to the defense of qualified immunity, which "protects municipal officers from liability in § 1983 actions as long 'as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "To receive qualified immunity, the officer must first show that he acted within his discretionary authority." Id. In the case at bar, the officers were acting within their discretionary authority, and thus Pruitt has the burden of showing...
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