Pruitt v. Wilson
| Decision Date | 02 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. 3:09cv380RLM |
| Parties | TOM R. PRUITT, Petitioner, v. BILL WILSON, SUPERINTENDENT Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
An Indiana jury convicted Tom Pruitt of murdering a deputy sheriff and the judge sentenced Mr. Pruitt to death. In this habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Mr. Pruitt brings a number of claims in which he contends that the state of Indiana violated his constitutional rights in connection with its prosecution and imposition of the death penalty. The court heard oral argument on the petition on September 14, 2012. The court thanks attorneys Marie Donnelly and Laurence Komp, who agreed to represent Mr. Pruitt on this petition, for their excellent briefs and argument. Deputy Attorneys General Stephen Creason and James Martin provided equally proficient and professional representation to the State of Indiana.
Most of this petition focuses on the following: the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for mentally retarded individuals. The Indiana courts found that Mr. Pruitt was not mentally retarded, and have ordered his execution. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies Mr. Pruitt's petition. Mr. Pruittcontends that whether due to constitutionally insufficient performance by his attorneys in the Indiana courts, or unreasonable fact-finding or application of the law in the Indiana courts, the finding that he is not mentally retarded cannot stand. Under any view, Mr. Pruitt is borderline — either a high functioning mentally retarded individual, or an individual with very low average intelligence. The Indiana courts faced the challenge of deciding where Mr. Pruitt fits on that imprecise continuum. As explained more fully in the following opinion, this record supports no finding that the Indiana courts acted unreasonably in making that decision, or that Mr. Pruitt's attorneys provided anything short of effective assistance as the Indiana courts made that decision. Accordingly, the court denies Mr. Pruitt's petition.
Mr. Pruitt's erratic driving on June 14, 2001 caught Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Starnes's attention. Deputy Starnes, who was accompanied by his college-aged son, was on routine patrol. Deputy Starnes observed increasingly erratic driving as he followed Mr. Pruitt for some distance. When Mr. Pruitt eventually stopped, Deputy Starnes pulled in behind him, turned on his flashing lights, and got Mr. Pruitt's license and registration. Deputy Starnes called in the information and learned that a recent robbery report suggested that Mr. Pruitt might have stolen weapons with him. Deputy Starnes started back to Mr. Pruitt'scar. Mr. Pruitt came out firing. Deputy Starnes fired back. Deputy Starnes was shot five times; Mr. Pruitt was shot seven times. Deputy Starnes was flown to Methodist Hospital and underwent surgery.
The next day, the state charged Mr. Pruitt with two counts of attempted murder (Mr. Pruitt had fired shots at the deputy's son, too), possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, two counts of possession of a handgun without a license, resisting law enforcement, and three counts of receiving stolen property.
An infection set in after Deputy Starnes was removed from intensive care, and he died 26 days after the shooting. The state amended the attempted murder count that day to charge Mr. Pruitt with murder, and added another count of receiving stolen property. About a month and half later, the state requested the death penalty because Deputy Starnes had been a law enforcement officer engaged in his duties. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(b)(6).
Dearborn County Circuit Judge James D. Humphrey appointed William Van Der Pol, Jr. and Douglas Garner to represent Mr. Pruitt at trial. Mr. Pruitt moved to preclude the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), contending he suffered from mental retardation. At the hearing on the motion, Mr. Pruitt's expert witnesses — clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist Dr. Bryan Hudson and professor of psychology Dr. Charles Golden — testified that Mr. Pruitt was mentally retarded based on IQ tests and assessments of adaptive functioning. Mr. Pruitt presented non-expert testimony and records about how hisdevelopmental disability had affected his ability to function. The trial court's appointed expert, Dr. George Schmedlen, testified that Mr. Pruitt wasn't mentally retarded, citing evidence that included IQ tests, achievement tests, an assessment of his adaptive function and ability to hold jobs and perform various tasks. Dr. Schmedlen testified that certain IQ scores for Mr. Pruitt obtained after Mr. Pruitt's arrest for Deputy Starnes's murder were invalid as the result of malingering. The state's expert, Dr. Martin Groff, agreed that Mr. Pruitt wasn't mentally retarded. Judge Humphrey found that Mr. Pruitt wasn't mentally retarded and denied Mr. Pruitt's motion. (PC App. 848).1
At trial, Mr. Pruitt didn't dispute having shot Deputy Starnes. The defense centered on cause of death, arguing that the deputy died from a severe sepsis infection rather than the gunshots. At Mr. Pruitt's request, Judge Humphrey instructed the jury on aggravated battery as a lesser included offense of murder. The jury found Mr. Pruitt guilty of the murder of Deputy Starnes, aggravated battery, the attempted murder of Deputy Starnes's son, the unlicensed possession of a firearm, resisting law enforcement, and four counts of receiving stolen property.
At the penalty phase, the defense presented evidence of Mr. Pruitt's background and mental retardation. Drs. Hudson and Golden testified that Mr. Pruitt is mentally retarded. Dr. Golden also reported that in January 1996, federalBureau of Prisons doctors had diagnosed Mr. Pruitt with schizotypal personality disorder and that in August 2001, an Indiana Department of Corrections psychologist had diagnosed and treated Mr. Pruitt for schizophrenia. Dr. Golden diagnosed Mr. Pruitt as suffering from schizotypal personality disorder (a personality disorder with no psychotic symptoms present).
Over Mr. Pruitt's objection, Judge Humphrey instructed the jury about the governor's power to grant a reprieve, commutation, or pardon to a person convicted and sentenced for murder. Judge Humphrey declined two instructions Mr. Pruitt requested: an instruction that the jury must decide whether the only aggravating circumstance charged outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and an instruction that the jury must decide on Mr. Pruitt's mental retardation before it could make a finding on the death penalty, citing Ring v. Arizona, supra, and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
The jury found the state had proven the charged aggravating circumstances — that Mr. Pruitt killed a law enforcement officer in the course of his duties — found that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and recommended a death sentence. Judge Humphrey sentenced Mr. Pruitt to death for the murder and to an aggregate term of 115 years for the other counts.
Teresa Harper and trial counsel William Van Der Pol represented Mr. Pruitt on his direct appeal and argued (among other things) that: (1) the death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because Mr. Pruitt is mentally retarded; (2) the exclusion of defense witness Michelle Calderone violated Mr. Pruitt's constitutional right to present a defense; (3) Judge Humphrey erred when he admitted gruesome photographs; (4) instructing the jury as to the possibility of executive clemency violated Mr. Pruitt's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and, (5) under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the jury should have been required to find that aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Pruitt's convictions and death sentence over Justice Rucker's dissent.2 Pruitt v. State, 834 N.E.2d 90 (Ind. 2005) ("Pruitt I"). Justice Dickson wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Shepard joined.
Mr. Pruitt petitioned the Dearborn Circuit Court for post-conviction relief. Judge Humphrey held an evidentiary hearing and then denied both the petition for post-conviction relief and Mr. Pruitt's ensuing motion to correct errors. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, again over Justice Rucker's dissent. State v. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2009), rehearing denied (June 16, 2009) ("Pruitt II").
Mr. Pruitt petitions this court for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He raises eight arguments (after abandoning a ninth3 during briefing): (1) The Eighth Amendment bars his execution because he is mentally retarded; (2) his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate adequately and present readily available evidence of his mental retardation at the pre-trial mental retardation hearing and at the trial's penalty phase; (3) Judge Humphrey's exclusion of a witness during the guilt phase violated Mr. Pruitt's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense; (4) an improper jury instruction about the possibility of a pardon or commutation violated Mr. Pruitt's rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) Mr. Pruitt's trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate competently and present readily available mitigating evidence at the trial's penalty phase; (6) Mr. Pruitt's trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and present readily available evidence in support of a verdict of guilty but mentally ill; (7) Mr. Pruitt's trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct in jury argument and appellate counsel's failure to raise such issues during petitioner's direct appeal resulted in a violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (8) Mr. Pruitt's death sentence...
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