Pruner v. Lovejoy, 3570
Decision Date | 28 May 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 3570,3570 |
Citation | 314 S.W.2d 651 |
Parties | J. E. PRUNER et al., Appellants, v. Eiland LOVEJOY, Administrator, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ernest May, Fort Worth, Walter M. Hilliard, Caldwell, for appellants.
T. R. Mears, Byron L. McClellan, Gatesville, for appellees.
This case is an appeal of a partition in probate. Parties will be referred to as in the Trial Court. Petitioners are Eiland Lovejoy, Administrator of the Estate of Mrs. L. B. Brown, deceased, Mrs. Edna Ruth Lovejoy (who is the wife of Eiland Lovejoy), Mrs. Countice Honeycutt and husband, and Mrs. Louise Schwalbe and husband. Respondents are Jim Ed Pruner and Mrs. Lucile Denman. Mrs. Lovejoy, Mrs. Honeycutt, Jim Ed Pruner and Mrs. Denman are children of Mrs. L. B. Brown, deceased, and Mrs. Schwalbe is the only heir of a deceased danghter of Mrs. Brown. They constitute all of the heirs at law of the deceased. Petitioner Lovejoy became administrator of the estate of Mrs. L. B. Brown, deceased, who died intestate, as the result of an agreement of all of the deceased's heirs at law. He filed application for partition of the estate on 6 February 1957, alleged that all debts had been paid, and prayed that certain sums of money received by Jim Ed Pruner and Mrs. Denman be charged against them as advancements and that they be required to account for same in the partition.
Respondents Pruner and Mrs. Denman answered, denying that the amounts received by them during their mother's lifetime were advancements, and alleged that same were absolute gifts and should not be charged against their distributive share in their mother's estate.
Trial was to the court without a jury, which found that the estate was fully administered; that Pruner had received $4,616 from his mother during her lifetime; that Mrs. Denman had received $3,500 from her mother during her lifetime; that such amounts were advancements and that respondents must account for same in the partition.
Respondents appeal contending:
1) The testimony of administrator Lovejoy was violative of Article 3716, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. (the Dead Man's Statute).
2) That the testimony of administrator Lovejoy was hearsay of his intestate, and as such inadmissible.
3) That the advancements to Pruner and Mrs. Denman were not proved.
The only issue to be determined in this case is whether the moneys received by Mr. Pruner and Mrs. Denman from their mother during her lifetime were advancements or whether same were outright gifts. It is undisputed in the evidence that respondents received the alleged amounts by checks, from their mother during her lifetime.
Section 44 of the Texas Probate Code, Vol. 17A, V.A.T.S., which went into effect on January 1, 1956, provides:
'* * * Every gratuitous inter vivos transfer is deemed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless proved to be an advancement. * * *'
Prior to the effective date of the Probate Code the rule was substantially the same; i. e., that a party asserting that transfers made prior to the death of a party were an advancement has the burden of proving such fact. Rutherford v. Deaver, Tex.Com.App., 235 S.W. 853, opinion adopted Sup.Ct.; Bailey v. Bailey, Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 189, W/E Refused.
Petitioners have duly plead that the amounts received by respondents were advancements. Their proof consisted of the testimony of Eiland Lovejoy, the administrator of the estate, and husband of one of the petitioners. He testified:
The foregoing constitutes all of the proof tendered by petitioners to sustain their pleading and contention that the $4,616 in checks (in evidence) payable to Jim Ed Pruner or in his behalf, and the $3,500 in checks in evidence payable to Mrs. Lucile Denman or in her behalf were advancements rather than gifts. As noted, the burden of proof was upon petitioners. The foregoing testimony was objected to on the ground that it was being offered by the administrator as to a transaction with or statement by the intestate, in violation of Article 3716.
Respondents' first contention in this court is that such evidence was inadmissible as violative of Article 3716. Petitioners alleged that the estate was fully administered and prayed for partition. Respondents by answer admitted that such was the case, and the Trial Court in its judgment found that the estate was fully administered except for partition. If the estate has been fully administered the executor would be a mere nominal party and no judgment could be rendered which would affect him in such capacity. Pugh v. Turner, 145 Tex. 292, 197 S.W.2d 822, 172 A.L.R. 707. Likewise, the witness had no interest in the estate as the husband of Mrs. Edna Ruth Lovejoy. Lehmann v. Krahl, 155 Tex. 270, 285 S.W.2d 179. Under the foregoing authorities, administrator Lovejoy could neither profit nor lose by any judgment that might...
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