Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. IP 95-211-C-T/G.,IP 95-211-C-T/G.
• Citation: 927 F. Supp. 1140
• Parties: Vincent L. PRYNER, Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, v. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

927 F. Supp. 1140

Vincent L. PRYNER, Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, v. TRACTOR SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff.

No. IP 95-211-C-T/G.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

May 28, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Bobby Allen Potters, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Charles W. Pautsch, Wessels & Pautsch, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant.

Entry Regarding Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, In the Alternative, to Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration

TINDER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court upon Defendant Tractor Supply Company's ("TSC") motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. The court, having considered the motion and the submissions of the parties, finds that the Defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the remainder of the Plaintiff's claims or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings pending arbitration should be DENIED for the reasons set forth below.

I. Background Facts and Procedural History

The Plaintiff, Vincent L. Pryner ("Pryner"), was employed by TSC at its warehouse facility in Indianapolis, Indiana from September 13, 1985 until his termination on February 22, 1996. Following a sixty-day probationary period at the beginning of his employment, the terms and conditions of Pryner's employment have been governed by a succession of collective-bargaining agreements ("CBA") between TSC and Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 135 (the "Union"). Details of Pryner's early work history were not provided, but there were no indications of any problems until Pryner's allegations that he had been subjected to a racially-hostile work environment since January 1992.

The CBA relevant to the period at issue in the case at bar contains a "Grievance and Arbitration Procedure" for the resolution of any disputes "involving interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement." (Def.'s Ex. 3 at 14.) Said procedure provides for a three step grievance adjustment process followed by arbitration which is "final and binding on both parties." (Id. at 16.) The CBA also contains the following "miscellaneous" provisions relevant to the instant inquiry:

Section 2 — No Discrimination

The Company agrees that it will not discriminate against any associate for employment for or on account of his affiliation or activities with the Union. The Company and Union agree not to discriminate against any individual with respect to hiring, compensation, terms or conditions of employment because of an individual's race, color, religion, age, sex, or national origin. Nor will the Company limit, segregate or classify associates in any way to deprive any individual associate of employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, age, sex, veteran or national origin.

Section 3 — The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)

Due to the Americans with Disabilities Act or the regulations promulgated thereunder, the Company may be required to make a reasonable accommodation to the disability of an applicant or incumbent associate that may be in conflict with provisions of this Agreement. In such event, the Company shall be privileged to make such accommodation notwithstanding the requirements of this Agreement. The Company shall notify the Union thereafter as soon as is practicable of such situation on a confidential basis.

(Id. at 25.)

On February 17, 1995, Pryner filed the instant complaint against TSC, which was amended with leave of the court on July 12, 1995. Count I of the amended complaint alleges that TSC discharged Pryner from his employment on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Count II alleges that Pryner was discharged from his employment on the basis of his disability in violation of the ADA; and Count III alleges that TSC retaliated against Pryner for having filed a complaint of discrimination, also in violation of Title VII.¹ In its answer, TSC counterclaimed that Pryner and James A. Motley, another TSC employee, conspired to deprive various TSC employees of the equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).

On April 4, 1994, the Defendant moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a stay of the instant action pending arbitration of the Plaintiff's complaints, on the ground that the mandatory arbitration provisions of the CBA divest this court of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. The matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for adjudication.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The Seventh Circuit stated the standard for summary judgment in Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.1987).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) provides that a district court shall grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When the facts are disputed, the parties must produce proper documentary evidence to support their contentions, and may not rest on mere allegations in the pleadings, Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 105 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 392, 78 L.Ed.2d 336 (1983), or upon conclusory statements in affidavits. First Commodity Traders v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.1985). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Matsushita Elecs. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356-57, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).... The mere existence of a factual dispute will not bar summary judgment unless "the disputed fact is outcome determinative under governing law." Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 296 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, 104 S.Ct. 284, 78 L.Ed.2d 262 (1983).

Id. at 642.

The Supreme Court further clarified the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In Celotex, the Court held that the initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate "with or without affidavits" the absence of genuine issues of material fact and that, absent such material facts, judgment should be granted as a matter of law in the moving party's favor. 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53. Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and designate specific facts to support or defend each element of the claim, demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assocs., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). Not every factual dispute creates a barrier to summary judgment, "only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

III. Discussion

The crux of the Defendant's argument is that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), requires a finding that Pryner's sole remedy in this proceeding is the arbitration to which he agreed in the CBA. In support of this argument, the Defendant points to the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.1996).

In addressing this issue, the court must begin with the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). In Gardner-Denver, the plaintiff, an African-American union member employed pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, claimed that his discharge by the defendant was the result of racial discrimination. The plaintiff initially filed a grievance under the broad arbitration provisions of his collective-bargaining agreement. Prior to the arbitration hearing, the plaintiff filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred the complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Id. at 38-42, 94 S.Ct. at 1015-17.

The arbitrator ruled that the plaintiff had been "discharged for just cause." Thereafter, the EEOC determined that no reasonable cause existed to support a finding that any violation of Title VII had occurred and issued the plaintiff a right to sue letter. The plaintiff subsequently filed an action in federal court alleging that his discharge had resulted from a racially-discriminatory employment practice in violation of Title VII. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 42-43, 94 S.Ct. at 1016-17.

The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. "The court found that the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to the plaintiff. It then held that the plaintiff, having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement, was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded from suing his employer under Title VII." Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43, 94 S.Ct. at 1017. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. Id.

In reversing, the Supreme Court noted that the grievance procedure in the collective-bargaining agreement was intended to vindicate the plaintiff's contractual rights, while Title VII created an independent statutory right to be free from racial...