Przywieczerski v. Blinken
| Decision Date | 10 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 20-02098 (KM) (JBC) |
| Parties | DARIUSZ PRZYWIECZERSKI, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY BLINKEN, Secretary of State; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary of Homeland Security; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; TRACY RENAUD, Acting Director of United States Citizenship & Immigration Services; and UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Dariusz Przywieczerski1 is a Polish citizen and lawful permanent resident ("LPR") of the United States. He was extradited to Poland, where he is or was serving a prison sentence. As a result, he fears that his LPR status is no longer valid, so he seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against federal agencies and their heads (the "Government") to preserve his LPR status and permit his eventual reentry. The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). (DE 13.) Mr. Przywieczerski opposed and moved to amend his First Complaint. (DE 27.)2 Forthe following reasons, I will treat the motion to amend (DE 27) as a motion to supplement the original complaint, and that motion is GRANTED. Despite the supplemental allegations, the motion to dismiss (DE 13) is GRANTED.
Mr. Przywieczerski is a Polish citizen who has been an LPR of the United States since 2001. (1st Compl. ¶ 2.) In September 2018, he was extradited to Poland. (Id. ¶ 7.) His term of imprisonment in Poland was then set to end on April 28, 2021, and his "alien registration card" (which the pleading does not more precisely define) expired on May 12, 2021. (Id. ¶ 8.)
He filed the First Complaint in February 2020 seeking, via the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706, (1) a declaratory judgment that he remains an LPR, and (2) an injunction ordering the Government to provide him appropriate documentation to permit his return to the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.)3 The Government moved to dismiss, arguing that the First Complaint was too threadbare and that any claims were not ripe. (Mot. to Dismiss.) In its motion, the Government explained the legal proceduresthat Mr. Przywieczerski could invoke for reentry under 8 C.F.R. § 211.1 (discussed further, infra). (Id. at 6-7.)
Mr. Przywieczerski opposed the motion and concurrently moved to amend his First Complaint in May 2021. (DE 28, 27.) His Second Complaint did four things: (1) updated the government defendants with the current officeholders, (2) provided documents relating to his extradition process, (3) alleged that, because of subsequent developments, his term of imprisonment will not end in April but in October 2021, and (4) alleged that the Government "take[s] the position" that he "lost" his LPR status based on its interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 211.1. ( The Government opposed the motion to amend, arguing that the additional allegations do not cure the deficiencies identified in the motion to dismiss. (DE 13-1.)
First, some housekeeping. Currently pending are a motion to dismiss and a motion to amend. The Government asks that I grant the motion to dismiss and then deny the motion to amend on grounds of futility. See generally Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010) ().
Looking beyond the labels, I perceive that Mr. Przywieczerski has in substance presented not a motion to amend but a motion to supplement his already existing claims with recent factual developments. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides for amending pleadings and "enable[s] a party to assert matters that were overlooked or were unknown" when the party filed the first complaint. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Rule 15(d), by contrast, provides for supplementing pleadings, id., and "[a] supplemental pleading adds post-complaint events tothe operative pleading and does not supersede it," Korb v. Haystings, --- F. App'x ----, ----, No. 19-2826, 2021 WL 2328220, at *2 n.5 (3d Cir. June 8, 2021).
Such supplementation may allow a plaintiff to add newly arisen facts that, e.g., cure jurisdictional defects. Id.; see also Garrett, 938 F.3d at 82. For example, a plaintiff may assert post-complaint facts that show that his alleged injury is no longer speculative, thus giving him standing or presenting the court with a now-ripe controversy. U.S. ex rel. Gadbois v. PharMerica Corp., 809 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2015); Crimson Galeria Ltd. P'ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20, 34-35 (D. Mass. 2018); Newark Branch, NAACP v. Millburn Township, Civ. No. 89-4219, 1990 WL 238747, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 27, 1990). In such a case, the usual rule that courts assess jurisdiction at the time of initial filing, see Gadbois, 809 F.3d at 5, gives way to a preference to decide cases on full facts. The alternative, i.e., dismissing the complaint with the full knowledge that the plaintiff will immediately seek to amend, may simply be inefficient and wasteful. Id.; see T-Mobile Ne. LLC v. City of Wilmington, 913 F.3d 311, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2019) ().
The Second Complaint's pertinent additional allegations relate to post-complaint events: the modification of Mr. Przywieczerski's prison term and an incorporation of the Government's arguments in its motion to dismiss.4 As such, I should treat his motion to amend as a motion to supplement. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 81 n.17 (); Korb, 2021 WL 2328220, at *3 ().
A motion to supplement should be granted "[o]n motion and reasonable notice" if the court finds "just terms." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The Government responded to the motion, albeit under the related motion-to-amend standard, so there was notice and it suffers no prejudice from this recharacterization. There are "just terms" because granting the motion will allow me to consider whether the additional allegations cure jurisdictional defects. See Korb, 2021 WL 2328220, at *2 n.5. Accordingly, the motion to amend is construed as a motion to supplement and granted. I take up the motion to dismiss in light of the allegations of the First Complaint, plus the supplemental allegations of the Second Complaint. See id. ().
The Government moves to dismiss on the ground that this case is not ripe. (Mot. to Dismiss at 7-9.)5
"Article III of the Constitution limits the federal judiciary's authority to exercise its judicial Power' to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.'" Plains All Am. Pipeline L.P. v. Cook, 866 F.3d 534, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). One component of a case or controversy is that a real dispute has sufficiently developed between two parties and is not premature; this is called ripeness. Id. at 539. To determine whether claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are ripe, I consider, among other things, "the adversity of the parties' interests." Id. at 539-40 (citation omitted).6
On the first prong, parties' interests are adverse when there is a "substantial threat of real harm" absent declaratory or injunctive relief. Id. at 541 (citation omitted). But if the threatened harm is dependent on uncertain contingencies, then the case is not ripe. Id. Relatedly, in cases where the harm would be at the hands of an agency, the Third Circuit has considered "whether the agency action is final; whether the issue presented for decision is one of law which requires no additional factual development; and whether further administrative action is needed to clarify the agency's position." Nextel Commc'ns of Mid-Atl., Inc. v. City of Margate, 305 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (challenge to decisions of a zoning board); see also Felmeister v. Off. of Att'y Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1988) ().7
Here, there has been no action or threatened action by the Government that could harm Mr. Przywieczerski. He has not been denied entry. He cannot even attempt to enter the United States for the next few months, as he will remain imprisoned until October. Nor has the Government affirmatively revoked his LPR status or stated that it will do so. There are no allegations that he has interacted with the Government at all.
At most, he contends that the Government's "position" in this litigation represents its adjudication of his LPR status. (2d Compl. ¶ 11; Opp. at 4, 6.) But the Government's explanation of the applicable statutory framework in abrief is not equivalent to a final adjudication of Mr. Przywieczerski's legal rights. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (); Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2011) (); Querim v. EEOC, 111 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (), aff'd, 9 F. App'x 35 (2d Cir. 200...
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