PTI Royston, LLC v. Eubanks
Citation | 861 S.E.2d 115,360 Ga.App. 263 |
Decision Date | 28 June 2021 |
Docket Number | A21A0182 |
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Parties | PTI ROYSTON, LLC v. EUBANKS et al. |
Eric Todd Hawkins, David C. Marshall, Atlanta, Caroline M. Tinsley, Charissa N. Walker, Michael James Ruttinger, for Appellant.
Roy E. Barnes, John Raymond Bevis, Robert David Cheeley, Julia Ann Merritt, Benjamin Robert Rosichan, Marietta, for Appellee.
This interlocutory appeal raises the question of whether the general tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2) bars strict liability claims brought under the Asbestos Claims and Silica Claims Act, OCGA § 51-14-1 et seq. ("the Act"). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that it does. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's ruling, and remand the case to the trial court to consider whether there was any fraud that would preclude PTI from raising the statute of repose defense.
When considering a motion to dismiss, we construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve any doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga. v. Brooks , 324 Ga. App. 15, 15-16, 749 S.E.2d 23 (2013). "When a question of law is at issue, such as whether the statute of [repose] bars an action, we owe no deference to the trial court's ruling and apply the plain legal error standard of review." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Brooks , 354 Ga. App. 78, 79, 840 S.E.2d 156 (2020).
So viewed, the facts as set forth in the complaint are as follows: Shirley Eubanks used Johnson & Johnson baby powder containing talc daily from 1963 until 2016. In 2016, she was diagnosed with an aggressive form of ovarian cancer
, which she contends is due to the asbestos found in talc powder. Three years later, Eubanks and her husband ("the Plaintiffs") sued Johnson & Johnson ("J&J") and PTI Royston, LLC ("PTI"), a company that has manufactured talc for J&J since 2005,1 alleging three counts of strict liability based on the failure to warn, a design defect, and a manufacturing defect.2
PTI moved to dismiss the strict liability counts on the ground that the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the ten-year tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2). It is undisputed that PTI's first sale of the talc was in 2005, more than ten years before Eubanks learned of her cancer diagnosis
and filed suit.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the limitation provision in the Act, as codified in OCGA § 51-14-5, barred the application of the general tort statute of repose.3 The trial court granted a certificate of immediate review, and this Court granted PTI's application for interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, PTI argues that the trial court erred in reading the Act's statutory provision as displacing the general tort statute of repose because the plain language of the statute of repose establishes that it applies to all strict liability claims against manufacturers, without exception for asbestos claims. It contends that the trial court's interpretation of OCGA § 51-14-5 frustrates the General Assembly's intent as set forth in the Act itself. PTI further argues that the two statutes should not be read in pari materia under our rules of statutory interpretation, and the Act provides for a statute of limitation, not a statute of repose. PTI also asserts that the trial court erred in finding the specific provision in the Act controlled over the more general statute of repose because the provisions in these two statutes do not conflict. Finally, it argues that Plaintiffs’ accusation of fraud does not bar it from raising the statute of repose as a defense.
(Emphasis supplied.)
At issue here is the interplay between this limitation provision in the Act, OCGA § 51-14-5, and the general tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), which provides that "[n]o action shall be commenced [related to manufacturer liability] with respect to an injury after ten years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption of the personal property causing or otherwise bringing about the injury."
PTI argues that the strict liability claims are barred by the general tort statute of repose in OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (2), which applies to all strict liability claims, whereas the language in OCGA § 51-14-5 provides only a statute of limitation.6 Applying our rules of statutory construction, and given the ordinary meaning of the language in both statutes, and the purposes set forth in the Act itself, we agree.
Amazing Amusements Group v. Wilson , 353 Ga. App. 256, 257-258, 835 S.E.2d 781 (2019) ; see also Deal v. Coleman , 294 Ga. 170, 172-173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013). "But when the language of a statute or regulation is not obvious on its face, we should employ other tools of construction to interpret it and resolve its meaning." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Premier Health Care Investments v. UHS of Anchor , 310 Ga. 32, 39 (3) (b), 849 S.E.2d 441 (2020). Those rules require that "we give due weight and meaning to all of the words of the statute, and we are not authorized to disregard any of the words of the statute in question unless the failure to do so would lead to an absurdity manifestly not intended by the legislature." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Ga. Lottery Corp. v. Sumner , 242 Ga. App. 758, 760 (2), 529 S.E.2d 925 (2000). In addition, "[l]anguage in one part of the statute must be construed in light of the legislature's intent as found in the whole statute." Echols v. Thomas , 265 Ga. 474, 475, 458 S.E.2d 100 (1995) ; Fielder v. Johnson , 333 Ga. App. 658, 661, 773 S.E.2d 831 (2015) () (citation and punctuation omitted).
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