Public Service Electric and Gas Company v. City of Camden

• Decision Date: 05 May 1937
• Citation: Public Service Electric and Gas Company v. City of Camden, 192 A. 222, 118 N.J.L. 245 (N.J. 1937)
• Docket Number: 223
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
• Parties: PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY, PROSECUTOR, v. CITY OF CAMDEN ET AL., DEFENDANTS

192 A. 222

118 N.J.Law 245

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS CO.

v. CITY OF CAMDEN et al.

No. 223.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

May 5, 1937.

[Copyrighted material omitted.]

Certiorari by the Public Service Electric & Gas Company against the City of Cam-den and others, to review a resolution of the Board of Commissioners of Camden, and a referendum held pursuant thereto.

Resolution and referendum vacated.

See also, 13 N.J.Misc. 774, 181 A. 43.

Argued January term, 1936, before TRENCHARD, HEHER, and PERSKIE, JJ.

William H. Speer, of Newark, for prosecutor.E. G. C. Bleakly, of Camden, for defendants.

HEHER, Justice.

In the exercise of the authority bestowed by article 33 of chapter 152 of the Laws of 1917(Pamph. L., pp. 319, 442, [Comp.St. Supp.1924, § *136—3301 et seq.]), the board of commissioners of the City of Camden, at a meeting held on October 3, 1935, adopted, on its own initiative, a resolution providing for the submission to popular vote at the ensuing general election of the question of whether the defendant municipality should construct "a municipal electric light, heat and power plant for the purpose of supplying light, heat and power for the public and private uses of such municipality and its inhabitants," to be erected upon lands within its corporate limits, at "the approximate cost of (but not to exceed) * * * $10,000,000."

Thereupon the prosecutor sued out this certiorari.The allocatur was so conditioned as not to interfere with the submission of the proposal to the municipal electorate, as in the resolution provided.The referendum was had accordingly, and the question was resolved in the affirmative.A previous submission—with like result— of the same general proposition, pursuant to a petition filed by voters of the municipality under section 3 of article 33 of the act of 1917, supra(Comp.St.Supp.1924, § *136—3303), was set aside by this court upon the ground that the petition was not signed by the requisite number of voters, qualified by registration as well as otherwise, and the subsequent proceedings were therefore not supported by a basic statutory requirement.Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. City of Camden, 180 A. 778, 13 N.J.Misc. 693.

The prosecutor now urges that, for certain basic and procedural reasons, the instant resolution is "null and void," and that it and the ensuing referendum should therefore be vacated.

First.Certiorari is plainly an appropriate remedy at this stage of the proceedings.State (Hoxsey) v. City of Paterson, 39 N. J.Law, 489;State (Danforth) v. City of Paterson, 34 N.J.Law, 163;State (Gregory) v. Jersey City, 34 N.J.Law, 390.

Second.It is said that the cited article of the statute confers "powers * * * upon municipalities in their proprietary or private character, as distinguished from their governmental or public character," and that this purpose is not expressed in the title of the act, in compliance with the mandate of article 4, section 7, paragraph 4, of the State Constitution, providing that "every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."

We do not share the doubt on this point voiced obiter by Mr. Justice Bergen in the case of Board of Trade of Newark, v. Newark, 97 N.J.Law, 52, 116 A. 172, affirmed98 N.J.Law, 555, 119 A. 924.We deem the provision to be free of this asserted constitutional vice.

The statute is entitled, "An act concerning municipalities."It is popularly known by the descriptive term "Home Rule Act"(Comp.St.Supps. § *136—101 et seq.); and its general title is plainly embracive of the subject-matter of article 33(Comp. St.Supp.1924, § *136—3301 et seq.).The inquiry is whether it is also expressive of its object.We think it is.

The title of a statute gives expression to its object, in the constitutional sense, "if it contain a mention of the subject-matter generally, together with a succinct indication of the proposed legislation respecting it."Mortland v. Christian, 52 N.J.Law, 521, 537, 20 A. 673, 674.The "object" of a law is not to be confused with its "product" It is not requisite that the title be an abstract or synopsis of the contents of the statute.Quigley v. Lehigh ValleyR. Co., 80 'N.J.Law, 486, 491, 79 A. 458;Bonicwsky v. Polish Home of Lodi, 103 N.J.Law, 323, 136 A. 741;Stagway v. Riker, 84 N.J.Law, 201, 86 A. 440;Gottuso v. Baker, 80 N.J.Law, 520, 77 A. 1038;Rader v. Union Township, 39 N.J.Law, 509;Fernetti v. West Jersey & Seashore R. Co., 87 N.J.Law, 268, 93 A. 576.The title is a label not an index.Moore v. Burdett, 62 N.J.Law, 163, 40 A. 631.In that case, Mr. Justice Garrison aptly said: "Every law is an exhibition of legislative activity directed to a particular end.This purposive direction implies the kind of activity put forth, and the choice of the field for its display, but not the particulars of the purpose, or the means selected for its accomplishment.The former is the object of the law, the latter is its product.The object of every law, by force of the constitution, must be single, and be expressed in the title of the law.The product may be as diverse as the object requires, and finds its expression in the terms of the enactment only."See, also, Thompson v. Bader, 102 N.J. Law, 227, 131 A. 902.

If the "leading" or general subject of a staute is fairly expressed in the title, the constitutional requirement is met.Boniewsky v. Polish Home of Lodi, supra;Bumsted v. Govern, 47 N.J.Law, 368, 373, 1 A. 835, affirmedGovern v. Bumstead, 48 N.J.Law, 612, 9 A. 577;Ringer v. Paterson, 98 N.J.Law, 455, 120 A. 24, 25;Anderson v. Camden, 58 N.J.Law, 515, 518, 33 A. 846.;Quigley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., supra;State ex rel. Walter v. Town of Union, 33 N.J.Law, 350;Van Riper v. North Plainfield, 43 N.J.Law, 349; McCran, Attorney-General, v. Ocean Grove, 96 N.J.Law, 158, 114 A. 15;Hetrick v. Roberts, 117 N.J.Law, 584, 190 A. 504, 505;Moore v. Burdett, supra.The function of the title is to "give notice of the effect of the legislation to one conversant with the existing state of the law"; and its validity "is not to be determined by nice distinctions of etymology or definition of words, but by the facts of the case and the history of the legislation.Language which at one time may be quite inadequate to warn the public of the object of legislation may at another, owing to custom or usage, be entirely sufficient."Sawter v. Shoenthal, 83 N.J.Law, 499, 83 A. 1004, 1005.See. also, State v. Twining, 73 N.J.Law, 3, 62 A. 402, affirmed73 N.J.Law, 683, 64 A. 1073, 1135;Moore v. Burdett, supra.As was said by Chief Justice Gummere, in Ringer v. Paterson, supra, "the mere fact that the object of the legislation might have been expressed more specifically in its title affords no ground for declaring it void, so long as that title fairly points out the general purpose sought to be accomplished thereby.The constitutional requirement is complied with when the title fairly indicates the general object of the statute, although it does not declare the means or methods of attaining that object."

Where the subject of legislation is single, and is of a general character, all matters reasonably connected therewith, and appropriate to the achievement of the legislative object, may be embraced therein without infringing the constitutional interdict; and, by the same token, matters cognate to that object are not required to be expressly mentioned in the title.The title comprehends, within the signification of this constitutional provision, all matters embodied in the statute germane to the subject of the title, and not excluded thereby.Boorum v. Connelly, 66 N.J.Law, 197, 48 A. 955, 959, 88 Am.St.Rep. 469;Warner v. Hoagland, 51 N.J.Law, 62, 73, 16 A. 166;Ringer v. Paterson, supra;McMahon v. Riker, 92 N.J.Law, 1, 104 A. 289, affirmed92 N.J.Law, 637, 106 A. 892.As observed by Chief Justice Depue, in Boorum v. Connelly, supra, "the courts give paramount consideration to the general object of the act."That being ascertained, "the legislature may include in it provisions of multiform character, designed to carry into execution the legislative purpose, which are not inconsistent with, or foreign to, the general object of the act."See, also, Easton & Amboy Railroad Co. v. Central Railroad Co. of N. J., 52 N.J.Law, 267, 19 A. 722.If the ultimate purpose is clearly implied in the expression of the immediate object of the legislation, the title is sufficient.Sawter v. Shoenthal, supra.

The general test of constitutional sufficiency in this respect is whether the titular expression of the object of the statute is misleading.Michaelson v. Wall Township, 92 N.J.Law, 72, 108 A. 145;Johnson v. Asbury Park, 60 N.J.Law, 427, 428, 39 A. 693; Grey, Attorney-General, v. Newark Plank Road Co., 65 N.J.Law, 51, 46 A. 606;Falkner v. Dorland, 54 N.J. Law, 409, 24 A. 403;State v. Steelman, 66 N.J.Law, 518, 49 A. 978;Stagway v. Riker, supra;Rader v. Union Township, supra.In Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N.J.Law, 58, Chief Justice Beasley thus described the constitutional design: "The purpose of the constitution in this requirement is to prevent frauds upon legislation by means of false and deceptive titles to statutes."The criterion is "whether the title of the act is such that by it members of the legislature are informed of the subject to which the act relates, and the public notified of the kind of legislation that is being considered."Grover v. Trustees of Ocean Grove Camp-Meeting Ass'n, 45 N.J.Law, 399, 404.See, also, Schmalz v. Wooley, 57 N.J.Eq. 303, 41 A. 939, 43 L.R.A. 86, 73 Am.St.Rep. 637.Mere generality or comprehensiveness of title will not render the statute ineffectual; if the title is not uncertain or misleading, or made a cover for incongruous or unconnected subjects of legislation, it is sufficient.59 C.J. 808, 809.

And it is the settled rule that a statute will not be judicially declared inoperative and unenforceable on this ground...