Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Lopez

Decision Date09 June 1988
Docket Number71618,Nos. 70968,s. 70968
Parties13 Fla. L. Weekly 377 PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE COUNTY, Petitioner, v. Jorge LOPEZ, Respondent. In re The ESTATE OF Helen V. TAYLOR, Deceased. Mary Helen HINES and Cynthia Whidden, as personal representatives of the Estate of Helen V. Taylor, Deceased, Petitioners, v. GESSLER CLINIC, P.A., and Winter Haven Hospital, Respondents.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Atty., and Shepard J. Nevel, Asst. County Atty., Miami, for Public Health Trust of Dade County.

John W. Frost, II and Hank B. Campbell of Frost & Purcell, P.A., Bartow, and Andrew P. Trakas of Andrew P. Trakas, P.A. Winter Haven, for Mary Helen Hines and Cynthia Whidden.

Gerald Forman of Gerald Forman, P.A., Miami, for Jorge Lopez.

Rex P. Cowan of Kalogridis & Cowan, Winter Haven, for Gessler Clinic, P.A., and Winter Haven Hosp.

BARKETT, Justice.

We review the conflicting decisions of Lopez v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 509 So.2d 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), and In re Estate of Taylor, 516 So.2d 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). In so doing, we answer in the affirmative the following question posed in Lopez :

Whether article X, section 4 of the Constitution of Florida, as amended, serves to exempt a decedent's homestead property from forced sale for the benefit of the decedent's creditors, where the decedent is not survived by a dependent spouse or children? 1

We have jurisdiction. Art. V, §§ 3(b)(3) and (4), Fla. Const.

The principal facts are not in dispute. In Lopez, the decedent homeowner, Nereida Lopez, at the time of her death, was residing in the home with her three adult children. The decedent's personal representatives petitioned the probate court to have the property set aside as homestead under article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution. 2 The petition was opposed by Public Health Trust, to whom the decedent was indebted. The trial court denied the petition based upon its finding that the decedent's heirs, her three adult children, were not dependent on her at the time of her death.

Similarly, in Hines, the homeowner, Helen Taylor, at the time of her death, was single and residing in the home she had acquired from her divorced husband. She died intestate, survived by four adult, nondependent children who lived elsewhere. Here, too, the probate court denied the personal representatives' petition to have the home set aside as exempt from the decedent's creditors, Gessler Clinic and Winter Haven Hospital.

On appeal, the Third District reversed in Lopez, concluding that the homestead exemption inures to the benefit of the decedent's heirs whether or not the heirs were dependent on the decedent. Conversely, in Hines, the Second District affirmed the lower court, holding that the residence of a single person who is not survived by a spouse or dependent family members is not exempt from the decedent's creditors.

On this appeal, Public Health Trust, Gessler Clinic, and Winter Haven Hospital ("creditors") argue that article X, section 4(b), extending the homestead exemption to the "surviving spouse or heirs of the owner," must be construed to apply only to minor or dependent heirs. To support this interpretation, the creditors assert that under prior case law, 3 Florida's homestead exemption was not available to adult heirs of a decedent unless the heirs had been dependent on the decedent. They point to the history of the 1985 amendment as evidence that the legislature never intended to eliminate this requirement. The creditors also argue that a literal interpretation of section 4(b) would provide a windfall for financially independent heirs at the expense of the decedent's creditors, distorting the historical purpose of homestead laws to protect dependents in need of shelter.

In addition, Public Health Trust questions whether the amended provision protects the homes of all single persons and suggests that it applies only to those single persons who are surviving widows or divorced parents.

The personal representatives, on the other hand, argue that the language of the homestead exemption is clear and unambiguous; that the cases relied upon by the creditors are inapposite; and that the precise question presented already has been answered in their favor in Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29, 7 So. 140 (1890); Scull v. Beatty, 27 Fla. 426, 9 So. 4 (1891); and Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin, 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492 (1939).

For the reasons advanced by the personal representatives, we reject the creditors' position. For over a century, Florida has by constitutional provision made the homeplace exempt from the claims of creditors. See Baker v. State, 17 Fla. 406 (1879) (construing homestead provision of the Florida Constitution of 1868). As a matter of public policy, the purpose of the homestead exemption is to promote the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that the homeowner and his or her heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the demands of creditors who have given credit under such law. See Bigelow v. Dunphe, 143 Fla. 603, 197 So. 328 (1940).

Until 1985, the homestead protection was limited to those persons who qualified under the constitutionally designated term "head of a family." See art. X, § 4, Fla. Const. (1983). In 1984, however, the people of Florida approved an amendment changing the term "head of a family" to "a natural person." The amendment thus expanded the class of persons who can take advantage of the homestead provision and its protections.

As an initial matter, we reject Public Health Trust's suggestion that "natural person," when applied to single persons, means only widows and divorced parents. Such an interpretation is contrary to the language, logic and history of the amendment. As Representative Hawkins, who sponsored the amendment in the House of Representatives, explained, the purpose of the revision was "to give protection against forced sale for the homestead of a single person, a divorced person, any person who has a homestead, rather than just a head of a family." House Judiciary Full Committee Meeting, March 29, 1983.

The 1985 amendment thus made the homestead protection available to any natural person. Accordingly, the property and residences in question clearly fit within the definition of "homestead" under section 4(a)(1), as amended.

We turn then to the principal issue before us, the meaning and application of article X, section 4(b). The language of this provision is indeed plain and unambiguous. As the district court in Lopez noted:

The amended section serves to exempt all homestead property from forced sale for the benefit of the decedent's heirs, regardless of whether the decedent was the head of a household prior to his or her death. As such, whether the decedent had dependent heirs at the time of her death is immaterial under the new amendment. Once it was established that the decedent owned and resided in the property at the time of her death, her estate was entitled to have the property set aside as homestead.

509 So.2d at 1286-87 (citations omitted).

As the creditors themselves point out, legislative intent controls construction of statutes in Florida. 4 Moreover, "that intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute [and] ... [t]he plain meaning of the statutory language is the first consideration." St. Petersburg Bank and Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982) (citation omitted). This Court consistently has adhered to the plain meaning rule in applying statutory and constitutional provisions. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984); Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 882 (Fla.1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.1979); State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So.2d 114, 116 (Fla.1954); Wilson v. Crews, 160 Fla. 169, 175, 34 So.2d 114, 118 (1948); City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 171-73, 151 So. 488, 489-90 (1933); Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 798, 78 So. 693, 694 (1918). As we recently explained:

Florida case law contains a plethora of rules and extrinsic aids to guide courts in their efforts to discern legislative intent from ambiguously worded statutes. However, "[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." It has also been accurately stated that courts of this state are "without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power."

Holly, 450 So.2d at 219 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

The constitutional provision at issue is clear, reasonable and logical in its operation. Section 4(b) states, without any qualification, that the benefits "inure to the surviving spouse or heirs of the owner." There are no words suggesting that the heirs or surviving spouse had to have been dependent on the homeowner to enjoy this protection. Consequently, the creditors are not asking us merely to construe or interpret the amendment but rather to graft onto it something that is not there. This we cannot do. We are not permitted to attribute to the legislature an intent beyond that expressed, see Bill Smith, Inc. v. Cox, 166 So.2d 497, 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964), or to speculate about what should have been intended. Tropical Coach Line v. Carter, 121 So.2d 779, 782 (1960). Nor may we insert words or phrases in a constitutional provision, or supply an omission that was not in the minds of the people when the law was enacted. See Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control Dist., 148 So.2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). The legislature, and in this case, the...

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