Public Highway Authority v. Revenig
| Decision Date | 14 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03SA356.,03SA356. |
| Citation | 91 P.3d 1038 |
| Parties | E-470 PUBLIC HIGHWAY AUTHORITY, Petitioner-Appellee v. Steven A. REVENIG, Trustee, Successor Trustee to Stephen A. Hellerstein; and Howard L. Farkas, Respondents-Appellants. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duncan, Ostrander & Dingess, P.C., Robert R. Duncan, Donald M. Ostrander, James Birch, Special Counsel, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellee.
Grimshaw & Harring, P.C., Wayne B. Schroeder, Jody Harper Alderman, Opperman & Schell, P.C., William M. Schell, Julie A. Rech, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents-Appellants.
Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Larry D. Tannenbaum, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State of Colorado.
In this appeal, we review the trial court's decision upholding the constitutionality of a takings compensation statute that requires a trial court to reduce by up to fifty percent an award of compensation for property taken in highway acquisitions by the amount of special benefits to the landowner's remaining property. We affirm.
As part of the E-470 highway project, respondent E-470 Public Highway Authority condemned over seventy acres of the petitioning landowners' 351-acre parcel.1 A commission of landholders found that the value of the property taken was $1,323,691.15 and also found that the petitioners' remaining property, the portion that was not condemned, was specially benefited by $297,000 by virtue of the new highway. When a landowner's property is condemned as part of a highway project, the highway may directly increase the value of the landowner's remaining property through specific improvements such as better access and changes in available uses, which are known as special benefits.
Following the mandate of section 38-1-114(2)(d), 10 C.R.S. (2003), the takings compensation statute, the trial court applied the $297,000 in special benefits determined by the commission by first reducing the amount of damages to the petitioners' remaining property from $100,000 to zero, and then reducing the compensation for the property taken by the $197,000 surplus in special benefits.
We affirm the trial court's holding that section 38-1-114(2)(d) does not violate article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which requires that landowners receive just compensation for property taken or damaged. Article II, section 15, by its terms, entitles a landowner to the value of which he has been deprived. It does not require cash to be paid for property taken or damaged. In construing article II, section 15, this Court has never held that "just compensation" requires payment only in cash. Such a holding would contradict, in principle, over 100 years of precedent affirming special benefits as a form of just compensation when applied to the remaining property.
In 1987, the Colorado General Assembly enacted section 38-1-114(2)(d), which requires a trial court to apply special benefits not only to reduce the amount of damages to the landowner's remaining property but also to reduce the landowner's compensation for the property taken.
The General Assembly may provide the method for calculating just compensation when a landowner's property is taken in a condemnation proceeding provided that the method satisfies the guarantee of our just compensation clause. Before the taking, the landowner owns the entire property, which includes the value of the remaining property and the value of the land taken. After the taking, the landowner possesses the value of the remaining property plus compensation for the land taken, which shall be reduced by the value of any surplus in special benefits to the remaining property according to the mandate of section 38-1-114(2)(d). In sum, the value of the payment received plus the value of the remaining property possessed by the landowner after the taking, enhanced by the special benefits, is equivalent to the value of the landowner's property prior to the taking. Thus, section 38-1-114(2)(d) does not conflict with the just compensation guarantee of our constitution because the landowner receives the value of which he has been deprived. Accordingly, we defer to the General Assembly's method of calculating compensation and hold that this statute is constitutional.
In addition, we hold that the trial court's application of section 38-1-114(2)(d) in this case did not violate article II, section 15. As a result of the taking, the petitioners were owed $1,323,691.15 for the property actually taken and $100,000 for damages to their remaining property, which comes to a total of $1,423,691.15. As compensation, they received a cash payment of $1,126,691.15 and $297,000 in special benefits, for a total of $1,423,691.15 received. Thus, the petitioners received the value of which they had been deprived, as required by article II, section 15 of our constitution.
Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court and return this case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Petitioners Steven A. Revenig, trustee, and Howard L. Farkas owned approximately 351 acres of undeveloped land in Aurora, Colorado. Through condemnation proceedings, respondent E-470 Public Highway Authority ("E-470") subsequently acquired from the petitioners 60.9 acres in fee and 12.6 acres in easements for its highway project.
A commission of landholders then determined the value of the property taken and the effect of the highway project on the remaining property. After a trial, the commissioners assessed the value of the property taken at $1,323,691.15 and the value of special benefits to the remaining property at $297,000. The commissioners had been instructed that special benefits resulting from the E-470 highway project "must result directly in a benefit to the [remaining property] and be particular to it" and that such benefits "are to be measured by the increase, if any, in the reasonable market value of the [remaining property] due to the construction of the E-470 Highway."
The commission's assessments of the value of the property taken and the value of the special benefits were not appealed; however, its assessment of the amount of damages to the remaining property was appealed. After this Court held that the commission's determination of damages to the remaining property was not supported by the evidence and was excessive as a matter of law, Jagow v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo.2002), petitioners accepted a remittitur of $100,000 in damages to the remaining property on remand. The trial court applied the $297,000 in special benefits by reducing the amount of damages to the petitioners' remaining property from $100,000 to zero, leaving a surplus of $197,000 in special benefits. Applying section 38-1-114(2)(d), the trial court then reduced the $1,323,691.15 value of the property taken by the $197,000 surplus in special benefits, leaving petitioners with a total condemnation award of $1,126,691.15.
The petitioners appealed to the court of appeals, where the parties filed a stipulated motion to transfer the case to this Court pursuant to section 13-4-109(1)(a), 5 C.R.S. (2003), because issues of significant public interest were at stake. We accepted jurisdiction of the case to determine whether section 38-1-114(2)(d) violates article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.2
Petitioners argue that section 38-1-114(2)(d), which requires the trial court to reduce a landowner's compensation for property taken by the amount of special benefits to the remaining property, conflicts with the just compensation guarantee of article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution. We disagree.
We review the trial court's assessment of the constitutionality of section 38-1-114(2)(d) de novo. Gen. Motors Corp. v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 59, 67 (Colo. 1999). We begin with the presumption that section 38-1-114(2)(d) is constitutional, and we must uphold the statute unless the petitioners prove it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1021-22 (Colo.2004). Further, we must uphold the constitutionality of a statute unless a "clear and unmistakable" conflict exists between the statute and a provision of the Colorado Constitution. City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000).
The General Assembly may provide the method for calculating just compensation when a landowner's property is taken in a condemnation proceeding provided that the method satisfies the constitutional guarantee of just compensation. Colo. Midland Ry. v. Jones, 29 F. 193, 193 (D.Colo.1886) (); see also Gustavus Adolphus Coll. v. Dep't of Transp., 714 A.2d 802, 803 (Me.1998) (); State Highway Comm'n v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 265 N.C. 35, 143 S.E.2d 87, 92 (1965) (); Kellett v. Fulton County, 215 Ga. 551, 111 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1959) ().
Article II, section 15 provides, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation." Colo. Const....
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