Public Lands Access Ass'n Inc. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 16 January 2008
• Docket Number: No. DA 06-0523.,DA 06-0523.
• Citation: 2008 MT 12,176 P.3d 1005,341 Mont. 111
• Parties: PUBLIC LANDS ACCESS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Roger JONES, and the United States of America Bureau of Reclamation, Defendants and. Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

176 P.3d 1005

2008 MT 12

341 Mont. 111

PUBLIC LANDS ACCESS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Roger JONES, and the United States of America Bureau of Reclamation, Defendants and. Appellees.

No. DA 06-0523.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs May 16, 2007.

Decided January 16, 2008.

For Appellant: J. Devlan Geddes, Trent M. Gardner, Goetz, Gallik & Baldwin, Bozeman, Montana.

For Appellee Jones: John E. Bloomquist, Abigail J. St. Lawrence, Doney Crowley Bloomquist, Payne & Uda, P.C., Helena, Montana, Maxon R. Davis, Davis, Hatley, Haffeman & Tighe, P.C., Great Falls, Montana.

For Appellee U.S. Bureau of Reclamation: George F. Darragh, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Great Falls, Montana.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Appellant Public Lands Access Association, Inc. (Association) appeals an order of the Ninth Judicial District, Teton County, dismissing with prejudice its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Appellee Roger Jones (Jones). We reverse the District Court and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Jones is the owner of real property in Teton County, Montana. The Association is a non-profit organization which promotes access to public lands in Montana.¹ The Sun River. Slope Canal Road (Canal Road) is located on real property owned by Jones in Teton County. The Canal Road was built between 1917 and 1919 by the authority of the Secretary of the Interior under the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 371. The United States of America Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) has had an express, nonexclusive easement over the Canal Road for irrigation and maintenance purposes since it was constructed.

¶ 3 According to the Association, Canal Road has been used by members of the public for many years in order to gain access to public lands. Jones has blocked access to public lands via the Canal Road by placing a chain and locked gates across it. On October 10, 2003, the Association filed suit against Jones in the Ninth Judicial District, Teton County, seeking a declaratory judgment that a public prescriptive easement was established by the Association's members and the general public over the Canal Road. The complaint also sought an injunction against Jones to prevent him from impeding or otherwise interfering with use of the Canal Road.

¶ 4 After its complaint was filed, the Association continued to investigate whether other parties had interests in the portion of the Canal Road over which the Association claimed a public prescriptive easement. The Association discovered that the Greenfield Irrigation District (GID) possessed an easement in the Canal Road. Subsequently, the Association and the GID entered into an agreement stipulating that the Association's easement claim was not in conflict with any interests held by the GID in the Canal Road. In late 2005 the Association discovered the existence of the Bureau's easement over the Canal Road. On December 6, 2005, the Association joined the Bureau as a party defendant on the assumption that the Bureau "may have some right, title, or interest in, the Sun River Slope Canal Road adverse to the [Association] and the public...."

¶ 5 On March 17, 2006, the Association and the Bureau entered into a stipulated agreement (Stipulation) which resulted in the Bureau's dismissal from the suit. In the Stipulation, the Association and the Bureau both acknowledged that "[t]he Bureau owns a nonexclusive easement or right-of-way for the Sun River Slope Canal and its related maintenance road...." However, the Bureau also acknowledged it had never blocked public use of the Canal Road and further that "[a]t no time since completion of construction of the ... Sun River Slope Canal Road has a member of the public or the underlying private landowner(s) used the Sun River Canal Slope Road in a manner that is incompatible with or interferes with the use and enjoyment of the easement interests held by the Bureau." In agreeing to dismiss the Bureau, both parties acknowledged that "this Stipulation, as stated herein, shall not be construed or used as any admission regarding the status, character, or nature, or use of the roadway, nor shall this stipulation be used to assert the validity or invalidity of said roadways as a public road, county road, or public right-of-way, where said road crosses the Bureau's land and premises." Moreover, the parties expressly agreed that nothing in the Stipulation "shall be deemed to impact the current rights of the Bureau or the Greenfields Irrigation District from prohibiting use of said roadway by third parties should said use interfere or become inconsistent with the Bureau's or the Greenfields Irrigation District's use of the Sun River Slope Canal Road, or to impose any obligations that the Bureau maintain said roadway for public use."

¶ 6 After the Bureau was dismissed from the suit, Jones moved to dismiss the Association's complaint under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2), and (6). Jones advanced several arguments in support of his motion. First, Jones asserted the Association's claim for a public prescriptive easement raised a dispute in title between it and the United States, that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over such title disputes pursuant to the Federal Quiet Title Act (FQTA), 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, and that therefore the Association's complaint could not proceed in state District Court. Additionally, Jones argued the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over the Association's complaint meant that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over those claims as well. Finally, Jones argued that the Association's suit should be dismissed for failing to be commenced within twelve years of the date its claim accrued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g).

¶ 7 The District Court granted Jones's motion and dismissed the Association's suit with prejudice. The District Court concluded that the Association's complaint "clearly challenges an interest in real property owned by the United States[,]" and thus must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because "[t]he exclusive means to challenge an interest of the United States in real property is through the Federal Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. Block v. North Dakota (1983), 461 U.S. 273, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1819, 75 L.E d.2d 840." The District Court observed the Bureau did not concede that Canal Road was a public road and reserved its right to prohibit public use at a later date. As a consequence, if the District Court were to grant the Association the relief it requested and declare the Canal Road a public road, then it "would have to find the Sun River Slope Canal Road is a public road when it passes over the easement owned by the Bureau of Reclamation and available to the public at all times, in contravention of the position of the Bureau in the Stipulation." Thus, a declaration of a public prescriptive easement over the Canal Road would require the District Court "to hold the interest claimed by [the Association] is superior to that of the United States." Consequently, the District Court dismissed the Association's complaint. The Association timely appeals from this order.

ISSUE

¶ 8 We state the sole issue on appeal as follows: Did the District Court err in dismissing with prejudice the Association's complaint against Jones?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 "The question of whether a district court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a conclusion of law which we review to determine if the court's interpretation and application of the law is correct." Fleenor v. Darby Sch. Dist., 2006 MT 31, ¶ 6, 331 Mont. 124, ¶ 6, 128 P.3d 1048, ¶ 6. "When deciding a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court must determine whether the complaint states facts that, if true, would vest the court with subject matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss should be construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the non-moving party can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief." Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 2003 MT 82, ¶ 12, 315 Mont. 75, ¶ 12, 67 P.3d 306, ¶ 12 (citations and quotations omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 Did the District Court err in dismissing with prejudice the Association's complaint against Jones?

¶ 11 The resolution of this appeal turns on whether the FQTA requires that the Bureau be a party defendant to the Association's suit. If it does, then the Association's suit can proceed only in federal district court and the District Court in Montana would lack subject-matter jurisdiction. The pertinent language of the FQTA reads as follows:

The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.

28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a).

¶ 12 The United States Supreme Court has held that FQTA "provide[s] the exclusive means by which adverse claimants c[an] challenge the United States' title to real property." Block, 461 U.S. at 286, 103 S.Ct. at 1819. Federal courts are vested with exclusive jurisdiction for claims arising under the FQTA. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(1).

¶ 13 The Association maintains that the District Court erred in dismissing its complaint because the FQTA is not applicable to this case. The Association asserts that the FQTA applies only when there is adversity between a claimant and the United States, and that the Stipulation demonstrates there is no adversity between the Bureau and the Association here. Thus, the District Court may still entertain the Association's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Jones. The Association argues that Leisnoi, Inc. v. United States, 170 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.1999), supports its position.

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