Public Service Commission v. Schaller
| Decision Date | 30 July 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 572A253,572A253 |
| Citation | 299 N.E.2d 625,157 Ind.App. 125 |
| Parties | PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION of Indiana et al., Appellants, v. Joseph SCHALLER, and Associated Freight Lines, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Harold J. Bell, Bell & Bell, Indianapolis, for appellants.
James L. Beattey, Frederick J. Graf, Martz, Beattey, Hinds & Wallace, Indianapolis, for appellees.
The basic issues before us are whether or not the trial court erred in overruling Intervening Defendants-Appellants' Trial Rule 60(B), IC 1971, 34--5--1--1 Motion for Relief from Judgment and whether a hearing upon such Motion was required.
The appeal is a link in a chain of circumstances which began almost thirty-five years ago. The circumstances must be summarized in order to give background for consideration of the issues.
On December 23, 1938, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Joseph Schaller as an intrastate motor carrier of property. It has been alleged that due to clerical error, this certificate contained a broader grant of powers than had been intended. Nevertheless, Schaller operated under this certificate until March 30, 1949, at which time Schaller entered into a contract for sale of the certificate to Associated Freight Lines, Inc., a corporation which had been formed by Mr. Schaller. Various truck lines appeared before the Public Service Commission as remonstrators against the application for transfer of the certificate to Associated, and the Commission, on July 13, 1950, entered an order modifying Schaller's certificate in order to limit it to the transportation of sand, gravel, cement and all other kindred products.
On September 8, 1950, Schaller and Associated filed a complaint in four paragraphs, seeking a declaration that the Commission's modification of the certificate was null and void, and for an injunction to prevent the Commission from revoking, changing, modifying, amending or otherwise disturbing the certificate.
Subsequently, the Marion Superior Court, Room 4, on December 30, 1950, found for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction barring the Commission from revoking, changing, modifying, amending or otherwise disturbing the certificate, and declared the prior modification by the Commission to be null and void.
However, on July 5, 1951, the Commission dismissed Schaller's and Associated's joint petition for approval of the transfer of the certificate. On August 16, 1951 Schaller and Associated returned to Marion Superior Court, Room 4, and sought an injunction directing the Commission to reinstate the petition and to grant the transfer. Venue for this action was changed to the Johnson Circuit Court which subsequently ruled that the Public Service Commission must approve the transfer of the certificate from Schaller to Associated.
The Public Service Commission responded some time later with an original action for a writ of prohibition filed in the Indiana Supreme Court. The Court's opinion, in State of Indiana et rel. Public Service Commission of Indiana v. Johnson Circuit Court (1953) 232 Ind. 501, 112 N.E.2d 429, held that the certificate of public convenience and necessity constituted a property right, that the Johnson Circuit Court had properly directed the Commission to reinstate the Petition to Transfer but that the Johnson Circuit Court was without authority to mandate a decision thereon.
Apparently the transfer was never effectuated, and the certificate remained in Schaller's hands until his death on December 1, 1960, since which time the certificate has been held by his estate, which has continued his business. Associated Freight Lines became defunct, and its Articles of Incorporation were revoked and forfeited on October 3, 1961.
The instant action was initiated on January 21, 1971, when twenty trucking companies (hereinafter referred to as Girton Brothers) filed a motion to intervene as parties defendant in the original 1950 injunction action in Marion Superior Court, Room 4. Intervention was granted and Girton Brothers filed a motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rule 60(B) 'on the ground that it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application and the injunction issued herein be applied against the defendant, Public Service Commission of Indiana, on behalf of persons other than those in the relationship of the plaintiffs herein who are both now deceased or out of legal existence . . ..' Subsequently, Schaller's estate requested a determination upon the merits of the motion for relief from judgment without a hearing, arguing that, since the Public Service Commission had not appeared in the proceedings, the standing of Girton Brothers was questionable and further that the motion was without merit. On October 27, 1971, the court without a hearing entered an order denying the motion for relief from judgment, upon the ground that the motion was without merit and should be overruled. From this ruling, Girton Brothers appeal.
Throughout the present proceedings Girton Brothers treated the original judgment as if it were grounded solely upon protection of the innocent prospective purchaser (Associated) who relied upon the validity of the certificate. However, reading of the complaint and judgment reveal that such is not the case. The judgment expressly found for Schaller and Associated on all four paragraphs of their complaint. Paragraph 1 alleged that the Commission was without jurisdiction, power or authority to modify the certificate, and further that the order and decision were without basis in law and were unsupported by sufficient evidence. The allegations in the motion for relief from judgment that Schaller is deceased and Associated defunct have absolutely no bearing on the court's judgment upon Paragraph 1.
Similarly, Paragraph 2 of the 1950 complaint contends that the amendment of the certificate by the Commission constituted a taking of property without just compensation and due process of law. That the certificate does indeed constitute a property right was iterated by the Supreme Court in State ex rel Public Service Commission of Indiana v. Johnson Circuit Court, supra. The estate of Joseph Schaller is the present holder of the certificate and is the immediate, direct, lawful and representative successor-in-interest of Joseph Schaller. The equities with respect to Schaller's property interests in the certificate are therefore unchanged. Thus, the mere facts that Schaller, the original certificate holder, is deceased and that his proposed transferee, Associated, is defunct do not render continued effect of the injunction invalid or inequitable.
Girton Brothers contend that the trial court should have conducted a hearing on the Motion for Relief of Judgment and that the evidence before the court conclusively established their right to relief from judgment. We must therefore address ourselves to the scope of the rule which makes provision for the extraordinary relief sought by Girton Brothers. Rule TR. 60(D) provides:
Girton Brothers are correct in their assertion that the language of Rule TR. 60(D) is mandatory. However, it is mandatory only for the presentation of 'pertinent evidence' and when applied to 'a motion allowed by subdivision (B)' of Rule 60. We therefore must look to the requirements for a motion for relief from judgment as set forth in 60(B) not only to determine whether a hearing was required but to determine as well whether the motion of Girton Brothers upon its face could qualify for the extraordinary remedy.
Rule TR. 60(B) states in pertinent part:
'(B) On Motion and upon such terms as are just the court may relieve a party or his legal representative frosm a final judgment, order, default or proceeding for the following reasons:
'(7) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(8) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and (4) not more than one (1) year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.'
Thus, it may be seen that in order to satisfy Rule TR. 60(B), a motion for relief from judgment must meet two requirements: first, it must qualify under one of the enumerated reasons for relief, and secondly, it must be made within a reasonable time. While there are no Indiana cases to assist our determination in this regard, Federal Rule...
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...trans. denied). However, when there is no pertinent evidence to be heard, a hearing is unnecessary. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Schaller, 157 Ind.App. 125, 133-34, 299 N.E.2d 625, 630 (1973). A hearing might have been highly useful in establishing the prejudice element of Jack's Trial Rule 60(B)(1......
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