Pucciarelli v. United Elec. Rys. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1940
• Docket Number: No. 8062.,8062.
• Citation: 11 A.2d 924
• Parties: PUCCIARELLI v. UNITED ELECTRIC RYS. CO.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

11 A.2d 924

PUCCIARELLI

v. UNITED ELECTRIC RYS. CO.

No. 8062.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 19, 1940.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Walter Curry, Judge.

Action by Elvisa Pucciarelli against the United Electric Railways Company for injuries suffered by plaintiff when struck by defendant's bus. On plaintiff's exception to a ruling of the superior court adjudging her nonsuit at the close of her evidence.

Exception sustained, and case remitted for new trial.

G. William Grande and Edward F. Dwyer, both of Woonsocket, for plaintiff.

Clifford Whipple and Earl A. Sweeney, both of Providence, for defendant.

CONDON, Justice.

This case is here on plaintiff's exception to a ruling of the superior court adjudging her nonsuit at the close of her evidence on the defendant's motion.

The facts are simple and substantially undisputed. The plaintiff was knocked down by defendant's bus while she was crossing South Main street in the city of Woonsocket and was at a point on the southerly side of that street directly opposite its intersection with Glenark street. That street intersects South Main street on its north side but does not cross it. South Main street runs approximately east and west. From the corner of Glenark street there is a clear view for several hundred feet to the east and west along South Main street. At this point the latter street is thirty feet wide from curb to curb and there is a car track approximately in the center of the street.

The accident appears to have happened in the following manner. Plaintiff, a night operative at the Glenark Mills on Glenark street, had finished her work and had left the mill at about 10:45 p. m., to go home. She and a fellow operative walked down Glenark street to the corner of South Main street and looked up that street to the west for a bus, as she intended to take a bus to her home; but just at that moment none was in sight. She then stood for a moment or two with her friend, until she saw, to the west, that is, to her right, a bus about to come around a curve at the rotary traffic stand in South Main street, where that street is intersected on its south side by Front street, which runs approximately north and south. The rotary was a little short of three hundred feet from where she stood. When the bus came into view, her friend left to go in another direction for a taxicab, and plaintiff started to cross South Main street, to a point directly opposite on the south side of that street, where there was a stop designated for the bus to receive and discharge passengers.

Before leaving the sidewalk plaintiff looked first to her left, that is, east on South Main street, and seeing no traffic approaching, she then looked to her right, that is, west, and saw the bus rounding the bend into South Main street at about the rotary. She did not look again until she had crossed beyond the car track when she noticed the bus, about thirty feet from her, and that the operator had his head turned toward the sidewalk. She was then directly in front of the bus and, sensing her peril, hurried to reach the sidewalk, but she was struck and knocked down when she was about two feet from the curb.

There was no other traffic in the street at that time or just before the accident, and the operator of the bus had a clear and unobstructed view of South Main street for several hundred feet to the east when he rounded the curve at Front street. The night was dark and the plaintiff wore a black coat, but the headlights on the bus were lighted and there was a street light near the place of the accident. There also was testimony by other witnesses that the visibility was good.

On these facts the defendant contends that the plaintiff was clearly guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, principally because she did not look a second time to her right, that is, in the direction of the approaching bus, before continuing to cross South Main street in the path of the bus. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that, whether she acted in the circumstances as an ordinary prudent person would have acted, was, on all the evidence, clearly a question of fact to be determined by the jury.

Ordinarily, as this court has often said, the question of contributory negligence is one of fact, but sometimes, when it clearly appears from the facts what course a person of ordinary prudence would pursue, it is a question of law. However, it was long ago observed by this court that cases of the latter kind are few, and generally they are cases "in which the situation is so simple that any person of ordinary prudence would instantly perceive what to do, or what to refrain from doing." Clarke v. Rhode Island Electric Lighting Co., 16 R.I. 463, 465, 17 A. 59, 60.

The defendant contends that the instant case is such a case and that it falls within that group where this court has held that the failure of a pedestrian to look before crossing a street in the path of oncoming traffic constitutes negligence as a matter of law. Gardiner v. Romano, 54 R.I. 348, 173 A. 84; Sarcione v. Outlet Co., 53 R.I. 76, 163 A. 741; McKean v. Barker, R.I., 148 A. 599.

An analysis of the facts in each of the above-cited cases will, we think, show some vital point or points...