Pucylowski v. Pucylowski, 98-CA-00089-COA.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-CA-00089-COA.,98-CA-00089-COA. |
| Parties | John Franklin PUCYLOWSKI, J.F.P. & Co., Inc. and HR Development, Inc., Appellants, v. Judith Polk PUCYLOWSKI, Appellee. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Fred W. Johnson, Jr., Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
B. Ruth Johnson, Jackson, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE McMILLIN, C.J., IRVING, AND PAYNE, JJ.
McMILLIN, C.J., for the Court:
¶ 1. This case comes before the Court as an appeal by John Pucylowski from a decision of the Chancery Court of Hinds County dissolving his marriage to Judith Pucylowski, making an equitable division of certain marital assets and awarding Mrs. Pucylowski lump sum alimony. Mr. Pucylowski complains that the chancellor erred in denying his own claim for divorce arising out of the cruel and inhuman manner in which Mrs. Pucylowski had treated him during the marriage. He also urges that the chancellor erred in making an equitable division of marital assets and lump sum alimony award without first making those determinations of value of the assets that would necessarily precede awards of that nature. We determine that Mr. Pucylowski's first issue is without merit. However, finding merit in his second issue, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Facts
¶ 2. These parties began their marriage in 1968 when they were both under twenty-one years of age. There is no indication that either brought any resources to the marriage beyond an apparent inclination toward hard work shared by both of them. Though they both began their careers as employees in the public sector, an early profitable side venture into building and selling what is known in the industry as a "spec house" led the couple into the field of land development and residential property construction. This field of endeavor proved fruitful for the couple and they prospered financially, enjoying a good income and many of the luxuries of life including a nice home, nice vehicles, and extensive travel. Despite their lifestyle, however, their financial efforts were successful to the extent that they were able to accumulate substantial investment assets that consisted primarily of interests in land development projects owned solely in Mr. Pucylowski's name.
¶ 3. Their personal relations, however, did not prosper to the same degree as their financial efforts and, in the mid-1990's their marriage began to deteriorate. Mr. Pucylowski finally left the marital domicile in April 1996, moving to an apartment that he had rented a month prior to his departure. Subsequent investigation revealed that Mr. Pucylowski had become romantically involved with Laura Prince, who had been recently widowed. Mr. and Mrs. Prince had also been in the residential construction business and had become friends to the Pucylowskis, and Mr. Pucylowski had been spending time with Mrs. Prince helping her maintain her business after the untimely death of her husband in an automobile accident. Private investigators retained by Mrs. Pucylowski after the separation observed Mrs. Prince frequenting Mr. Pucylowski's apartment and it was determined that she had her own key to the premises. Both Mr. Pucylowski and Mrs. Prince admitted that they had begun an adulterous relationship but they insisted that it had not begun until after Mr. Pucylowski had moved out of the home.
¶ 4. By way of his counterclaim, Mr. Pucylowski presented evidence that his wife was given to fits of rage against him where she would berate him in public and threaten to kill him or emasculate him. He also presented letters where Mrs. Pucylowski ridiculed his religious beliefs and accused him of belonging to a religious cult. He claimed that she constantly threatened to leave him and that she had opened a separate bank account which she mockingly called her "Leaving Frank Account." Mr. Pucylowski testified that her behavior made it difficult for him to sleep.
¶ 5. Prior to the separation, the couple had worked together in the home construction business, using the corporate form of operation. The corporation was known as J.F.P. After the separation, Mr. Pucylowski ceased any efforts in that corporation and, instead, began working in a residential construction business known as Team Builders, which was formed after the separation and was owned solely by Mr. Pucylowski's elderly mother. Several other key employees of J.F.P. also went to work for Team Builders. Though Mr. Pucylowski acts as president of the corporation, he testified that his sole remuneration from the corporation consisted of a salary of $1,500 per month. Mrs. Pucylowski had not found other suitable employment at the time of trial. She had worked at several positions through a temporary employment agency, but had depleted a substantial amount of existing assets to meet her living expenses after the separation.
¶ 6. The principal assets of the parties consisted of J.F.P., the largely moribund corporation formerly operated by the couple; the marital domicile; Mrs. Pucylowski's jewelry; various vehicles; retirement accounts; and various corporate interests held solely by Mr. Pucylowski involved in real estate development projects and related business enterprises. The chancellor awarded Mrs. Pucylowski the marital dwelling, a Ford Explorer vehicle, a Lincoln automobile, her jewelry and furs, and the household goods in her possession by virtue of her occupancy of the dwelling, a tractor and bush hog to use in maintaining the marital dwelling, and cash of $60,000. She allowed Mrs. Pucylowski to retain her individual retirement account, awarded her one half of Mr. Pucylowski's holdings in one of the real estate development corporations, and ordered Mr. Pucylowski to pay $250,000 in lump sum alimony over a period of five to seven years.
¶ 7. In making that award, the chancellor concluded that the total package given to Mrs. Pucylowski amounted in value to approximately one half of the marital assets.
II.
The First Issue: Grounds for Divorce
¶ 8. We will resolve this issue first since, depending on its resolution, it has the potential to render the issues of the property division and alimony moot. Mr. Pucylowski actually raises two separate issues regarding the propriety of granting a divorce. First, he urges that the chancellor erred in awarding his former wife a divorce on the ground of uncondoned adultery because the adulterous relationship only began after the couple had separated and was, thus, not the cause of the marriage breakdown. He further argues that the overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests that the true cause of the marital breakup was Mrs. Pucylowski's prolonged cruel and inhuman treatment of him. Citing Parker v. Parker as authority, Mr. Pucylowski urges this Court to reverse the chancellor's decision granting a divorce to his wife on adultery and, instead, grant him a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Parker v. Parker, 519 So.2d 1232 (Miss.1988). Parker v. Parker does not stand for the proposition that the adulterous relationship must be the cause of the marriage breakup in order to entitle the other spouse to a divorce. Rather, the decision dealt with the defense of recrimination asserted by the defendant husband to the charge of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment asserted by his wife. Id. at 1234. The chancellor, finding that the wife had, indeed, engaged in adulterous activity, denied her claim to a divorce on the ground of recrimination although, apparently, he was satisfied that a case for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment had been made. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in reversing that decision, held only that the adulterous relationship had arisen after the marriage had essentially been destroyed by the husband's protracted misconduct and determined that it was inequitable under those facts to sustain a recrimination defense. Id. at 1236.
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