Pudlo v. DIRECTOR, IRS, 84 C 2311.
Decision Date | 11 July 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 84 C 2311.,84 C 2311. |
Citation | 587 F. Supp. 1010 |
Parties | Thaddeus PUDLO and Walter Pudlo, d/b/a Pudlo Food Products, et al., Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Internal Revenue District of Chicago, Illinois, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Dennis M. Doherty, Chicago, Ill., for petitioners.
Michael S. O'Connell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Dan K. Webb, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for respondent.
Thaddeus Pudlo and Walter Pudlo ("Pudlos"), both in their individual capacities and as proprietors of Pudlo Food Products, filed their petition to quash an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") summons one day late in contravention of 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A) ("Code § 7609(b)(2)(A)"). Chicago District IRS Director ("Director") moved to dismiss the petition as untimely filed,1 and Pudlos acknowledged the flaw as soon as it was called to their attention. Accordingly this Court granted dismissal.
At issue now is Director's contemporaneously-filed motion for an award of attorneys' fees. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, that motion is denied.
Director's memorandum on both issues was quite lengthy, comprising 12 pages of argument, a statutory appendix and 11 exhibits. Pudlos in response acknowledged their late filing and correctly pointed out Director had engaged in overkill. Director's attorneys' fees request is based on the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), and Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 11. This opinion must determine whether petitioners and their counsel can escape liability under those provisions.2
Neither party has cited any decisions discussing awards in favor of the United States under EAJA, though by its terms it does appear to apply. There is however no need to consider the extent (if any) to which EAJA may provide the United States protection against litigation that is not "substantially justified." Director argues only that EAJA permits the United States to be awarded attorneys' fees for bad faith litigation. Because bad faith would enable this Court to award fees even in the absence of statutory authorization (see, e.g., McCandless v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 697 F.2d 198, 200-01 (7th Cir.1983)), no question of EAJA statutory interpretation is implicated.
This Court finds Pudlos did not file or pursue this action in bad faith. Director argues the petition was filed for purposes of delay, but he has provided no evidence to that effect, nor has he even shown Pudlos have benefited in any way from the delay in the summons procedure caused by the filing of their petition. On the contrary, two factors strongly suggest good faith:
Any finding of bad faith would be really insupportable.
Allowance of attorneys' fees under the newly-amended version of Rule 11 presents a more difficult question. Before its amendment Rule 11 seldom led to an award of attorneys' fees — and even then only on a finding of bad faith. See, e.g., Ellingson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 653 F.2d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir.1981). Now however Rule 11 provides attorneys' fees or other sanctions "shall" be imposed whenever based on "reasonable inquiry" a pleading is not "well grounded in fact and ... warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for ... modification ... of existing law." Unlike the bad faith standard, Rule 11 is objective in its application except to the extent a litigant argues for a change in the law. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1983 Amendment to Rule 11.
This Court finds Pudlos also meet the objective test of Rule 11. Their counsel's inquiry into applicable law was reasonable, albeit obviously not effective enough to avert dismissal. As interpreted by court decisions, Code § 7609(b)(2)(A) required dismissal of Pudlos' petition because it was filed more than 20 days after issuance of the challenged IRS summons. Pudlos' counsel's failure to have known that standard will not be deemed unreasonable in light of two factors:
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