Puerto Rico American Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 08-2012

Citation603 F.3d 125
Decision Date05 May 2010
Docket NumberNo. 08-2012,08-2274.,08-2012
PartiesPUERTO RICO AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Rafael RIVERA-VÁZQUEZ et al., Defendants, Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

María I. Santos Rivera, for appellants.

James W. McCartney, with whom Rafael Barreto-Solá and Cancio, Nadal, Rivera & Díaz were on brief, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SELYA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

The defendants, Rafael Rivera-Vázquez (Rivera) and Isabel Hurtado, husband and wife, appeal from (i) the entry of summary judgment against them, (ii) the denial of their cross-motion for summary judgment, and (iii) the denial of a discovery-related motion.1 In the final analysis, the appeals turn on the proper handling of cross-motions for summary judgment. Concluding, as we do, that the district court abused its discretion by applying materially different procedural requirements to the two motions, we wipe the slate clean. On unrelated grounds, we vacate the discovery-related order. The district court must revisit these matters anew.

I. BACKGROUND

These appeals arise out of a massive civil action commenced in Puerto Rico's federal district court by nine insurance companies against hundreds of defendants under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. The complaint posited that the defendants had engaged in a wide-ranging scheme to defraud the insurers by submitting false automobile insurance claims in violation of both RICO and a Puerto Rico anti-fraud statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. We limit our discussion to the claims against the appellants: Rivera, Hurtado, and their conjugal partnership. The appellees are five of the plaintiffs below, namely, Puerto Rico American Insurance Company (PRAICO), National Insurance Company, Universal Insurance Company, Caribbean Alliance Insurance Company (CAICO), and Cooperativa de Seguros Múltiples de Puerto Rico.2

The operative pleading for present purposes is the second amended complaint, which added Rivera, Hurtado, and their conjugal partnership as defendants. The complaint alleged that Rivera participated in a number of fraudulent claims, both as an attorney representing claimants and as a claimant himself. The complaint further alleged that Hurtado took part in the swindle as a claimant.

The case proceeded through discovery. One discovery-related ruling is pertinent to these appeals. We sketch the circumstances relevant to this ruling.

During discovery, the appellants requested that the insurers make certain admissions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(1). Receiving no responses within the allotted time, the appellants moved for an order deeming admitted the matters delineated in their requests. The district court denied the motion and extended the time for responding. The insurers served their responses within this extended period. The appellants objected, asserting that the matters set forth in the requests should be deemed admitted because the responses did not comply with Rule 36.

The objection lay fallow for slightly more than three years. At that point the district court, treating the objection as a motion,3 denied it on the ground that the appellants had failed to include the required certification. See D.P.R.R. 26(b) (providing that a district court "shall not consider any discovery motion that is not accompanied by a certification that the moving party has made a reasonable and good-faith effort to reach an agreement with opposing counsel on the matters set forth in the motion").

During the protracted period in which the parties were squabbling over the requests for admission, the summary judgment issues were starting to crystallize. The district court had set a deadline of February 17, 2006, for the filing of dispositive motions. On February 16, the insurers filed a motion for partial summary judgment.4 They supported their motion with a separate statement of uncontested facts (SUF) and a series of affidavits. The motion sought to impose liability on the appellants under sections 1962(c) and (d) of RICO.

One day later (and within the period prescribed by the district court), the appellants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, supported by a separate SUF. This cross-motion sought the dismissal of all claims against them. On March 30, 2006, the insurers filed a timely opposition, but did not respond to the appellants' SUF. In their opposition, the insurers mentioned that, on February 21, 2006, Rivera had pleaded guilty to a criminal information charging him with conspiring to devise a scheme to defraud insurance companies in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341. The insurers attached the information and plea agreement to their opposition.

On April 18, 2006, the appellants filed an opposition to the insurers' summary judgment motion, supported by a separate response to the insurers' SUF.

On June 12, 2008, the district court addressed the insurers' motion for summary judgment. The court granted that motion in part and denied it in part.5 In its opinion, the court held that the insurers' SUF was proper in form, appropriately supported by affidavits, and compliant in all other respects with the requirements of the local rules. P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Burgos (PRAICO I), No. 01-1186, slip op. at 3 (D.P.R. June 12, 2008) (unpublished) (citing D.P.R.R. 56). The court also held that the appellants' opposition failed to comply with the local rules and, accordingly, deemed admitted the facts set out in the insurers' SUF. Id. at 5 (citing D.P.R.R. 56(e)). Based on this ruling the court concluded, as a matter of undisputed fact, that Rivera had filed fraudulent insurance claims, both as an attorney representing other claimants and to his own behoof, with PRAICO, Cooperativa, National, CAICO, and Universal. Id. Similarly, the court concluded, as a matter of undisputed fact, that Rivera and Hurtado had jointly filed a false claim with National. Id. at 6. Moving to damages, the court concluded, as a matter of undisputed fact, that the insurers had paid these bogus claims, resulting in specific monetary losses. Id. at 5-6. With these determinations in place, the court held that the summary judgment record satisfied the requirements for liability under RICO § 1962(c), id. at 10, and proceeded to award treble damages in the insurers' favor. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). The court entered a partial judgment against the appellants in these amounts.

In a separate opinion, issued more than a month later, the district court granted in part and denied in part the appellants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The court noted that the appellants' SUF complied with the local rules and that the insurers had neglected to file the separate response to the SUF required by those rules. P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Burgos (PRAICO II), No. 01-1186, slip op. at 5 (D.P.R. July 29, 2008) (unpublished). Based on this deficiency, the court deemed admitted some of the facts limned in the appellants' SUF. Id. But the court stopped short of deeming all the facts admitted; rather, it concluded that, despite the insurers' failure to file a counter-statement, it would not deem admitted any facts that contradicted the facts on which its earlier partial judgment rested. Id.

This truncated view of the record led the district court to deny the cross-motion with respect to the claims asserted against the appellants by PRAICO, Cooperativa, National, CAICO, and Universal. Id. The court exonerated the appellants with respect to other claims. See id. at 7; see also supra note 5. This included a determination that Hurtado had not submitted false claims to PRAICO, Universal, or Cooperativa. PRAICO II, slip op. at 8. The court thereupon entered another partial judgment.

On August 8, 2008, the district court entered a final judgment.6 We have jurisdiction over the ensuing appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. ANALYSIS

Before us, the appellants asseverate that the district court abused its discretion in disregarding their opposition to the SUF that accompanied the insurers' motion for summary judgment; that, in all events, the lower court treated them unfairly by applying materially different standards to the adjudication of the two motions for summary judgment; and that the court erred in its final ruling concerning their requests for admission.7 We discuss the first two assignments of error together and then move to the third.

A. Summary Judgment Practice.

When passing upon a motion for summary judgment, a district court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom to that party's behoof. Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). This standard operates in conjunction with a district court's local anti-ferret rule. When the district court, acting in pursuance of an anti-ferret rule, deems admitted facts contained in the movant's SUF, those facts are considered not properly controverted, but the district court must still apply the standard articulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In such circumstances, we review the district court's deeming order for abuse of discretion. CMI Capital Mkt. Inv., LLC v. González-Toro, 520 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir.2008). This entails "a special degree of deference. . . to the court's interpretation of its own local rules." Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 361 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 422 (1st Cir.1995)). Apart from any judgment calls concerning the application of the local rule, the ultimate decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Cabán Hernández, 486 F.3d at 8.

Local Rule 56 of the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico is such an anti-ferret rule. It requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a "separate, short, and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
188 cases
  • Cosme-Perez v. Municipality of Juana Diaz
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • June 26, 2015
    ...motions for summary judgment does not affect either party's obligation to comply with the local rule. See P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera–Vazquez, 603 F.3d 125, 132 (1st Cir.2010) ("A party cannot circumvent the requirements imposed by an anti-ferret rule simply by filing a cross-motion for sum......
  • Club Gallístico De Puerto Rico Inc. v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • October 28, 2019
    ...improperly controverts the facts, the Court may treat the opposing party's facts as uncontroverted. See Puerto Rico Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vazquez, 603 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 2010). Similarly, the Court can ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.......
  • GonzÁlez-Droz v. GonzÁlez-ColÓn
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • June 15, 2010
    ...simultaneously, or nearly so, the district court ordinarily should consider the two motions at the same time." P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vazquez, 603 F.3d 125 (1st Cir.2010). Accordingly, the parties' motions for summary judgment will be considered simultaneously. Upon reviewing the filin......
  • AES P.R., L.P. v. Trujillo-Panisse
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • July 27, 2016
    ...consider the two motions at the same time, applying the same standards to each motion." Id. at 51 (quoting P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera – Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 133 (1st Cir.2010) (noting that the requirement to decide each motion separately does not require that "each motion must be conside......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT