Puget Sound B. & D. Co. v. S.U.C.C.

• Decision Date: 26 May 1942
• Citation: 168 Or. 614,126 P.2d 37
• Parties: PUGET SOUND BRIDGE & DREDGING CO. <I>v.</I> STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION ET AL.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

168 Or. 614

126 P.2d 37

PUGET SOUND BRIDGE & DREDGING CO.

v. STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION ET AL.

Supreme Court of Oregon.

Argued March 31, 1942.

Affirmed May 26, 1942.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

1. The unemployment compensation law of Oregon, patterned after the federal social security act, being "remedial legislation", should be liberally construed to the end that employees receive the benefits intended, and thereby effectuate the purpose of the act.

Statutes — Remedial legislation — Construction

2. A remedial statute must be construed liberally so as to afford all the relief within the power of the court which the language of the act indicates that the legislature intended to grant.

Taxation — Exemption

3. Where exemption from a general tax is claimed, the statute should be strictly construed against the party asserting such exemption, the rule requiring liberal construction in favor of taxpayer being inapplicable when such exemption is claimed.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

4. The state unemployment compensation law in defining as localized services covered by the law services performed outside the state, but incidental to the individual's services within the state, uses the term "incidental" to include any service which is temporary or transitory in nature or which consists of isolated transactions.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

5. Evidence established that "base of operations" of drill barge engaged in deepening and widening channel of Columbia river, the center of which marked boundary line between Washington and Oregon, was in Oregon, so as to give unemployment compensation commission of that state jurisdiction over claim for unemployment benefits made by fireman employed on the barge.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

6. Unemployment compensation commission's decision that claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits was not subject to reversal because of commission's failure to specifically find as to situs of the work in which claimant was engaged, since such decision necessarily implied that services were rendered in the state within the meaning of the law.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

7. Unemployment compensation commission's finding that claimant was not a member of any crew of a vessel, so as to be excluded from benefits under unemployment compensation law, if supported by evidence, is conclusive.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

8. Where neither state unemployment compensation act nor federal social security act in excluding from coverage thereof members of the crew of a vessel on navigable waters of the United States defined the term "crew", court would give to such term its ordinary and commonly accepted meaning in maritime law to the end that the purpose of the act should be accomplished.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

9. The unemployment compensation law excluding from the coverage thereof services performed as an officer or member of the crew of a vessel on navigable waters of the United States does not limit the meaning of the term "crew" to those persons on board who are physically causing the vessel to move through the water, but includes within the term all those contributing in some way to the operation and welfare of the vessel as an instrument of navigation.

Courts — Statutes — Construction

10. No construction by state court of provision of state unemployment compensation law excluding from the coverage thereof services performed as an officer or member of the crew of a vessel on navigable waters of the United States is valid if it materially conflicts with the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal government.

Admiralty — Jurisdiction

11. The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal government was intended to commit direct control to federal government and to relieve maritime commerce of unnecessary burdens by reason of discordant laws of the several states.

Courts — Statutes — Construction

12. Where United States supreme court had not determined what was meant by "member of the crew" as used in state unemployment compensation law and federal social security act excluding from coverage thereof services performed as officer or member of the crew of a vessel on navigable waters of the United States and decisions of district and federal intermediate courts of appeal and of federal administrative boards and commissions were in conflict on the point, state supreme court would use its own judgment in determining meaning thereof, being guided by what it considered the best reasoned cases.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

13. In order that services performed by individual upon a vessel on navigable waters of the United States be excluded from coverage under unemployment compensation law as being services performed by "member of the crew", such services must substantially tend to promote the welfare of the vessel as an agency of navigation, and it is not sufficient if they are merely incidental to navigation.

Master and servant — Unemployment compensation

14. The fireman of a donkey engine being used on a drill barge in connection with the work of deepening and widening channel of the Columbia river was not a "member of the crew" within meaning of unemployment compensation law excluding from coverage thereof services performed as an officer or member of the crew of a vessel on navigable waters of the United States.

                  See 25 R.C.L. 765
                  38 C.J., Master and Servant, § 362
                

Before KELLY, Chief Justice, and BELT, BAILEY, LUSK, RAND and ROSSMAN, Associate Justices.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.

JAMES W. CRAWFORD, Judge.

Proceedings by Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Company against the State Unemployment Compensation Commission of the State of Oregon and others, to review a decision of the commission granting the claim of Ross E. Sedoris for benefits under the unemployment compensation law of Oregon. From a decree affirming the decision of the commission, plaintiff appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Frank C. Howell, of Portland (Wilbur, Beckett, Howell & Oppenheimer, of Portland, on the brief), for appellant.

H. Lawrence Lister, Assistant Attorney General (I.H. Van Winkle, Attorney General, on the brief), for respondent State Unemployment Compensation Commission.

James Landye, of Portland (B.A. Green, of Portland, on the brief), for respondent Ross E. Sedoris.

BELT, J.

The Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., a corporation organized under the laws of Nevada and having its principal office in Seattle, Washington, entered into a contract with the United States government to deepen and widen the channel of the Columbia river at Devil's Bend rapids between 84 and 85 miles above Celilo falls. Ross E. Sedoris was a fireman on the drill barge engaged in such work, which was owned and operated by the above named company. Sedoris, on May 17, 1938, filed his claim for benefits under the Unemployment Compensation Law of Oregon (§§ 126-701-126-729 O.C.L.A.). The application was denied by a deputy claim investigator of the Unemployment Compensation Commission for the reason that the work performed by Sedoris was "as a member of the crew of a vessel on the navigable waters of the United States" (§ 126-702 (f) (F) (4) O.C.L.A.) and, therefore, not covered by the act. Sedoris appealed from the deputy's decision and a hearing was had before a referee. The referee found that the drill barge was a "vessel" on "navigable waters of the United States," but that Sedoris was not a member of the "crew" within the meaning of the exclusionary clause and was entitled to relief. The commission approved the report of the referee and the company employer thereupon appealed to the circuit court which, after a review of the record, affirmed the decision of the commission. Hence this appeal.

There are two vital questions involved: (1) Was the situs of the work within the state of Oregon? If not, the commission of this state would have no jurisdiction. (2) Was Sedoris a member of the "crew" within the meaning of the exclusionary clause of the unemployment compensation law? These two questions will be considered in the above order after a more complete statement of the facts out of which this controversy arose. It is conceded that Sedoris was working on a "vessel" on navigable waters of the United States. See: City of Los Angeles v. United Dredging Co., 14 F. (2d) 364.

The drill barge or scow was a registered "vessel" and had been towed from Puget Sound to the place of operations on the Columbia river. It had no means of self-propulsion. During the period of two and one-half years in which it had been engaged in improving the channel, it had moved approximately one mile. The barge was 81 feet long, 28 feet wide, and seven feet deep, and had a net capacity of 135 tons. On one side of the deck was a track consisting of two rails upon which the steam drill was moved from one end of the barge to the other when operated. On the other side of the barge was housed the boiler, winches, pumps and other mechanical equipment. Appellant speaks of it as a "seagoing vessel" whereas respondent refers to it as a lowly scow.

There were four men employed on each shift on the barge, viz: a foreman (courteously referred to by appellant as "Captain"); a fireman; a driller; and a "powder monkey." During the day, a mechanic was employed in addition to the four mentioned. It was the specific duty of Sedoris to fire the donkey engine in order to operate the steam drill, winches, and other machinery on the barge. No living quarters were provided on the barge. The men employed lived ashore at Umatilla, Oregon. "Captain" Waggoner, who was in charge of the men on the drill barge, had no master's papers authorizing him to navigate a vessel and showed no familiarity with maritime terms and regulations. None of the men had signed any seamen's articles.

The...