Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. City of Seattle, 24296.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1933
• Docket Number: 24296.
• Citation: 172 Wash. 668,21 P.2d 727
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

21 P.2d 727

172 Wash. 668

PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

No. 24296.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 21, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald, Judge.

Suit by Puget Sound Power & Light Company against the City of Seattle. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Todd Holman & Sprague and Clarence R. Innis, all of Seattle, for appellant.

A. C Van Soelen, Walter L. Baumgartner, and C. V. Hoard, all of Seattle, for respondent.

BLAKE Justice.

This is a companion case to Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v City of Seattle (Wash. Dec.) 21 P.2d 721;

and, like that case, is here on appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer to the amended complaint had been sustained. The assignments of error are:

'I. The court erred in sustaining respondent's demurrer to appellant's amended complaint.

'II. The court erred in dismissing appellant's first cause of action.

'III. The court erred in dismissing appellant's second cause of action.

'IV. The court erred in failing to hold that the enforcement of the ordinance as to appellant would contravene article 1, § 10, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and article 1, §§ 3, 14 and 16, and sections 5 and 9 of article 7 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.'

The following provisions of Ordinance No. 62,662, in addition to those set out in the opinion in the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. Case, are pertinent to the questions raised by the appellant in this case:

'Section 5. * * *

'(c) Upon every person engaged in or carrying on the business of selling or furnishing electric light and power a fee or tax equal to three per cent. (3%) of the total gross income from such business in the city during his fiscal year next preceding the tax year for which the license is required; provided, however, that the minimum fee or tax shall not be less than Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars per tax year.'

'Section 6. City of Seattle, Subject to Tax. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 5 shall, so far as permitted by law, be applicable to the city of Seattle, except that said city shall not as a taxpayer, be required to conform to the other provisions of this ordinance.'

The appellant raises some twenty-seven objections to the ordinance, all of which were disposed of in the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. Case, with the exception of two. These are: (1) That the tax is in contravention of appellant's rights under its franchise from the city; and (2) that the tax is peculiarly discriminatory, unreasonable, and confiscatory, as to it, by reason of the fact that the city, in its proprietary capacity, is a competitor of appellant in the power and light business.

I. The Fourteenth Amendment of the state Constitution provides: 'The power of taxation shall never be suspended, surrendered or contracted away.' This, however, does not answer appellant's first contention, since its franchise antedates the amendment. Whether or not the state or a municipality may barter away its taxing power is a question upon which the authorities generally are not in harmony. There are strong reasons why it should be held that it may not. State v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. Co., 75 Mo. 208; City of Portland v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 80 Or. 271, 156 P. 1058. For the purposes of this case, however, we do not find it necessary to pass upon that question, for, in any event, the intent to relinquish the power to tax must not only be clear but distinctly expressed. It is a doctrine that is indulged in no implications. The question is put and the rule concisely stated in City of St. Louis v. United Railways Co., 210 U.S. 266, 28 S.Ct. 630, 631, 52 L.Ed. 1054, as follows:

'The theory, then, upon which the bill was framed and this case decided, was that the city, having once fixed a price for the use of its streets, which the railway companies had agreed to pay, there was no right to impose a license tax upon the railway companies under the ordinance. * * *

'The principles involved in this case have been the subject of frequent consideration in this court, and while it can be no longer doubted that a state or municipal corporation, acting under its authority, may deprive itself by contract of the power to exercise a right conferred by law to collect taxes or license fees, as the same time the principle has been established that such deprivation can only follow when the state or city has concluded itself by the use of clear and unequivocal terms. The existence of doubt in the interpretation of the alleged contract is fatal to the claim of exemption.'

No terms of appellant's franchise have been called to our attention which could be interpreted as a relinquishment by the city of any of its powers of taxation.

II. In principle, appellant's second proposition is akin to the first. The question is: Can the state's power of taxation be abridged or abrogated by estoppel? In the abstract, the question would seem to merit scant consideration; but the allegations of the amended complaint reveal a condition of unfair competition, created by the exaction of this tax from the appellant, which commands the careful attention of a court of equity.

The city, in its proprietary capacity, is in competition with appellant in the power and light business. The possible consequences to appellant, if it is subjected to an excise of 3 per cent. on its gross revenues, while its competitor escapes the burden, are too obvious for discussion. Evidently having such consequences in mind, the city council, by virtue of section 6 of the ordinance, has undertaken to subject the city's power and light business to the tax imposed upon persons and corporations engaging in that business. This is merely a more or less friendly gesture. The city has not allocated, and probably cannot allocate, any of the revenues of its power and light business to the payment of such a tax. Bonds have been issued in excess of $30,000,000 against the revenues from that business; and those bonds are a prior lien on the entire income from it--taking precedence even over operating charges. Conceding that the city's light and power revenues could be subjected to the tax, no machinery is set up in the ordinance to accomplish such an end. Furthermore, in making up its budget for 1932, no provision was made for the levy of general taxes to cover the excise provided for in the ordinance. So the problem must be met as though section 6 had been omitted from the ordinance; as though the city had levied the excise on the appellant and exempted its own light and power business therefrom.

Conceding, for the sake of argument, that to be the situation, counsel for the city seek to sustain the tax against appellant under the doctrine that constitutional limitations on the taxing power do not prevent a reasonable classification of persons and occupations subject to the tax; and that a privately owned light and power business is subject to a different classification than one owned by a municipality--that the one may properly be subjected to the excise and the other exempted.

In passing, it is to be noted that the ordinance is a good-faith exercise by the city of its power to impose excise taxes for the purpose of raising revenue. Some half dozen businesses enjoying peculiar privileges in and upon the streets of the city are included within its purview. The fact that it imposes a burden upon appellant not borne by the city in its competing business is an incident and not the purpose of the ordinance.

The expediency of imposing excise taxes and the classification of persons and occupations affected is a legislative problem, so long as the exaction is not inherently oppressive and the classification is reasonable. As we have seen, in the case of Pacific Tel. & Teleg. Co. v. City of Seattle (Wash.) 21 P.2d 721, the tax imposed by this ordinance is not inherently oppressive. The question here is whether the classification as between the appellant and the city, in its ownership in a proprietary capacity of a light and power business, is reasonable. In the case of State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 543, 75 L.Ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 1464, Mr. Justice Roberts said:

'The principles which govern the decision of this cause are well settled. The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence of the government of the states. The restriction that it shall not be so exercised as to deny to any the equal protection of the laws does not compel the adoption of an iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent variety or differences in taxation, or discretion in the selection of subjects, or the classification for taxation of properties, businesses, trades, callings, or occupations. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 10 S.Ct. 533, 33 L.Ed. 892; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 30 S.Ct. 496, 54 L.Ed. 688; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 30 S.Ct. 578, 54 L.Ed. 883. The fact that a statute discriminates in favor of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, American Sugar Rfg. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 S.Ct. 43, 45 L.Ed. 102, or if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 S.Ct. 370, 374, 60 L.Ed. 679, L. R. A. 1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 32 S.Ct. 192, 56 L.Ed. 350. As was said in Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, supra, at page 573 of 217 U.S., 30 S.Ct. 578, 580:

"A very wide discretion must be conceded to the legislative power of the state in the classification of trades,

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