Pugh v. State

Decision Date30 May 1974
Docket NumberNo. 194,194
Citation271 Md. 701,319 A.2d 542
PartiesAdolphus Reddick PUGH v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Alfred J. O'Ferrall, III, Deputy Public Defender, Baltimore, for appellant.

David B. Allen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Milton B. Allen, State's Atty. for Baltimore City on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ELDRIDGE, JJ.

ELDRIDGE, Judge.

The question in this case is whether the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents a trial judge, moments after he intentionally rendered a 'not guilty' verdict following a court trial, from changing his mind and finding the defendant guilty. We hold that it does.

Adolphus Reddick Pugh was charged by the Baltimore City Grand Jury in two indictments with violations of the narcotics statutes. Indictment number 2110 charged him with possession of cocaine, and indictment number 2111 charged him with possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute the cocaine. Pugh elected to be tried by the court instead of a jury.

At the trial, the State's evidence consisted of the testimony of two police officers. The officers stated that they observed an automobile driven by the defendant Pugh pull over to the side of a street in Baltimore City, that a Mr. Holt who had been standing upon the sidewalk walked to the driver's side of the car, that Mr. Holt handed Mr. Pugh some money, that Mr. Pugh handed Mr. Holt two packets wrapped in tinfoil, that Mr. Pugh drove off, and that Mr. Holt began walking away with the two packets. The officers then followed Mr. Holt. Immediately prior to their apprehending him, Mr. Holt threw the two packets to the pavement, and one of the officers retrieved them. The packets were found to contain cocaine. Following the testimony of the two police officers, the trial judge denied a motion for acquittal. Thereafter the defense called Mr. Holt as a witness, and he denied purchasing any narcotics from Mr. Pugh. He admitted standing on the sidewalk and then walking over to Mr. Pugh's car at the time the narcotics transaction was supposed to take place. However, he claimed that he merely borrowed a dollar from Mr. Pugh.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the defendant's attorney made a final argument. After the argument for the defense, the trial judge asked the Assistant State's Attorney, 'Do you want to be heard, Mr. Iamele?' The prosecuting attorney declined to make an argument, stating that he 'would submit on the evidence.' The trial judge delivered an oral resume of the evidence and then stated:

'So, the verdict is guilty on the first count. Does anybody have the indictment? Guilty in 2110, and not guilty in 2111. I don't think it's in sufficient quantity.'

Immediately after the pronouncement of 'not guilty' as to indictment 2111, the following took place:

'MR. IAMELE: 2111 would be the distribution charge. That's what the State is pressing in this case.

'THE COURT: I would be glad to hear from you.

'MR. IAMELE: I believe that we have evidence, ample evidence of sale. That's exactly what the State is going after. This man is a distributor of cocaine, and on the night of the 18th of Feburary-

'THE COURT: I see what you mean.

'MR. IAMELE:-he made a sale.

'THE COURT: I was thinking of it in a different way. So, the verdict is guilty of 2111, because it was an actual sale. What I was thinking of was the possession in quantity to indicate distribution . . ..'

The court sentenced the defendant to twelve years' imprisonment on the distribution charge. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that he had been twice placed in jeopardy. The Court of Special Appeals, rejecting both arguments, affirmed the judgment. We granted a writ of certiorari limited to the double jeopardy question.

The prohibition against twice placing a defendant in jeopardy is applicable in this State as a common law principle, and also by virtue of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); Couser v. State, 256 Md. 393, 260 A.2d 334 (1970); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 220 A.2d 304 (1966); State v. Campbell and Reeves, 7 Md.App. 538, 256 A.2d 537 (1969). The double jeopardy prohibition is often said to consist of different but related rules, embodying several distinct pleas at common law. See, e. g., Patton v. State of North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 643 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 905, 88 S.Ct. 818, 19 L.Ed.2d 871 (1968); Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425, 433 (1863); State v. Barger, supra, 242 Md. at 618-620, 635-636; Comment, Double Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262 (1965). Moreover, in certain contexts, the application of the prohibition is difficult and often fraught with disagreement. 1

However, one particular aspect of the prohibition against double jeopardy has not engendered any difficulties in application or diverse opinions. From the earliest days, it has been clear that once a verdict of not guilty has been rendered at the conclusion of a criminal trial, that verdict is final and cannot be set aside. Any attempt to do so by the prosecutor is barred by what at common law was the plea of autrefois acquit. Thus, in State v. Shields, 49 Md. 301, 303 (1878), our predecessors declined to construe a statute as permitting the State to appeal a verdict of acquittal, saying:

'It has always been a settled rule of the common law that after an acquittal of a party upon a regular trial on an indictment for either a felony or a misdemeanor, the verdict of acquittal can never afterward, on the application of the prosecutor . . . be set aside . . ..'

The Court in Shields went on to point out that it made no difference whether the acquittal was based on a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. See also State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341, 348, 76 A.2d 575 (1950); Cochran v. State, 119 Md. 539 544, 87 A. 400 (1913); State v. Campbell and Reeves, supra, 7 Md.App. at 540-541, 256 A.2d 537.

The United States Supreme Court, in applying the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, has consistently set forth the same view. In Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896), involving inter alia an attempted second prosecution of one defendant following a verdict of acquittal rendered by a jury, the Court stated:

'The verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting him (the defendant) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the constitution.'

The Court went on to state that the verdict was final and a bar to further prosecution even though no judgment was entered on it. In Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130, 24 S.Ct. 797, 805, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904), a non-jury trial where there was an attempted appeal from the trial judge's verdict of not guilty, the Supreme Court reiterated that the verdict of acquittal was final regardless of whether judgment was entered, saying:

'If is, then, the...

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