Pujalt-Leon v. Holder
| Citation | 934 F.Supp.2d 759 |
| Decision Date | 25 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:CV–12–1749. |
| Parties | Fernando PUJALT–LEON, Petitioner, v. Eric HOLDER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Fernando Pujalt–Leon, York, PA, pro se.
Mark Morrison, Melissa Swauger, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Respondents.
Presently before the Court are Magistrate Judge Blewitt's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 23) to Petitioner's Petitionfor Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Respondents' Objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 24.) In the instant petition, Petitioner, a detainee of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), challenges ICE's determination that he is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Petitioner contends that he is instead detained under § 1226(a) and therefore entitled to a bond hearing. According to Magistrate Judge Blewitt, § 1226(c) only applies to aliens detained immediately after release from custody or within a reasonable time after release. As such, Magistrate Judge Blewitt recommends Petitioner be afforded an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge because Petitioner was not detained by immigration officials until four years after his release from state custody. Respondents filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. Because Petitioner's pre-removal-period detention is governed by § 1226(a) and not § 1226(c), the Report and Recommendation will be adopted and Petitioner will be afforded an individualized bond determination within ten days from the date of entry of the accompanying Order.
The facts giving rise to the instant § 2241 petition are set forth at length in Magistrate Judge Blewitt's Report and Recommendation and will not be recounted in their entirety herein. For purposes of review of the Report and Recommendation, it is sufficient to note the following:
Petitioner, a citizen and native of Peru, entered the United States on a temporary visitor visa in January 1997. (Doc. 23, 2.) On April 6, 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of threatening to kill and was sentenced to probation for one year. ( Id.) On January 5, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of retail theft and sentenced to probation for two years. ( Id.) Prior to the above convictions, Petitioner was arrested seven additional times. ( Id.) Eventually, on December 29, 2010, Petitioner was arrested for violation of a protection from abuse order. ( Id. at 3.)
After he was arrested on December 29, 2010, Petitioner was placed into ICE custody, almost four years after he was released from his criminal conviction for a removable offense. ( Id.) The next day, on December 30, 2010, ICE issued a Notice to Appear to Petitioner under § 237(a)(1)(B) and § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. ( Id.) Petitioner appeared before the immigration court on January 19, 2011. Petitioner requested an adjournment to seek counsel. ( Id.)
Since then, Petitioner's removal proceedings have been put on hold, delayed, and/or continued for a number of reasons. ( Id. at 3–8.) According to Respondents, Petitioner's removal proceedings, as of October 2012, were on hold for four months while he was in the custody of other authorities, continued by the Immigration Judge six times at Petitioner's request, and delayed multiple times based on Petitioner's failure to provide proof that he filed an I–130 as claimed or that one of his crimes had been vacated which was central to Petitioner's removability. (Doc. 17, 37–38.) Since October 2012, Respondents contend that the delays in the removal proceedings have been “at the behest of Leon, his conduct, or factors which the government had no control over.” (Doc. 25, 6.) For example, Petitioner's master calendar hearing scheduled for October 30, 2012 had to be postponed until January 16, 2013 due to Hurricane Sandy. ( Id.) And, at the January 16, 2013 hearing, the Immigration Judge determined that Petitioner was not eligible for cancellation of removal, and the proceedings were adjourned to February 26, 2013 to ascertain the status of an additional request for relief raised by Petitioner. ( Id.) Based on the Court's review of Petitioner's status on March 15, 2013, he appears to still be in ICE custody.
Based on the foregoing events, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging the applicability of § 1226(c) to his detention. He also argues that his continued detention has been unreasonably prolonged.
Magistrate Judge Blewitt recommends that the petition be granted to the extent that Petitioner be provided with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. Following an extensive review of case law interpreting the “when the alien is released” language in § 1226(c), Magistrate Judge Blewitt concluded:
We find that Petitioner should be granted an individualized bond hearing since the plain meaning of the statute provides that [§ 1226(c) ] only applies to aliens immediately when the alien is released from custody or within a reasonable time after release. We find that [§ 1226(c) ] does not apply to aliens released from their criminal sentences four years before ICE detains them. As such, we will recommend that Petitioner be afforded an individualized bond hearing by the IJ.
(Doc. 23, 20.) Magistrate Judge Blewitt also found Petitioner's removal proceedings to have been unreasonably delayed and that the almost two year detention period to be an unreasonable period of time given the critical factors set forth in Alli v. Decker, 644 F.Supp.2d 535 (M.D.Pa.2009). ( Id. at 23.) Thus, Magistrate Judge Blewitt recommends that Petitioner be afforded an individualized bond hearing within ten days. ( Id.)
Respondents assert two objections to the Report and Recommendation. First, Respondents contend that Petitioner is, in fact, subject to mandatory detention. Specifically, Respondents argue that § 1226(c) is ambiguous, as the statute's “when ... released” language “signals the beginning of ICE's continuing duty to detain criminal aliens rather than defines which aliens must be detained.” (Doc. 25, 3.) Respondents also suggest that § 1226(c) is ambiguous because of “significant district court splits” as to its meaning. ( Id.) Additionally, Respondents assert that the Board of Immigration Appeals' (“BIA”) interpretation of § 1226(c) in Matter of Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117, 2001 WL 537957 (BIA 2001) warrants deference because it is reasonable. ( Id.)1
Respondents' second objection to the Report and Recommendation relates to Magistrate Judge Blewitt's determination that the removal proceedings have been unreasonably delayed. ( Id. at 4.) While Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner's detention has continued beyond the average time necessary for the completion of removal proceedings, they argue that these delays are largely the product of Petitioner's own conduct. ( Id. at 5.) Respondents also emphasize that the extent of future removal proceedings will be based solely on Petitioner's conduct and that it is more likely than not that the proceedings will actually result in removal. ( Id. at 5–6.)
Where objections to the Magistrate Judge's report are filed, the court must conduct a de novo review of the contested portions of the report. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n. 3 (3d Cir.1989) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). However, this only applies to the extent that a party's objections are both timely and specific. Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984) (emphasis added). In conducting a de novo review, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the factual findings or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge. See28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Owens v. Beard, 829 F.Supp. 736, 738 (M.D.Pa.1993). Although the review is de novo, the law permits the court to rely on the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675–76, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7;Ball v. United States Parole Comm'n, 849 F.Supp. 328, 330 (M.D.Pa.1994). Uncontested portions of the report may be reviewed at a standard determined by the district court. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Goney, 749 F.2d at 7. At the very least, the court should review uncontested portions for clear error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Cruz v. Chater, 990 F.Supp. 375, 376–77 (M.D.Pa.1998).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), habeas jurisdiction “shall not extend to a prisoner unless ... [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction under § 2241(c)(3) if two requirements are satisfied: (1) the petitioner is “in custody,” and (2) the custody is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). Jurisdiction over the instant petition is proper because Petitioner is in custody in the Middle District of Pennsylvania and Petitioner alleges that his detention is not statutorily authorized and in violation of the Constitution.
The core issue with respect to the instant petition is whether Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Section 1226(a) authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an alien pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. See8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Except as provided in § 1226(c), the Attorney General may...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Suiter v. Logan Cnty.
... ... The Court concludes that summary judgment was warranted on this claim. See Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (M.D. Pa. 2013) ("Uncontested portions of the report may be reviewed at a standard determined by the district ... ...