Pulaski v. State
Citation | 24 Wis.2d 450,129 N.W.2d 204 |
Parties | Gerald Joseph PULASKI, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. |
Decision Date | 30 June 1964 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Runkel & Runkel, Port Washington, for plaintiff in error.
George Thompson, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Betty R. Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for defendant in error.
Reversible error is claimed in admitting the confession of Pulaski in evidence because it was not the voluntary product of his free and unconstrained will. This confession related only to four of the seven burglaries, i. e., those involved in counts 4, 5, 6, and 7. It is argued the confession was not voluntary because of the length of time Pulaski was questioned, the interrogations took place in a room 10 feet by 10 feet, he had little sleep until after 6 o'clock a. m. on the day he made the confession, nine different officers questioned him, the only food he had from the time of his arrest until his confession was a bologna sandwich and coffee at noon, that the police who questioned him were physically larger than he was, and Pulaski had only an eighth grade education, and was not allowed to talk to fellow-prisoners. It is also claimed Pulaski asked the police for an attorney, which request was refused, and he was struck, kicked and physically mistreated by the Milwaukee police.
In State v. Hoyt (Wis.1964), 128 N.W.2d 645, on rehearing, we pointed out that a confession to be saved from constitutional condemnation must be the result of a deliberateness of choice. Pulaski's confession seems to us to have been the product of his free and unconstrained will. It is not shown the interrogation even by several different police was of such constant duration as to affect Pulaski's mind and force him to confess against his better judgment. The confession occurred some 17 hours after his arrest but Pulaski was not continuously interrogated for that period of time. This court does not approve of lengthy-continuous interrogations of an accused and a deprivation of sleep to break an accused down and which results in a confession being virtually wrung out of the accused. We find no such facts here.
Pulaski was arrested late at night, taken to the police station for interrogation, taken to his rooming house, and again taken back to the jail and again interrogated. When the night shift left, he was allowed to rest. It does not appear he was given any breakfast or that he wanted any. It does not appear how long he was permitted to sleep before being questioned by the day-shift detectives and the Ozaukee county officers. However, while being interrogated late in the afternoon with a stenographer present he confessed to four burglaries which the Milwaukee police were also interested in solving, and he was interrogated as to these; eventually over a period of months he confessed to some 23 or 24 burglaries in Milwaukee county. The interrogation of Pulaski strikes us under the circumstances as being a search for information in the process of investigation and not an attempt by the police to create written evidence for use against Pulaski at his trial.
We are not impressed in this case with the psychological factors relied on by Pulaski, namely, the room was only 10 feet by 10 feet, he was smaller in size than the policemen who interrogated him, he had but an eighth grade education, and he had only a bologna sandwich and black coffee for lunch. Pulaski, a man of 35 years of age, had previous convictions and previous contacts with the police and the courts. This is not a case of the first offender as was the Hoyt case but of a professional and a member of a ring or gang. Pulaski was not denied his right to talk to his counsel. He had no counsel and expected the police to furnish one upon his request. This, the police were under no duty to do. His physical treatment by the police was disputed in the testimony and both the trial court and the jury found against him. We accept their findings.
Of importance is the fact the confession of March 29th itself shows it to be 'the voluntary product of a free and unconstrained will.' The exhibit is in question and answer form. Pulaski was willing to disclose certain burglaries, but he refused to state who his accomplices were and expressly told the police he would not implicate anyone else. It is plain he told the police just what he wanted to tell them and no more. As stated in Culombe v. Connecticut (1961), 367 U.S. 568, 81A S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037. From what transpired later in the Milwaukee case, * * *'we believe the confession was a result of calculation which turned out to be a miscalculation from Pulaski's standpoint. But risks are not unknown to men who pursue crime. Incidentally we point out there were six other confessions made on three subsequent days extending over two months which were admitted in evidence. Five of these confessions involved burglaries in Ozaukee county and no exception to their admissibility has been taken.
Pulaski contends the search of his dwelling was made without a search warrant and without his consent and the ring found was, therefore, erroneously received in evidence. The police testified in general terms that Pulaski was cooperative, led them to his room, and watched them make the search. Pulaski testified he did not consent and was taken to his dwelling in handcuffs. The trial court admitted the evidence for the reason Pulaski did not specifically object to the search.
Assuming the search was illegal and, therefore, the ring should not have been admitted in evidence, we consider the error to be harmless. The improper admission of evidence is not a ground for reversal unless...
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