Pulliam v. Prince George's Cnty.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1164,1164 |
| Parties | NIGEL PULLIAM v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Prince George's County
UNREPORTED
*Woodward, *Wright, Moylan, Charles E., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Woodward, J.
*Wright, Alexander, J., now retired, and Woodward, Patrick L., J., now retired, participated in the hearing of this case while active members of this Court, and Woodward, Patrick L., J. as its Chief Judge; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, they also participated in the decision and the preparation of this opinion.
**This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
On August 4, 2014, Officer Brandon Peters of the Prince George's County Police Department pursued a dirt bike operated by Amir Brooks-Watson with Nigel Pulliam, appellant, riding as a passenger on the back of the bike. The pursuit began in Prince George's County, Maryland, and ended in Washington, D.C., when Brooks-Watson lost control of the dirt bike and crashed into a tree. Both Brooks-Watson and appellant sustained injuries in the crash, but Brooks-Watson later died as a result of his injuries. On July 22, 2016, appellant filed a four-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Prince George's County, Maryland ("the County"), Officer Peters, and Sergeant Nicholas Cicale, appellees. On March 29, 2017, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the complaint. On July 14, 2017, a hearing on appellees' motion was held, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, appellant raises two questions,1 which we have consolidated and rephrased as one: Did the trial court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on all counts?
For the reasons set forth herein, we answer this question in the negative, and accordingly, affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On the afternoon of August 4, 2014, Officer Peters was working "secondary employment" as a security guard at the Fox Club Apartments in Forestville, Maryland.2 Officer Peters observed Brooks-Watson driving a green Kawasaki dirt bike through the apartment complex with his cousin, appellant, riding as a passenger on the back. Officer Peters recalled that a dirt bike was reported stolen recently in a commercial robbery in the area, and he thought that the dirt bike ridden by appellant and Brooks-Watson may match the description of the stolen dirt bike. Officer Peters began to follow the dirt bike to the back of the apartment complex, but when Brooks-Watson and appellant saw Officer Peters approaching them, Brooks-Watson accelerated the bike, rode over the curb and grass, and left the complex. Officer Peters followed Brooks-Watson and appellant down Brooks Drive and then on to Pennsylvania Avenue. According to appellant, Officer Peters's cruiser's emergency lights were not activated at this time, and Officer Peters's proximity to the bike forced Brooks-Watson to cut across the median of Pennsylvania Avenue and drive on the shoulder on the wrong side of the road. Officer Peters followed the dirt bike to the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue as Brooks-Watson drove against oncoming traffic.
During the pursuit of the dirt bike, Officer Peters asked the police dispatcher to provide a description of the stolen dirt bike. Sergeant Cicale, who was also working secondary employment at the time, responded to Officer Peters's request, informing Officer Peters that the stolen dirt bike was yellow. According to Officer Peters, he was unable to hear Sergeant Cicale's response because Officer Peters's dog was barking in the backseat of his cruiser.
When Brooks-Watson and appellant approached the border between Maryland and the District of Columbia, they crossed over the median and began driving on the correct side of Pennsylvania Avenue. Once in the District of Columbia, Officer Peters slowed down and was five or six car lengths behind the dirt bike. Brooks-Watson then turned left on to Alabama Avenue, and Officer Peters lost sight of the bike. Officer Peters also turned on to Alabama Avenue and drove until he saw a plume of smoke. When he reached the origin of the smoke, Officer Peters saw that the dirt bike had been involved in a single vehicle accident. Officer Peters informed the dispatcher that two bikers had been injured in an accident and instructed the dispatcher to call for help. Officer Peters also asked the dispatcher to run a check on the dirt bike, and the dispatcher informed Officer Peters that it was not the dirt bike that had been reported stolen. Appellant was seriously injured in the accident, and Brooks-Watson died as a result of the injuries that he sustained in the accident.
On July 22, 2016, appellant filed the instant litigation, alleging four counts. Count I alleged Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against the County and Officer Peters. Count II alleged Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against the County and Sergeant Cicale. Count III alleged Negligence/Gross Negligence for failure to train and supervise against the County and Sergeant Cicale. Count IV alleged Negligence/Gross Negligence against the County and Officer Peters. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on March 29, 2017. On July 14, 2017, a hearing on the motion was held before the circuit court, and that court granted the motion as to all counts. Appellant noted a timely appeal to this Court on August 11, 2017. Additional facts will be supplied as necessary to the resolution of the instant appeal.
We review the decision of a circuit court to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo. Hogan v. Hogans Agency, Inc., 224 Md. App. 563, 567-68 (2015). Under Maryland Rule 2-501(f), a trial court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "'[W]e independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a dispute of material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc. v. Partlow, 460 Md. 607, 632-33 (2018) (quoting Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 455 Md. 462, 482 (2017)). In doing so, "[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts against the moving party." Id. Generally, we "will consider only the grounds upon which the lower court relied in granting summary judgment." PaineWebber Inc. v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422 (2001) (citations omitted).
Appellant argues that the circuit court applied the wrong law when analyzing his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Specifically, appellant claims that the court relied on only Maryland case law when his claim "included the emotional distress suffered in Maryland and in the District of Columbia." According to appellant, Maryland law requires a plaintiff to demonstrate "a severely disabling emotional response" while District of Columbia law "does not appear to require a disabling emotional response." Additionally, appellant asserts that, because the circuit court assumed that Officer Peters's conduct was "outrageous and extreme," appellant's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should have been submitted to a jury. We disagree and shall explain.
Under District of Columbia law, intentional infliction of emotional distress consists of three elements: "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of [the defendant] that (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) caused [the plaintiff] severe emotional distress." Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends School, 128 A.3d 1023, 1037 (D.C. 2015). "Recovery is not allowed merely because conduct causes mental distress." Crowley v. North Am. Telecomm. Ass'n, 691 A.2d 1169, 1172 (D.C. 1997) (citation omitted). Instead, plaintiffs must demonstrate "emotional distress 'of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences might be not unlikely to result.'" Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924 A.2d 1040, 1046 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men of Wash. D.C., 70 App. D.C. 183, 186 (1939)).4 Similarly, under Maryland law, a prima facie claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a plaintiff to show: "(1) the conduct is intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct is extreme and outrageous; (3) there is a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; [and] (4) the emotional distress is severe." Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md. App. 268, 315 (2000). Also, for the distress to be sufficiently severe, the plaintiff must show "'that he suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct,' and that the distress was so severe that 'no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.'" Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 570-71 (1977)).
Here, appellant's complaint simply states that he "has suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe and extreme emotional distress." In the summary judgment proceeding, appellant did not present any evidence about any specific symptoms of emotional distress that he suffered as a result of the accident. See Ortberg v. Goldman Sachs Group, 64 A.3d 158, 164 (D.C. 2013) (). Nor did appellant offer any evidence of counseling...
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