Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Lawrence

Decision Date24 May 1897
Citation22 So. 53,74 Miss. 782
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesPULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. v. TRUEMAN P. LAWRENCE

October 1896

FROM the circuit court of Claiborne county HON. W. K. McLAURIN Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Percy Roberts and J. McC. Martin, for appellant.

Question of jurisdiction.--Can a citizen residing in a foreign state sue the Pullman Palace Car Company, which is a citizen of and resident in the same foreign state with himself, in the circuit court of Mississippi, for a tort committed in the foreign state, of which both of them are citizens and residents, neither of them being citizens of or residents in Mississippi?

Section 849 of the annotated code provides: "Corporations which exist by the laws of any other state of the union, may sue in this state by their corporate names, and they shall also be liable to be sued or proceeded against, by attachment or otherwise, as individual nonresident debtors may be sued or proceeded against." The simple meaning of this section is: (1) That foreign corporations may sue in this state, by their corporate names, any person found in this state, in the county of such person's residence, or such corporation may proceed against any nonresident debtor, having property in this state, by attachment, etc.; (2) that foreign corporations shall also be liable to be sued or proceeded against, by attachment or otherwise, as individual nonresident debtors may be sued or proceeded against. Individual nonresident debtors can only be sued or proceeded against by attachment or garnishment thereunder.

Clearly it never was the purpose to open the courts of this state to a nonresident claiming a right of action against a tort feasor residing in the same state with himself, for a wrong done in the state wherein both reside, especially where no reason appears for seeking the tribunals of this state, and especially when the plaintiff has not acquired, and does not even contemplate acquiring, a domicile in Mississippi. If such were the law, every person in the State of Illinois having a grievance against the Pullman Palace Car Company could seek redress in the courts of this or any other foreign state; without first acquiring citizenship and without showing proper cause for coming to our courts, or without proceeding by attachment. Another effect would be to harass the nonresident foreign corporation with suits remote from its place of citizenship and remote from the place of residence of its witnesses, while it would be deprived of ordinary or compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses. Again, such right would contravene a fundamental principle of jurisdiction--one so carefully guarded by § 650 of the annotated code of Mississippi, and so fully provided for in our federal and state judicial systems--the principle which requires ordinary actions to be brought in the county of defendant's residence.

A careful review of the several decisions of the supreme court of Mississippi, bearing on the question at bar, brings to light no case directly in point. In the case of N O. J. & G. N. R. R. Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss. 244, the facts are briefly as follows: The plaintiff was a resident of this state. He received injuries in Louisiana, which resulted from a collision of trains. The defendant was regarded as a domestic corporation, and was so treated by the court.

In the case of Chicago, etc., Railroad Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss. 977, the husband of plaintiff was killed by collision of trains in Tennessee. Plaintiff resided in Mississippi. She based her action on negligence said to have been commenced at Water Valley in Mississippi, and which resulted in the death of her husband, an engineer in the employ of defendant. It was claimed that a train dispatcher at Water Valley, in Mississippi, sent a message which was the moving cause of the injury. The court held "the view that no recovery could be had here, except for a result traceable to an omission of duty in Mississippi, is unfounded. Physical force resulting from this state and inflicting injury in another state, might give rise to an action in either state.

In the case of the Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Grudup, 63 Miss. 298, the appellee resided in Mississippi. His son was fatally injured in a collision between trains of appellant in the State of Tennessee, and died a few days thereafter from the effects of the injury.

The plaintiff was a resident of this state, and was invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of this state on the principles of comity. In the case at bar, no question of comity can possibly arise, because all the parties and the wrong were subjects, and exclusive subjects, of the jurisdiction of the courts of Illinois.

In the case of McMaster v. 1. C. R. R. Co., 65 Miss. 264, the plaintiff was a citizen of Mississippi. Her son was killed in Louisiana. A demurrer was interposed to the declaration on the ground that her son came to his death by the carelessness and negligence of fellow servants. No question of jurisdiction was involved.

The question presented in the case at bar is founded in the facts that the plaintiff and defendant are both residents and citizens of the State of Illinois; that neither at the time of bringing the action in the circuit court of Claiborne county, Mississippi, nor since, has the plaintiff been a citizen of and resident in the State of Mississippi, nor has the defendant been a citizen of and resident in the said state, Illinois being the state of its creation, and that the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the State of Mississippi is not invoked in good faith. We are not wanting in authorities, however, of other states that deny jurisdiction to a state over torts committed by citizens of another state upon citizens of the same state and within the territorial limits of the same state.

The following authorities maintain our contention: Kahl v. M. & C. R. R. Co. (Ala.), 10 So. 661; Newhaven Horse Nail Co. v. Linden Springs Co., 142 Mass. 349; Ferguson v. Nelson, 11 N.Y., 594; Morris v. Pa. R. R. Co., 78 Tex., 17; Winchester v. Brown, 13 N.Y. 655; Gregory v. Lake Erie, etc., R. R. Co., 40 N. J., 38; Central R. R. Co. v. Banking Co., 76 Ala. 388; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Adams Express Co., 22 F. 404.

Question of punitive damages.--Under what facts, conditions, and circumstances can sleeping car companies be held liable in exemplary damages; and can defendant be held liable in exemplary damages, under the disclosures of the record in the case at bar?

"The justification of exemplary damages lies in the evil intent of the defendant, and the allowance of such damages is, therefore, restricted to cases of wanton injury. There must be some wrongful motive accompanying the wrongful act." Sedgwick on Damages, sec. 363; Reeder v. Pardy, 48 Ill. 261; Fornell v. Warren, 70 Ill. 28; Toledo W. & W. R. R. Co. v. Roberts, 71 Ill. 540; Miller v. Kirby, 74: Ill. 420; Becker v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167.

The evolution of the doctrine of damages and exemplary damages, so far as the establishment of rules to govern in the imposition of same, is, indeed, interesting. In the early history of the cases allowing exemplary damages, the court seems to have considered that the placing of the issue upon the country gave the jury unrestrained discretion. The general warrant cases, which are the earliest, were all upheld on this assumption. More enlightened reasoning, however, led to the necessity of putting some restraint upon such arbitrary power. In short, law would be no rule of action unless every claim, demand, or penalty was controlled by some fixed principle.

In applying the doctrine of exemplary damages to master and servant, in modern practice, the rule seems to depend upon the nature of the master with reference to his relation with the servant. Thus, the rule as applied to individual master and servant is different when applied to a common carrier and its servant, the difference, however, being the strictness of the application of the doctrine to the latter class of master and servant.

In fixing the rule making a principal liable in exemplary damages for the acts of his agent or servant, Sedgwick, section 378, citing a large number of leading cases, lays down the rule as follows: "It is the better opinion that no recovery of exemplary damages can be had against a principal for the tort of a servant or agent, unless the principal expressly authorizes the act as it was performed, or approves it; or unless the principal was grossly negligent in hiring the servant or agent, or unless the principal was grossly negligent in not preventing the servant or agent from committing the act." He also states the rule to be: "That the burden of showing authorization or approval by the principal is on the plaintiff." The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheaton, 546; Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 Ill. 478; Becker v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167; Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496.

To conclude this branch of the case, we say the record shows that the Pullman Palace Car Company did not authorize the act of its waiter nor approve it; that it was not grossly negligent in hiring the waiter, if the waiter actually committed a tort; that it used every effort to ascertain the competency and habits of its waiter; and that there is nothing that shows that it employed or retained the waiter knowing him to be incompetent or knowing him, from bad habits, to be unfit for the position he occupied, and therefore instruction number five granted to plaintiff in no way should have been given by the court.

Question of excessive damages.--The approved rule, as laid down in Webb's Pollock on Torts and Sedgwick on Damages, and as approved by this court in the cases on the subject, and also in the case of Pennsylvania Railroad Co....

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