Pumphrey v. State, 71459

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida
Citation527 So.2d 1382,13 Fla. L. Weekly 433
Docket NumberNo. 71459,71459
Parties13 Fla. L. Weekly 433 Joseph PUMPHREY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Decision Date14 July 1988

Page 1382

527 So.2d 1382
13 Fla. L. Weekly 433
Joseph PUMPHREY, Petitioner,
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 71459.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 14, 1988.

Page 1383

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender and Kathleen Stover, Asst. Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Royall P. Terry, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

SHAW, Justice.

We have for review Pumphrey v. State, 512 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), which conflicts with Williamson v. State, 388 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. We quash the decision of the district court below.

Pumphrey was charged with grand theft, uttering, and forgery. He entered a plea, which was accepted by the trial court. The court withheld adjudication and, prior to sentencing, ordered a presentence investigation. The court also granted Pumphrey's request for a twenty-four hour furlough from jail to gather firewood for his grandmother. Pumphrey failed to return until many days later. On the basis of this failure to return, he was convicted of escape. Due to the presence of a mitigating factor, the trial court departed from the guidelines range of twelve to seventeen years and sentenced Pumphrey to two years imprisonment for this offense. The DCA affirmed the conviction, finding that Pumphrey was a "prisoner" under section 944.02(5), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides:

"[p]risoner" means any person who is under arrest and in the lawful custody of any law enforcement official ...

and that he had "escaped" under section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1985):

Any prisoner confined in any prison, jail, road camp, or other penal institution, state, county, or municipal, working upon the public roads, or being transported to or from a place of confinement who escapes or attempts to escape from such confinement shall be guilty of a felony....

However, because it found the trial court's reason for downward departure invalid, the district court reversed and remanded for resentencing, instructing the trial court either to follow the guidelines or to state clear and convincing reasons for departure. Pumphrey's petition for review was granted based on conflict with Williamson, a revocation of probation case in which the district court stated that section 944.40 "requires the prior confinement of a prisoner." Williamson, 388 So.2d at 1347 n. 2. We find that Pumphrey's failure to return from furlough failed to constitute "escape" under this statute.

In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied on Johnson v. State, 357 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1st DCA) (escape upheld where prisoner became ill during booking and, after being escorted to the emergency room, escaped from the hospital), cert. denied, 362 So.2d 1054 (Fla.1978). The Johnson court reasoned:

We do not believe the term "confinement" is narrowly limited to the actual physical presence in the jail. Appellant had been committed to the jail and was in

Page 1384

the lawful custody of the jail. This confinement may extend to the hospital from which appellant escaped.

Id. at 204. Adopting the Johnson rationale, the court below concluded:

Under the rationale of Johnson, appellant's confinement was not limited to his actual presence in the Leon County Jail, but extended for a 24-hour period to include the area of the grandmother's house, from which he unlawfully escaped.

Pumphrey, 512 So.2d at 1020.

Johnson, however, is distinguishable on three key points. First, Johnson was never formally...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Maddox v. State, No. SC92805
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • 11 d4 Maio d4 2000
    ...grounds for the trial judge to impose a departure sentence. See State v. Williams, 667 So.2d 191, 193-94 (Fla. 1996); Quarterman, 527 So.2d at 1382; see also §§ 921.0016(3)(a), (4)(a) (Supp.1996). We reasoned in Williams that "while it would be better form for a trial court to state in writ......
  • Mack v. State, 1D06-4096.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 26 d1 Março d1 2007
    ...be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such 955 So.2d 57 promise must be fulfilled"), so is the defense. Quarterman, 527 So.2d at 1382. The requirements of Apprendi and Blakely do not come into play because the "prescribed statutory maximum" is not at The petition for writ o......
  • Carson v. State, Case No. 1D09-5698 (Fla. App. 4/26/2010), Case No. 1D09-5698.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 26 d1 Abril d1 2010
    ...bargain itself serves as a clear and convincing reason for departure and [we] recede from any language in Williams to the contrary." 527 So. 2d at 1382. While a departure sentence challenged on direct appeal does not equate to a collateral challenge to an illegal sentence filed under Florid......
  • Houston v. State, 96-02527
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 24 d5 Outubro d5 1997
    ...four, which stated, "You will live honorably" or "You will live and remain at liberty without violating the law." See Pumphrey v. State, 527 So.2d 1382 (Fla.1988); Brown v. State, 338 So.2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 4 Condition four has never been a matter of great concern in the other four district......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT