Purcell v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n
| Citation | 2021 IL App (4th) 200359 WC,184 N.E.3d 373,451 Ill.Dec. 786 |
| Decision Date | 27 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No. 4-20-0359WC |
| Parties | Emily PURCELL, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., (University of Illinois, Appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Sandra K. Loeb, of Spiros Law, P.C., of Danville, for appellant.
Joseph K. Guyette, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen PC, of Champaign, for appellee.
¶ 1 The claimant, Emily Purcell, appeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) denying her claim for benefits under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2016)). The Commission affirmed the arbitrator's decision with changes, finding that the claimant failed to prove that her accident arose out of her employment. The claimant sought review of the Commission's decision before the circuit court of Champaign County. The court confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 3 The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing conducted on July 11, 2018.
¶ 4 The claimant provided the following testimony. She was employed as an administrative assistant on a temporary or "extra help" basis by the University of Illinois (University). Her regular work hours were 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, and she was paid for 7.5 hours per day. The claimant's primary job duty was to facilitate the day-to-day operations of the Mortensen Center, which focused on international libraries. Her job required her to leave her office located in the undergraduate library on a daily basis to perform various duties around campus. The claimant worked with departments on and off campus for purposes of event planning and coordination. When she had to go to other campus buildings, she would generally walk, but would also take the bus. The claimant occasionally gave tours of the campus, which involved walking around with international visitors. She managed her own daily schedule and decided when to complete various tasks and what route to take. However, the claimant later clarified that, on the occasions she would go out on campus in conjunction with her employment, it was done at the direction of her supervisor, Clara Chu, or another supervisor.
¶ 5 As a temporary employee, the claimant was required to turn in her time card at the Personnel Services Building every other Friday. She described this as a job duty. The claimant described that she would typically walk from her office to the Personnel Services Building or take the bus through campus and that she was not directed by the University as to the route she had to take to complete this task. She was not required to drop off the time card at any particular time of day and she "always" did so during her work hours. However, sometimes she turned in her time card before she went to her office in the morning, but never during her lunch hour.
¶ 6 On September 9, 2016, the claimant took the bus to campus for work and arrived at approximately 8:20 a.m. After she exited the bus, she intended to walk to the Personnel Services Building to drop off her time card. The claimant noted that the Personnel Services Building was in the opposite direction from her office located in the library. She crossed a street as she walked in the direction of the Personnel Services Building and approached a chain barrier/fence. She attempted to "hop" over it, the heel of her shoe got caught, and she fell onto her right elbow. The claimant was taken by ambulance to Presence Covenant Medical Center, and she ultimately had surgery on her right elbow on September 19, 2016.
¶ 7 The claimant admitted that there was no defect with the fence or the ground around it where she fell and that she fell before her workday began. Although the route she took was the most direct route, approximately 10 to 15 feet to the left of where she fell was an area without a fence. She admitted that there were no obstructions or anything else that would have prevented her from taking a route that would have allowed her to avoid the chain fence. She also admitted that it would have been safer to use a route that did not require her to cross the chain, and it would have only taken a couple of extra seconds for that route. The claimant stated that there were no other errands that she completed for the University before arriving to her office.
¶ 8 The claimant initially testified that she was told by her supervisor, Chu, that she was allowed to turn in her time card during work hours. Additionally, she stated that a human resources representative for the University, Skye Arseneau, also told her that she could turn in her time cards during work hours. The claimant stated that she understood that turning in her time card was a function of her job, she was required to physically turn it in, and she was able to turn it in during her workday. However, she later stated that she did not know if anyone actually told her that she was able to turn her time card in during work hours.
¶ 9 Chu testified that the claimant's job duties required her to leave the office "at times" and that she would walk between the buildings on campus when completing those duties. Chu stated that temporary employees, like the claimant, were required to turn in time cards at the Personnel Services Building to get paid. She noted that the claimant typically turned in her time card every other Friday, but that it could be done at any time prior. Chu stated that she did not instruct the claimant to turn in the time card at a certain time of day or outside of work hours. She assumed the claimant would turn it in during her breaks, like lunch, or after.
¶ 10 Arseneau testified that time reporting must be done very accurately and that temporary employees could be marked off for as little as one minute. Arseneau stated that these employees were supposed to complete their time cards during non-work hours and that they were not paid for the time it took to physically drop off their time cards. She noted that the time cards were to be turned in before work, at lunch, or after work. Arseneau explained that there is an exterior drop box at the Personnel Services Building so that employees could turn in time cards even when the department was closed. She stated that temporary employees are told during their information session on their first day of employment that time cards are not to be turned in during work hours. Arseneau had no personal knowledge that the claimant was so informed.
¶ 11 The claimant testified on rebuttal that she never attended any training prior to being employed as extra help and that she was never asked to attend a training session described by Arseneau. She also stated that she was not advised by anyone that her time cards were to be turned in during non-work hours. However, the claimant admitted that her time card for her first day of work reflected three hours of work that she spent with Arseneau filling out paperwork.
¶ 12 The arbitrator analyzed the claimant's case under a traveling-employee framework and concluded that the claimant failed to establish that she was a traveling employee. Specifically, the arbitrator noted that the testimony demonstrated that the claimant's tasks outside of the building that housed her office were uncommon; when the claimant worked outside of the library, those tasks were at Chu's specific direction; and Chu did not direct the claimant to undertake any task outside of the library on the morning of her injury. Further, the arbitrator noted that, the claimant's understanding that she could turn in her time card during work hours was her misunderstanding and did not make the activity work-related. The arbitrator also found that, even if the claimant was a traveling employee, her decision to hop over the fence was a personal risk unrelated to her employment. Therefore, the arbitrator concluded that the claimant's injury neither arose out of nor occurred in the course of her employment.
¶ 13 The claimant sought review of the arbitrator's determination before the Commission, which affirmed the arbitrator's decision with changes. The Commission disagreed with the arbitrator's finding that the claimant was not acting in the course of her employment at the time of the accident because the claimant was injured on the University's premises within a reasonable time period before commencing her job duties. However, the Commission agreed that the claimant failed to prove that the accident arose out of her employment.
¶ 14 The claimant sought review of the Commission's decision before the circuit court of Champaign County. Following a hearing, the court confirmed the Commission's decision.
¶ 16 On appeal, the claimant argues that the Commission's finding that her injury did not arise out of her employment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She argues that she proved this element as either a non-traveling employee or a traveling employee.
¶ 17 We first turn to whether the claimant satisfied the "arising out of" requirement as a non-traveling employee. If we answer that question in the negative, then we will decide whether she qualified as a traveling employee and satisfied the element in that capacity. "The determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the course of one's employment is generally a question of fact." Hosteny v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm'n , 397 Ill. App. 3d 665, 674, 340 Ill.Dec. 475, 928 N.E.2d 474 (2009). A factual finding by the Commission will not be set aside on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. City of Springfield v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm'n , 388 Ill. App. 3d 297, 315, 327 Ill.Dec. 333, 901 N.E.2d 1066 (2009). A finding of fact is against the manifest weight of the evidence when an opposite...
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