Purcellville National Bank v. Carter
Decision Date | 24 November 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 2232.,2232. |
Parties | The PURCELLVILLE NATIONAL BANK, body corporate, Appellant, v. William A. CARTER, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Jo V. Morgan, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Russell Hardy, Sr., Washington, D. C., with whom Russell Hardy, Jr., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.
Appellant brought suit on a note against appellee, an accommodation endorser. When both parties asked for summary judgment, the court granted appellee's motion on the ground that there was no consideration for the note. Appellant's main contention on this appeal is that the court's ruling was incorrect because there were issues of fact involved on the question of consideration which precluded summary judgment.
We have examined the pleadings, depositions and answers to various interrogatories in order to determine whether there was a material issue of fact. All doubts and inferences on this score will be resolved in favor of appellant, the non-movant. If it appears that there is such a factual issue, summary judgment may not be awarded.1
Appellee's position is that the facts here show that the Carters and appellant contemplated that a discharge and cancellation of the prior notes was to be the consideration for the issuance of the renewal note; that appellant's president has admitted that the notes were not cancelled, and that therefore there has been a failure of consideration. Appellant contends that the consideration for the renewal note was simply an extension of time and forbearance to sue on the old notes;4 that there was no agreement to discharge the old notes, and thus whether they were cancelled or not is immaterial with regard to its right to sue on the renewal note. Alternatively, appellant argues that if there was an agreement to cancel the notes, nonetheless it was not required to do so before coming into court, but that it would be sufficient to produce the notes at the time there is a determination by the court that there was an obligation to cancel them.
It is our conclusion that there were material issues of fact involved here, and that...
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...inferences against the moving party. Dewey v. Clark, 86 U.S. App.D.C. 137, 143, 180 F.2d 766, 772 (1950); Purcellville National Bank v. Carter, D.C. Mun.App., 146 A.2d 206, 207 (1958). In fact, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment "the situation must justify a directed verdict insofa......
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Early Settlers Insurance Company v. Schweid, 3899.
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Pallie v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 95-CV-1818 & 96-CV-1031.
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