Purdum v. Purdum

• Decision Date: 17 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 106,181.,106,181.
• Citation: 301 P.3d 718,48 Kan.App.2d 938
• Parties: Stephen E. PURDUM, Appellee/Cross-appellant, v. Katherine C. PURDUM, Appellee/Cross-appellee, (Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas), Appellant/Cross-appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

48 Kan.App.2d 938
301 P.3d 718

Stephen E. PURDUM, Appellee/Cross-appellant,
v.
Katherine C. PURDUM, Appellee/Cross-appellee,
(Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas), Appellant/Cross-appellee.

No. 106,181.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

May 17, 2013.

[301 P.3d 720]

[48 Kan.App.2d 938]Syllabus by the Court

1. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited.

2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution has a dual purpose. First, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or practice of any form of worship. Second, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the First Amendment contains two concepts: the freedom to believe and the freedom to act; the first is absolute, but the second cannot be.

3. Religious conduct is subject to regulation for the protection of society.

4. Privilege, absolute or qualified, is a complete defense against liability for libel.

5. The question of whether a publication is privileged is a question of law to be determined by the trial court.

6. Generally, the occasions for the absolute privilege are limited and extend to legislative, executive, or judicial proceedings.

7. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids excessive government entanglement with religion.

L. Martin Nussbaum, of Rothgerber, Johnson & Lyons, LLP, of Colorado Springs, Colorado, and Jeanne Gorman, of Jeanne Gorman Rau, LLC, of Overland Park, for appellant/cross-appellee Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas.

Robert W. Tormohlen and Joseph E. Bant, of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, for appellee/cross-appellant Stephen E. Purdum.

Christopher P. Lawson, of Lawson Law Office, LLC, of Overland Park, for appellee/cross-appellee Katherine C. Purdum.

Before GREEN, P.J., ATCHESON and BRUNS, JJ.

GREEN, J.

[48 Kan.App.2d 939]In this defamation case, Stephen E. Purdum sued his former wife, Katherine C. Harcsar, for allegedly libelous statements she made to the Archdiocese of Kansas City in Kansas. These alleged defamatory statements were made to the Archdiocesan Tribunal when Harcsar sought to annul her sacramental marriage to Purdum. Harcsar moved to dismiss Purdum's defamation action under K.S.A. 60–212(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. She maintained that because the statements were made in the context of the annulment action, they were absolutely privileged as part of a “quasi-judicial proceeding.” Before ruling on Harcsar's motion to dismiss, the trial court, with the parties' consent, solicited the Archdiocese for input as amicus curiae.

The Archdiocese submitted an amicus brief in favor of dismissal, although on somewhat different grounds. It argued that the defamation action should be dismissed under K.S.A. 60–212(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it impermissibly interfered with the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, that the statements were absolutely privileged, and that the suit ran afoul of the church autonomy doctrine. The Archdiocese further argued that church autonomy doctrine prevented the courts from reviewing or interfering with church affairs that involve faith, doctrine, governance, and policy.

When the trial court denied Harcsar's motion to dismiss, the Archdiocese moved to intervene and to become a party in the action. In its motion to intervene, the Archdiocese argued that the church autonomy doctrine prevented the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over the action. After reviewing the briefs and hearing arguments, the trial court again rejected the Archdiocese's argument based on the church autonomy doctrine and also denied its motion to intervene. In rejecting the church [48 Kan.App.2d 940]autonomy doctrine, the trial court recognized that no claims were made

[301 P.3d 721]

against the church, that the statements about Purdum's mental condition were secular in nature, and that determining the truth or falsity of such statements would not require interpretation of ecclesiastical doctrine or other such entanglement with the church. Nevertheless, the trial court held that the alleged defamatory statements were made in the context of a written statement to the Archdiocese, an activity that was “absolutely privileged as made pursuant to the defendant's First Amendment right to Free Exercise of her religion.” As a result, the trial court dismissed the defamation action against Harcsar for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60–212(b)(1).

On appeal, Purdum argues that the trial court erred by holding that the statements made in Harcsar's petition for annulment were absolutely privileged. Thus, he asserts that the trial court erred by finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a result of absolute privilege. This court agrees. Nevertheless, when a trial court reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied upon the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. Robbins v. City of Wichita, 285 Kan. 455, 472, 172 P.3d 1187 (2007).

Here, Harcsar's alleged defamatory statements are inextricably part of the Archdiocesan Tribunal. Moreover, Purdum conceded that the only defamatory publication allegedly made by Harcsar was made to the Archdiocesan Tribunal, within its ecclesiastical procedure. Harcsar raised defenses of consent and qualified privilege to the allegedly defamatory statements she made to the Archdiocesan Tribunal. Purdum's suit thus would require the civil courts to interpret canon law concerning Harcsar's consent defense. Harcsar's consent defense and her qualified privilege defense would excessively entangle the civil courts in a matter that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids. Because the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment precludes jurisdiction over the subject matter of Purdum's defamation action, this court determines that the trial court properly concluded that the First Amendment precluded its exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in this defamation action.

[48 Kan.App.2d 941]Facts

As stated earlier, the trial court dismissed Purdum's defamation action against Harcsar for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60–212(b)(1). The parties did not dispute the material facts upon which the trial court relied in dismissing the case, nor do they dispute those factual assertions for purposes of this appeal.

Purdum and Harcsar were married on April 25, 1993, in New Jersey. Before marrying, Purdum and Harcsar completed and signed the prenuptial inquiry prescribed by the Catholic Church. Moreover, in this inquiry, they both stated that they understood and consented to the obligations for a Catholic marriage. Under paragraph “44” of Exhibit C–1, it addressed Purdum's and Harcsar's consent to the authority of the Catholic Church over their marriage:

“Both spouses assent to the authority of the Catholic Church over their marriage by their free request to be married within the Catholic Church. This assent endures if one or both of the spouses later asks the Church to declare the invalidity of the same marriage. In other words, if the marriage is sacramentally celebrated within the Catholic Church, the Catholic Church has jurisdiction over not only the preparation for and liturgical celebration of the sacrament of marriage, it also has jurisdiction over the judicial process to discern whether there were defects in the marriage that warrant an ecclesiastical declaration of invalidity. Nonetheless, participation in the tribunal process is voluntary and uncoerced.”

The record indicates that “ ‘when [a] non-Catholic spouse voluntarily enters into the process of spiritual and religious preparation for sacramental marriage, that person freely submits to the jurisdiction of the Church as regards the celebration and oversight of the sacrament of marriage.’ ” He or she is told about the jurisdiction of the church. For example, under Purdum's prenuptial inquiry, he was asked the following question: “Are you giving your consent to this marriage

[301 P.3d 722]

freely, without force or fear of any kind?” Purdum answered “Yes” to that question. At the end of Purdum's prenuptial inquiry, a priest/deacon and Purdum signed the inquiry. The priest/deacon affirmed that he had instructed Purdum “according to the prescripts of Canon Law and the regulations of the Diocese.”

[48 Kan.App.2d 942]Purdum filed for divorce in Johnson County in late 2001, and the divorce was granted about 6 years later. Harcsar apparently wished to remarry in a Catholic ceremony. The Catholic Church will allow a later marriage when an annulment is granted for any previous marriage. Thus, before Harcsar could remarry in a Catholic ceremony, she needed to obtain an annulment of her marriage to Purdum.

In February 2009, Harcsar filed a petition for annulment with the Archdiocesan Tribunal. As provided in the rules for the Tribunal, the Archdiocese sent a copy of the petition to Purdum and informed him that he could participate in the annulment proceeding if he wanted. Persons affiliated with the Archdiocese read the petition in connection with the annulment process. The petition and the process are confidential. Only church officials directly involved in that process would be privy to the information contained in the petition.

In his civil suit, Purdum alleged that the statements Harcsar made about him in her annulment petition were false and defamatory. His amended petition described briefly the nature of the alleged defamation as an assertion that he had been “diagnosed as bipolar.” The suit contends that Harcsar knew those statements to be false. The amended petition made no claim against the Archdiocese or any of its employees, agents, or members of the Tribunal.

With the consent of Purdum and Harcsar, the trial court invited the Archdiocese...