Purdy v. People

• Decision Date: 18 January 1892
• Citation: 29 N.E. 700,140 Ill. 46
• Parties: PURDY v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

140 Ill. 46

29 N.E. 700

PURDY

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 18, 1892.

Error to criminal court of Cook county; JULIUS S. GRINNELL, Judge.

Indictment of William E. Purdy for murder. Defendant was convicted, and he brings error. Reversed.

Orlando Briggs, for plaintiff in error.

Geo. Hunt, Atty. Gen., for the People.

BAKER, J.

William E. Purdy, the plaintiff in error, was indicted and tried in the criminal court of Cook county for the murder of Samuel Reniniger, and was convicted, and sentenced to be executed. The criminating evidence was all circumstantial. The rule in such case is that, before a conviction can properly be had, the guilt of the accused must be so thorougly established as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis. Here the evidence for the prosecution was not of an entirely satisfactory character, but probably sufficient, if little or no weight be given to that for the defense, to sustain a conviction. Said evidence clearly shows that prior to and immediately up to the day of the death of the deceased the relations existing between him and the accused were most intimate and friendly, and the conduct of the latter after such death, as shown by said evidence, was not, in many respects, that which would naturally be expected in a guilty man. The only testimony introduced by the defense was that of the defendant himself. His statements upon the witness stand were in the main consistent with prior statements made by him, and wherein there were any discrepancies he made either reasonable or plausible explanations of the same. His account of the transactions involved was in most respects not inconsistent with the facts and circumstances in proof, and in many respects was corroborated by them. In a criminal case the jury are the judges of the facts, and of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight of the evidence. And in such case a defendant is, under our statute, a competent witness in his own behalf. By express provision of the statute the jury may take into consideration his interest in the event of the prosecution; but otherwise than this he stands upon the same footing with any other witness. It was without doubt the intention of the statute to confer upon defendants a substantial right and benefit under it. A person charged with crime has the right to submit his testimony to the jurors, and have them judge of it and of his credibility.

The seventh of the instructions given at the instance of the people was as follows: ‘The court instructs the jury as a matter of law that in this state the accused is permitted to testify in his own behalf; that when he does so testify he at once becomes the same as any other witness, and his credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests as are legally applied to any other witness; and in determining the degree of credibility that shall be accorded to his testimony the jury have a right to take into consideration the fact that he is interested in the result of this prosecution, as well as his demeanor and conduct on the witness stand and during the trial; and the jury are also to take into consideration the fact, if such is the fact, that he has been contradicted by other witnesses. And the court further instructs the jury that if, after considering all the evidence in the case, they find that the accused or any other witness has willfully and corruptly testified falsely to any fact material to the issue in this case, they have the right to entirely disregard their testimony, except in so far as their testimony is corroborated by other credible evidence in the case.’ It is to be noted that by this instruction the jury were told that in determining the degree of credibility that should be accorded to the testimony of the defendant they had a right to take into consideration not only his demeanor and conduct while on the witness stand, but also his demeanor and conduct during the trial. The jury were sworn to try the issues submitted to them according to the law and the evidence, and most assuredly the demeanor and conduct of the defendant during the progress of the trial and while he was not a witness upon the stand were no part of the evidence in the case. Evidence may be introduced which was not anticipated. A witness may greatly exaggerate a trifling circumstance, or may deliberately make a misstatement. A witness may fail to testify to a fact which the defendant fully believed was within the knowledge of such witness, and would be stated by him. Exaggerated denunciation may be indulged in by attorneys. The presiding judge may decide contrary to the expectations of the defendant in respect to the admissibility of certain evidence, or may rule a point of law against him. Under these and other like circumstances a prisoner, and especially in a trial where his life was at stake, might frequently, and especially so if he was not a hardened criminal, demean himself, while under the influence of his disappointment, fears, and feelings, in such a manner as that an observer would regard his conduct and demeanor as indication of guilt. It would be illogical and unjust, under circumstances such as stated, to deduce a conclusion unfavorable to the defendant. It has very frequently been held that a jury may, in determining the credibility of witnesses, consider their demeanor and conduct while upon the witness stand, and there is reason in such holding. A person charged with crime can be examined as a witness only at his own request; and...