Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., Ltd.
| Decision Date | 15 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. C00-4071-MWB.,C00-4071-MWB. |
| Citation | 202 F.Supp.2d 905 |
| Parties | PURE FISHING, INC., f/k/a Berkley, Inc., Plaintiff, v. SILVER STAR CO., LTD., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Robert D. Sharp of Belin, Lamson, McCormick, Zumbach, Flynn, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.
Gregory M. Lederer of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................... 908
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................. 908
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS ................................................. 908
A. Defendant's Motion To Dismiss ............................... 908
1. Standards for motion to dismiss .......................... 908
2. Analysis of motion ....................................... 909
B. Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment ..................... 910
1. Standards for summary judgment ........................... 910
2. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act .......... 911
3. Analysis of motion ....................................... 913
a. Personal jurisdiction under section 626B.4(1) ......... 913
b. Personal jurisdiction under section 626B.4(2) ......... 914
i. Minimum contacts .................................. 914
ii. Quantity, quality, and relatedness of contacts .... 917
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................................... 917
On July 2, 2000, plaintiff Pure Fishing, Inc. ("Pure Fishing") filed this action against defendant Silver Star Co., Ltd. ("Silver Star") seeking enforcement of a judgement obtained by Outdoor Technologies Group Australia ("Outdoor Technologies") against Silver Star in the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District, Registry General Division pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 626B, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Pure Fishing is the assignee of Outdoor Technologies.
On December 17, 2001, Pure Fishing moved for summary judgment. On December 19, 2001, Silver Star filed a motion to dismiss. In its motion to dismiss, Silver Star seeks dismissal from the case because of a lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).1 Both parties then sought and were granted extensions of time in which to resist the other party's respective motion. The parties subsequently filed their respective resistances to the other's motion.
On November 12, 1996, Outdoor Technologies Group of Australia Pty. Limited filed an action against Silver Star Co., Ltd., in the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District Registry General Division. This claim was personally served upon Silver Star's Chief of General Affairs, Cheug Yeun Sam, on January 15, 1997, at 488 Janglim-dong, Saha-ku, Busan, Korea.
On May 30, 1997, Judge Jay Lindgren of the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District Registry General Division entered judgement in favor of Outdoor Technologies and against Silver Star in the sum of $504,019 Australian, together with costs. Outdoor Technologies is now known as Abu Garcia Pty., Ltd. On June 19, 2000, Abu Garcia Pty., Ltd. assigned the May 30, 1997, judgment to Berkley, Inc., the predecessor in interest to Pure Fishing.
For purposes of Silver Star's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court takes all facts alleged in the complaint as true. See Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990). Further, the court must construe the allegations in the complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the complaint favorably to Pure Fishing. See Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986). Although the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of jurisdiction falls upon Pure Fishing, a nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction to defeat a motion to dismiss. See Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 543 (8th Cir. 1998); Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecommunications, Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir.1996); Wessels, Arnold & Henderson v. National Medical Waste, Inc., 65 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th Cir.1995); Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir.1994); Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hosoya Fireworks Co., Ltd. v. Barone, 513 U.S. 948, 115 S.Ct. 359, 130 L.Ed.2d 313 (1994); Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir.1994); Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir.1991); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir.) (), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1006, 117 S.Ct. 508, 136 L.Ed.2d 398 (1996). Jurisdiction need not be proved by a preponderance of the evidence until trial or until the court holds an evidentiary hearing. See Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1387; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). If the court does not hold a hearing and instead relies on pleadings and affidavits, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of that party. See id.; General Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1387 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Dakota Indus.); Med-Tec, Inc. v. Kostich, 980 F.Supp. 1315, 1326 (N.D.Iowa 1997); Woodke v. Dahm, 873 F.Supp. 179, 192 (N.D.Iowa 1995).
Silver Star contends in its motion that Pure Fishing may not enforce the Australian judgement against Silver Star unless there is some basis for Iowa's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Silver Star. In its resistance to Silver Star's Motion To Dismiss, Pure Fishing asserts that a party seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment under Iowa's version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act need not establish a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the foreign judgment debtor.
There is scant law interpreting Iowa's version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, and none addressing the issue before the court. Therefore, the court has turned to decisions interpreting other states' versions of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Even here, there is sparse authority. However, in Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec., 281 A.D.2d 42, 723 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.2001), the court held that, under New York's version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act:
We conclude, however, that a party seeking recognition in New York of a foreign money judgment (whether of a sister state or a foreign country) need not establish a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor by the New York courts. No such requirement can be found in the CPLR, and none inheres in the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, from which jurisdictional basis requirements derive.
Id. at 288. The court notes that New York's version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is for all practical purposes, identical to Iowa's. In Lenchyshyn, after noting that New York's version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act makes no mention of any requirement of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, the court offered the following rational in support of its decision:
Considerations of logic, fairness, and practicality dictate that a judgment creditor be permitted to obtain recognition and enforcement of a foreign country money judgment without any showing that the judgment debtor is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York. In proceeding under article 53, the judgment creditor does not seek any new relief against the judgment debtor, but instead merely asks the court to perform its ministerial function of recognizing the foreign country money judgment and converting it into a New York judgment. Moreover, it is not inevitable or even likely that any enforcement device ultimately employed by the judgment creditor will operate against the judgment debtor in personam. Most devices for the enforcement of money judgments operate in rem against the real or personal property of the judgment debtor, or in personam against third parties, such as banks, investment firms, employers, or other third-party garnishees, obligors or debtors of the judgment debtor.
Id. at 291 (citations omitted).
The court finds the rationale of the New York court in Lenchyshyn to be persuasive. The Iowa statute itself contains no requirement of personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. The court notes that in the context of the recognition and enforcement of other state judgments, the minimum contacts requirement of the Due Process Clause does not prevent a state from enforcing another state's valid judgment against a judgment-debtor's property located in that state, regardless of the lack of other minimum contacts by the judgment-debtor. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 n. 36 (1977) (). The principles announced by the Supreme Court in Shaffer would apply no less in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign money-judgments under Iowa's Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Thus, ...
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