Pure Foods v. Sir Sirloin, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1955
• Citation: 84 So.2d 51
• Parties: PURE FOODS, Inc., et al., Appellants, v. SIR SIRLOIN, Inc., Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 51

84 So.2d 51

PURE FOODS, Inc., et al., Appellants, v.SIR SIRLOIN, Inc., Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division B.

Dec. 2, 1955.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1956.

Joe Creel, Miami, for appellants.

Burton Young, Marshall H. Ader, Miami Beach, and Leonard Pepper, Tallahassee, for appellee.

THOMAS, Justice.

This case was here on an appeal from a decree of the chancellor dismissing the bill of complaint and we held that the facts alleged warranted consideration of the merits of the dispute so we reversed the decree with directions to hear testimony relevant to issues that might be formed by appropriate pleadings and to 'enter a final decree in accordance with law in the light of his findings of facts.'Sir Sirloin, Inc., v. Pure Foods, Inc., Fla., 66 So.2d 593.

The chancellor did as directed and it is on an appeal from his eventual decree that we again study the litigation.We go to the first record, used in the present appeal by order of this court, to get the averments the appellee represented that it could prove, and which proved, should entitle it to relief.

The appellee is a corporation engaged in preparing and selling frozen and fresh meat, called in the bill'specialty products.'Immediately it entered the business, it began through its agents to compile a list of customers, a list that lengthened with the passage of time.All employees were cautioned not to disclose the names of customers appearing on the roll.

The appellee, according to the bill, also acquired many 'trade names,' and 'trade secrets' which were revealed only to trusted employees and were used in the preparation of products that became widely known as 'Steakies,''Chuck Wagon Steaks,''Sir Sirloin Juniors,''Sir Sirloin Seniors,' and so on.In processing these articles, secret batters and mixtures were used and these, too, were disclosed only to trusted employees.

Among appellee's confidants were George Kirby, George Dennis and David Rowan, salesmen, and Jessie Smith, its office manager.

The appellee charged that Rowan started a campaign to persuade other employees to leave appellee's service and work for the appellant, Pure Foods, Inc., and that he was successful in inducing Kirby, Dennis and Smith to do that.Smith then began to win customers from appellee and persuade them to trade with the competitor, Pure Foods, Inc.

As soon as Rowan entered the service of the appellant corporation, the corporation began marketing products similar to those of appellee under the trade names 'Beef Fillets,''Sirloin Steaks,' and the like.

The appellant-corporation could not process its goods, charged the appellee, had it not taken advantage of the secrets conveyed to it by appellee's former employees, and could not have learned of appellee's list of customers had the list not been given it by them.

Such duplicity, averred the appellee, developed unfair competition that brought it irreparable injury.

All the individual defendants became owners of an interest in Pure Foods, Inc., when they left the employ of Sir Sirloin, Inc., but all except Jessie Smith have since disposed of their interest so she is the only one now a party to this appeal.

After the chancellor considered the testimony, he decreed that the appellant had completely failed to show sufficient damage to justify a monetary award.He decided that the methods and products of appellant had been so extensively imitated and used in the area by other firms that an injunction would serve no purpose, but he did undertake to relieve the appellee from 'future unfair competition' by restraining the appellant-corporation from '(c)opying any packages * * * (a)ppropriating any trade lists * * * (and)(e)mploying any meat processing secrets used by the Plaintiff(appellee).'Following this language appears this qualifying sentence: 'This does not mean that the corporate (defendant) may not continue in its present business nor employ its present merchandising processing or packaging methods.'

Costs in an amount approximating $1,000 were taxed against the original defendants and the placing of this burden on the appellant seems to be the appellant's main complaint here.

The decree of the chancellor follows almost verbatim the recommendations of the special master which were upheld after exceptions were filed by all parties.The only substantial difference was the chancellor's rejection of the master's proposal that a nominal judgment for one dollar be entered against the appellants.

As we analyze the decree, the salient parts of which we have quoted, we come to the conclusion that its terms neutralize one another and that in effect the appellee was denied all the relief it was seeking.If the methods and products of the appellee were so extensively used that an injunction would be feckless, and if the present operation of appellant's business and its use of present merchandising, processing and packaging methods should not be disturbed, it seems to usthe appellants were actually exonerated from all charges of wrongdoing, although by his approval of the special master's report the chancellor seems to have accepted the statement that appellants had indulged in unfair...