Pure Oil Company v. Suarez, 21446.

Citation346 F.2d 890
Decision Date07 September 1965
Docket NumberNo. 21446.,21446.
PartiesThe PURE OIL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Pascual SUAREZ, Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

William S. Stone, Joaquin Campoy, New Orleans, La., James L. Hurley, Miami, Fla., Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, La., Fowler, White, Gillen, Hurley & Trenam, Miami, Fla., for appellant.

Arthur Roth, Miami, Fla., S. Eldridge Sampliner, Cleveland, Ohio, for appellee.

Before WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges, and BREWSTER, District Judge.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge.

The appellee instituted this civil action in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida to recover damages for injuries he received while employed in the capacity of a seaman aboard the vessel S.S. "PURE OIL," owned and operated by The Pure Oil Company. His complaint proceeded on two theories: (1) negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S. C.A. § 688, and (2) breach of the shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The company moved to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois on the ground that venue was not properly laid in the Southern District of Florida.1 The trial court denied the motion, but certified the question under 28 U.S. C.A. § 1292(b), and this interlocutory appeal ensued.

The relevant provision of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, provides as follows:

"Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located." (Emphasis supplied.)

The parties stipulated that The Pure Oil Company "has transacted a substantial amount of business in Florida and the Southern District of Florida, was doing substantial amounts of business in the Southern District of Florida at the time of the commencement of this action, and hopes to continue doing substantial business therein. * * *" The company also filed an uncontradicted affidavit which states that it is incorporated in Ohio and maintains its principal office in Cook County, Illinois. The sole question for decision is whether the provision of the Jones Act quoted above enables an injured seaman to sue his employer corporation wherever the employer does business or whether his choice of forums is limited to the districts in which the employer is incorporated and maintains its principal office.

Although the quoted provision of the Jones Act literally speaks of "jurisdiction," it was early held to refer only to proper venue. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 265 U.S. 375, 44 S.Ct. 391, 68 L.Ed. 748 (1924). Hence, the privilege need not be given effect unless the defendant insists upon it. E. g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 S.Ct. 153, 84 L.Ed. 167 (1939); Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra; Wright Federal Courts 128 (1963). It is established that, in the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, the "residence" of a corporation for venue purposes is limited to the state of its incorporation. See Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163, 68 S.Ct. 587, 92 L.Ed. 614 (1948); Ex parte Shaw (Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co.), 145 U.S. 444, 450, 12 S.Ct. 935, 937, 36 L.Ed. 768, 771 (1892).

The appellee makes two arguments in support of the district court's denial of the motion to transfer, the first of which can be disposed of in short order. According to appellee, the Jones Act was passed in 1920 to expand and liberalize the relief afforded to seamen for injuries they sustained in their employment. Instead of devising separate standards to be applied in personal injury suits by seamen Congress adopted the expedient of incorporating by reference the more detailed provisions which govern the liability of railroads to their employees.2 Therefore, appellee argues that the special venue provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act, under which venue against Pure Oil would undoubtedly be proper in the instant case,3 are applicable to a civil action under the Jones Act. However, this argument does not adequately accommodate the well-recognized and eminently logical canon of statutory construction that the specific provisions of a statute control exclusively over the broader and more general provisions of another statute which may relate to the same subject matter in the absence of a clear manifestation to the contrary by the legislature. See Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758-759, 81 S.Ct. 864, 867-868, 6 L.Ed.2d 72, 76, (1961); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-229, 77 S.Ct. 787, 791-792, 1 L.Ed.2d 786, 790-791 (1957). As one court has stated, "The short answer to appellee's argument is that Congress has seen fit to impose different venue requirements in Jones Act cases. To now hold that the venue requirements under the Federal Employers' Liability Act are controlling would negate the plain language of 46 U.S.C. § 688." Rodriquez v. United Fruit Co., 236 F.Supp. 680, 682 (E.D.Va.1964). We are not persuaded to hold otherwise merely because the two other provisions of 45 U.S.C.A. § 56 have been held applicable in Jones Act cases.4 Neither of the subjects covered by those provisions is dealt with specifically in the Jones Act, and they would thus be fairly covered by the general reference to the FELA. See Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392, 44 S.Ct. 391, 396, 68 L.Ed. 748, 755 (1924).5

Appellee makes a far more appealing argument, at least from the point of view of statutory construction, in its assertion that the definition of the term "residence" which was added to the general venue statute in 1948, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (c), should be read into the Jones Act venue requirements. Prior to 1948 — and, indeed, at the time Congress enacted the Jones Act in 1920 — the general venue statute was geared to the residence of either the defendant or, in diversity cases, the plaintiff as well. The residence of a corporation was uniformly restricted to the state of its incorporation, even in Jones Act suits. E. g., Burris v. Matson Nav. Co. (S.D.N.Y.1940) 37 F.Supp. 648. In the course of the general revision of the Judicial Code in 1948, Congress inserted subsection (c) into the general venue statute. That section provides as follows:

"(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is the last clause of that subsection which concerns us primarily, for if that phrase can be read as defining the residence of a defendant corporation for the purposes of the Jones Act's venue provisions, then the trial court properly denied Pure Oil's motion to transfer.

If section 1391(c) and the Jones Act venue provision are viewed together in light of the remedial purposes of the Jones Act, the most logical conclusion might well be that the general venue statute did expand the definition of residence in the Jones Act. In fact, all the courts which were faced with the question between 1948 and 1957 read the Jones Act in light of the new concept of corporate residence embodied in section 1391(c).6

In 1957 however, the Supreme Court held that section 1391(c) did not define the residence of a corporate defendant in patent infringement litigation. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957). Since the decision in that case, most of the federal courts have concluded that its rationale foreclosed the application of section 1391(c) to Jones Act venue,7 although a few have reached a contrary result.8 The only other circuit court which has confronted the issue in light of the Fourco case has read that decision as militating against the application of section 1391(c) to the Jones Act. Leith v. Oil Transport Co. (3 Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 591. In addition, many courts have applied the Fourco rationale to other special venue statutes, holding that the provisions of the general venue section do not supplement those special statutes.9

Hence, a casual glance at the rather formidable array of authorities would suggest that the court in Leith was correct in its strict application of the Fourco result to suits under the Jones Act. Nevertheless, we must disagree with the Third Circuit's interpretation of the Fourco opinion.10 While we certainly deem that opinion controlling, we think its rationale compels a result contrary to that reached in Leith.

The special venue statute to which the plaintiff in Fourco sought to apply section 1391(c) provided as follows:

"Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b). (Emphasis supplied.)

That section was re-enacted in 1948 along with the general revision of the Judicial Code which resulted in the expanded definition of corporate residence in section 1391(c). When section 1400(b) was reenacted, the word "residence" was substituted for the word "inhabitant," but the court concluded from an examination of the legislative history of section 1400 (b) that no substantive change was intended by the change in wording. Furthermore, as indicated by the Supreme Court's own review of the reasons for the passage of the predecessor to section 1400(b) in Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 62 S.Ct. 780, 86 L.Ed. 1026 (1942), the special venue section applicable to patent infringement actions was intended as a restrictive measure, designed to place greater limits on venue in patent infringement suits than those which had previously applied under the general venue provisions then in force. The Supreme Court thus concluded:

"In light of the fact that the Revisers\' Notes do not express any substantive change in § 1400(b), and of the fact that several of those
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