Puritan Bed Spring Co. v. Wolfe

• Decision Date: 18 October 1918
• Docket Number: No. 10279.,10279.
• Citation: 120 N.E. 417,68 Ind.App. 330
• Parties: PURITAN BED SPRING CO. v. WOLFE.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

68 Ind.App. 330

120 N.E. 417

PURITAN BED SPRING CO.

v.WOLFE.

No. 10279.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

Oct. 18, 1918.

Appeal from Industrial Board of Indiana.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Albert Wolfe to obtain compensation for personal injuries, and opposed by the Puritan Bed Spring Company, employer. Compensation was awarded by a single member and subsequently by the full board, and the employer appeals. Affirmed.

Joseph W. Hutchinson and Frederick K. Werne, both of Indianapolis, for appellant. E. E. McFerren, of Indianapolis, for appellee.

HOTTEL, J.

On January 28, 1918, appellee filed with the Industrial Board of Indiana an application in the usual form for compensation for injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while in appellant's employ. A hearing on February 8, 1918, by Samuel R. Artman, a member of said board, resulted in an award in favor of appellee. Upon petition by appellant for review, said case was heard by the full board on March 1, 1918, with the result that a finding and award was made by the full board substantially the same as that made by the single member thereof. To this award the appellant excepted, and from it this appeal is prosecuted.

Appellant assigns as error that said award is contrary to law. Under this assignment appellant challenges the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the award and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of facts. The part of said finding pertinent and material to a consideration of these questions is, in substance, as follows: On November 29, 1917, appellee was in the employment of appellant at an average weekly wage of $21.60. On that date, while engaged in the discharge of the duties of his employment, appellee lifted a bale of wire, weighing about 150 pounds, to a reel which stood about even with the appellee's shoulders. In lifting the bale of wire, appellee severely strained his body, and thereby caused a protrusion of an intestine into an existing hernial sac or aperture.. By reason of the strain of appellee's body at the time said intestine was impinged or held in said hernial sac, producing an immediate intestinal strangulation. Appellant had actual knowledge of appellee's injury immediately thereafter. On December 15, 1917, appellant executed a report of such injury to the Industrial Board and delivered the same to its insurance carrier. Appellant did not furnish appellee an attending physician for treatment of his injuries nor the necessary surgical and hospital services and supplies required thereby. The strangulation aforesaid required an immediate surgical operation in order to save appellee's life. Appellee procured his own surgeon, Dr. Gatch of Indianapolis, to perform said operation, and a reasonable fee for his services in performing the operation and treating appellee following it and treating the first 30 days after the injury is $60. Appellee procured his own hospital services and supplies, and thereby incurred within the first 30 days after his injury an expense of $57.14, which he has paid. As a result of his injury, the appellee was totally disabled for work continuously from the date thereof until and including January 23, 1918.

It is insisted by appellant in effect that this finding affirmatively shows that appellee's injury was not accidental, or at least fails to show that such injury was accidental. This contention is in the main based on the words of the finding which we have italicized supra.

[1] Appellant concedes, and correctly so, that where an employé affected with disease received a personal injury under such circumstances that the act in question would entitle him to compensation had there been no disease involved, and such disease is materially hastened to a final culmination by the injury, there may be an award, if it is shown that such injury was the result of accident; that in such cases the court will not undertake to measure the degree of disability due respectively to the disease and to the accident, but the consequence of the disease will be attributed solely to the accident. Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Coleman, 117 N. E. 502, 503;In re Bowers, 116 N. E. 842, 843.

[2] It is insisted, however, in effect that these propositions of law cannot avail appellee for the reason that the finding here shows that he was afflicted with a disease or disabling physical condition which rendered him susceptible to the injury for which compensation was awarded, upon exposure to “some slight incident” either within or outside of the employment, and that in such cases the disease or condition, rather than the accident, will be treated as the cause of the disability. It is argued that the finding of the board that the lifting of the wire caused the intestine to protrude into an “ existing hernial sac or aperture,” affirmatively shows that appellee's condition, rather than the accident, was the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation was allowed, and that the mere fact that the disability occurred during his employment affords no justification for the award.

We think appellant confuses the injury and resulting disability upon which the award is predicated with the condition which made such injury or disability more...