Purjet v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.
Decision Date | 08 January 1986 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 1985/284 |
Citation | 22 V.I. 147 |
Parties | DAVID FRANK PURJET, individually, and as father and next friend and friend of CARRIE RENEE PURJET, Plaintiff v. HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION, THE LITWIN CORPORATION, AMERADA HESS CORPORATION, ST. CROIX PETRO-CHEMICAL CORPORATION, KEENE CORPORATION, OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLASS CORPORATION and XYZ ASBESTOS MANUFACTURING AND DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION, Defendant |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Motion for summary judgment by defendant in suit alleging exposure to asbestos. The District Court, O'Brien, J., held that since mere exposure to asbestos was insufficient to state a cause of action, the motion would be granted and plaintiffs complaint dismissed with prejudice.EDWARD HASKINS JACOBS, ESQ. (JACOBS & BRADY), St. Croix, V.I., for plaintiff
LEE J. ROHN, ESQ. (BRITAIN H. BRYANT), St. Croix, V.I., for defendant HOVIC
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This motion for summary judgment requires us to decide whether exposure to asbestos alone is sufficient to state a cause of action in the Virgin Islands. For the reasons stated herein, we hold it does not.
Plaintiff David Purjet worked as an insulation supervisor for Litwin Panamerican Corp. for two years. He alleges that over the course of his employment he was repeatedly exposed to asbestos at the St. Croix refinery of defendant Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. "(HOVIC"). Purjet also brings suit on behalf of his daughter, Carrie Renee Purjet, alleging she was exposed to the asbestos that he inadvertently brought home on his clothing.
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs are not presently suffering from an asbestos-related disease. Rather, their suit is grounded on the consequences of the lengthy latency period of these ailments.
HOVIC brought this motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs have failed to state a legally cognizable claim.
The plaintiffs have asserted four causes of action: enhanced risk of developing an asbestos-induced disease; intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of the enhanced risk, and the need to undergo diagnostic screening.
Actual injury or damage is an essential element of a tort cause of action. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7; W. Prosser and P. Keeton on Torts (5 ed. 1984) at 165. The Purjets ask us to dispense with this requirement because the claim of enhanced risk seeks present damages for a possible future injury.
Courts examining claims arising from exposure to carcinogens have consistently dismissed the cases pending manifestation of an injury related to the exposure. In Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1985), the Third Circuit rejected the contention that exposure to asbestos alone stated a cause of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("F.E.L.A."). Schweitzer involved asbestosis suits which were filed after the plaintiffs' employer had consummated reorganization. As railroad workers, the plaintiffs were required to follow F.E.L.A. regulations which define non-dischargeable claims as those in existence prior to the consummation of the employers' reorganization. In dismissing the case, the court stated:
[Subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos is insufficient to constitute the actual loss or damage to a plaintiff's interest required to sustain a cause of action under generally applicable principles of tort law.
The court also found that policy prevented a contrary result.
Moreover, we are persuaded that a contrary rule would be undesirable as applied in the asbestos-related tort context. If mere exposure to asbestos were sufficient to give rise to a F.E.L.A. cause of action, countless seemingly healthy railroad workers, workers who might never manifest injury, would have tort claims cognizable in federal court. It is obvious that proofof damages in such cases would be highly speculative, likely resulting in windfalls for those who never take ill and insufficient compensation for those who do. Requiring manifest injury as a necessary element of an asbestos-related tort action avoids these problems and best serves the underlying purpose of tort law: the compensation of victims who have suffered. Therefore we hold that, as a matter of federal law, F.E.L.A. actions for asbestos-related injury do not exist before manifestation of injury.
Similarly, in Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978), the court held that a risk of cancer stemming from ingestion of diethylstilbestrol ("DES") would not state a products liability claim in the absence of a concrete physical injury. Id. at 719. See also Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (); Ayers v. Jackson Township, 461 A.2d 184, 186-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 493 A.2d 1314 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1985) ( ).
[1] Since it is undisputed that the plaintiffs are presently free of any asbestos-related disease, we hold that their claim for enhanced risk fails to state a legally cognizable cause of action.
The plaintiffs allege that they have suffered emotional distress as a result of HOVIC's act of exposing Purjet, and therefore Carrie Renee, to asbestos, thus increasing their chances of contracting a disease. HOVIC's acts are characterized alternatively as intentional and negligent. We will examine these allegations separately.
(1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 defines this tort:
[2] Purjet must prove intent, injury and the requisite conduct to warrant denial of HOVIC's motion.
As for injury, Comment j to § 46 states:
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. . . . The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. . . .
See Moolenaar v. Atlas Motor Inns, Inc., 616 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1980) ( ).
The requisite conduct is described in Comment d:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community . . . . The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.
[3] HOVIC argues correctly that the pleadings are devoid of any evidence indicating that Purjet has suffered the intense psychological distress required to maintain a claim under § 46 and comment j. Indeed, he continues to smoke cigarettes in spite of the effect asbestos may have upon the respiratory system.
[4] Moreover, we find Purjet has failed to meet the intent requirement. It is undisputed that HOVIC moved quickly and responsibly to remove the asbestos from the refinery once it had knowledge of the hazard. The conduct requirement is lacking for the same reasons.
(2) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 defines this cause of action:
[5, 6] Because neither plaintiff has alleged that the emotional distress resulted in physical injury, we find that § 436A of the Restatement is controlling. It provides:
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