Pursell v. Wolverine-Pentronix, Inc., WOLVERINE-PENTRONI

• Decision Date: 17 January 1973
• Docket Number: Docket No. 13321,No. 2,WOLVERINE-PENTRONI,INC,2
• Citation: 44 Mich.App. 416,205 N.W.2d 504
• Parties: C. L. PURSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v., a Michigan corporation, and Don Smith, Individually, Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 504

205 N.W.2d 504

44 Mich.App. 416

C. L. PURSELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WOLVERINE-PENTRONIX, INC., a Michigan corporation, and Don

Smith, Individually, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 13321.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

Jan. 17, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 12, 1973.

Released for Publication March 27, 1973.

Edward L. Cobb, Richard Z. Rosenfeld, Anderson, Patch, Rosenfeld, Potter & Grover, Jackson, for plaintiff-appellant.

Leonard J. Grabow, Levin, Levin, Garvett & Dill, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and BRONSON and TARGONSKI, ^* JJ.

TARGONSKI, Judge.

The plaintiff brought suit for damages for the breach of an alleged oral contract of employment caused by a premature termination of the employment and for alleged defamation connected with the termination.

The facts appearing in the plaintiff's complaint are largely uncontested. In 1966, the plaintiff was 59 years old and employed by Dow Chemical as general manager of its plant in Jackson, Michigan. This plant was acquired by the defendant from Dow Chemical on September 1, 1966. The defendant offered to keep the plaintiff on as general manager, orally promising to employ him as vice- president until he reached retirement at age 65. In reliance on these promises, the plaintiff severed his employment with Dow Chemical and accepted the position offered by the defendant. In June of 1970, the defendant terminated plaintiff's employment thereby breaching the oral promise. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that sometime around the date of his determination Don Smith made false and defamatory statements impugning his character.

The defendants filed a motion for accelerated judgment ¹ on the oral contract asserting the statute of frauds ² as a defense to oral contracts not to be performed in one year from their making. The defendants also moved for summary judgment ³ on the defamation charge contending that the complaint failed to specify the nature of the slander charged. The trial court granted both motions and from this ruling, the plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff's first contention in this Court is that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for damages resulting from the breach of the oral contract of employment.

At the outset, it must be stated that a contract not to be performed within one year from its making must be in writing to be enforceable, M.S.L.A. § 566.132(1); M.S.A. § 26.922(1), and that this rule applies to oral contracts of employment. Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America, 283 Mich. 561, 278 N.W. 687 (1938); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937).

The plaintiff concedes that the oral contract is covered by the above-cited rule but argues that the defendants are estopped from raising this defense.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel, upon which the plaintiff relies, is set forth in 3 Williston, Contracts (3d ed), § 533A, p. 796:

'Where one has acted to his detriment solely in reliance on an oral agreement, an estoppel may be raised to defeat the defense of the Statute of Frauds.'

In the instant case, plaintiff argues that the giving up of his prior employment and the substantial retirement benefits that accompanied it constituted sufficient reliance within the meaning of the doctrine. The defendants counter this argument with the proposition that the giving up of other employment is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. In support of this proposition the defendant cites Adolph v. Cookware Co. of America, 283 Mich. 561, 278 N.W. 687 (1938); Gudenau v. Farm Crest Bakeries, 268 Mich. 399, 256 N.W. 462 (1934), and McLaughlin v. Ford Motor Co., 269 F.2d 120 (C.A.6, 1959). The holdings of these cases are adequately stated in McLaughlin, supra, 124, 125, in the following language:

'The exception recognized by that case and in some other jurisdictions is that the oral agreement is not affected by the Statute of Frauds if it is supported by a consideration separate and apart from its performance, such as where the plaintiff has given up something to the defendant for which it would not be compensated unless the agreement was enforced. * * * The action of the appellant in giving up his position with the General Motors Corp. was only a necessary incident in placing himself in a position so that he might perform his agreement with the Ford Motor Company. This conferred no benefit upon the Ford Motor Company and was not a separate consideration passing from the appellant to the Ford Motor Company within the meaning of the rule. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 689, 273 N.W. 315; Adolph v. Cookware Co., 283 Mich. 561, 568, 278 N.W. 687.'

Thus, these cases did not deal with the problem of estoppel and are not controlling.

A careful review of the law in this state reveals that the only case dealing with the doctrine of estoppel as applied to a factual situation similar to the instant case is Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328 (CA 6, 1965). In Oxley, supra, the plaintiff underwent considerable expenditures to begin to operate a 'hog leasing' program as a result of an oral agreement with the defendant. The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the defendant was estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds.

Granted, there may be a difference between the spending of a large amount of money in reliance on an oral contract and one's giving up of his employment. However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in those cases where its application is called for by the facts. Oxley, supra.

In the instant case, the facts adduced at trial may show that in this particular case, there was sufficient reliance to estop the defendant from raising the Statute of Frauds as a defense. Therefore, the granting of the motion for accelerated judgment was improper.

The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment with respect to the count alleging slander.

The trial court's basis for the ruling was that the complaint failed to state what false or defamatory statements were made, to whom they were made or when they were made.

The recitation in the complaint relied upon by the plaintiff to establish his defamation claim reads as...