Purtill v. Hess, No. 61517

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtRYAN; SIMON
Citation489 N.E.2d 867,95 Ill.Dec. 305,111 Ill.2d 229
Parties, 95 Ill.Dec. 305 Carol L. PURTILL, Appellant, v. J.H. HESS et al., Appellees.
Decision Date06 February 1986
Docket NumberNo. 61517

Page 867

489 N.E.2d 867
111 Ill.2d 229, 95 Ill.Dec. 305
Carol L. PURTILL, Appellant,
v.
J.H. HESS et al., Appellees.
No. 61517.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Feb. 6, 1986.

Page 868

[95 Ill.Dec. 306] [111 Ill.2d 233] James C. Kearns, Michael E. Raub, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Urbana, for appellees.

Craig J. Causeman, Thomas, Mamer & Haughey, Champaign, for appellee, George Elfers, M.D.

Segall Law Offices, P.C., Champaign, for appellant.

RYAN, Justice:

This medical malpractice action was instituted by the plaintiff, Carol L. Purtill, for damages occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendants, George Elfers, M.D., J.H. Hess, M.D., and Gibson Community Hospital, in the care, diagnosis, and treatment of the plaintiff during and following the birth of her child. The circuit court of Champaign County granted motions for summary judgment in favor of defendants Elfers and Gibson Community Hospital, on the ground that plaintiff's complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court also entered summary judgment in favor of defendant Hess on the basis of plaintiff's failure to affirmatively demonstrate the ability to offer competent expert testimony at trial concerning the applicable standard of medical care. (See 87 Ill.2d R. 191; Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hospital (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 1060, 76 Ill.Dec. 418, 458 N.E.2d 1072.) The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants [111 Ill.2d 234] in an unpublished Rule 23 order (87 Ill.2d R. 23). (128 Ill.App.3d 1162, 94 Ill.Dec. 59, 487 N.E.2d 816.) We granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal (94 Ill.2d R. 315). After oral argument, a brief amicus curiae was filed on behalf of Dr. Hess by the Illinois State Medical Society. This appeal involves only defendant Hess. No question has been raised in this court concerning the ruling of the trial and appellate courts on the statute of limitations issue.

On July 3, 1979, plaintiff gave birth to a child at Gibson Community Hospital in Gibson City. Dr. George Elfers, a licensed Illinois physician and surgeon practicing in McLean County, in the course of delivering the baby, performed a midline episiotomy, a surgical incision of the vulva. (Stedman's Medical Dictionary 474 (5th ed. 1982).) This incision allows delivery to occur without the tearing of the tissues which support the rectum and bladder, and prevents excessive stretching as the newborn passes through the vagina. 5B Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia of Personal Injuries & Allied Specialties sec. 37.7d (1972).

While performing the episiotomy, however, Dr. Elfers allegedly lacerated or tore the tissue between plaintiff's rectum and vagina. During the weeks following the delivery, plaintiff was examined by her family physician, Dr. J.H. Hess, a licensed

Page 869

[95 Ill.Dec. 307] Illinois physician practicing in Rantoul, in Champaign County. Dr. Hess' medical records indicated that he examined plaintiff in the area of her vagina and in the area of the episiotomy on July 9, August 9, and August 19 of 1979. Dr. Hess noted in his records that the scar left by the episiotomy seemed to be healing satisfactorily.

Approximately four months following the delivery, plaintiff began to experience the passing of fecal matter and flatulence from her vaginal opening. Plaintiff sought the medical advice of Dr. Hess. There is conflicting evidence in the record as to the exact number of occasions [111 Ill.2d 235] plaintiff consulted Dr. Hess. Plaintiff testified that she sought Dr. Hess' medical advice either by phone or by office visit on at least four occasions. Dr. Hess' notes and medical records indicated that the plaintiff first consulted him on September 19, 1980. In any event, the record established that between October of 1979 and February of 1981, plaintiff sought the medical advice of Dr. Hess, complaining only of vaginal irritation and discharge. Dr. Hess diagnosed plaintiff's condition during this period as a yeast infection and treated her with a topical ointment and vaginal suppositories. Plaintiff's problem, however, did not abate, and her condition deteriorated, proving particularly bothersome during her menstrual period.

Finally, on February 12, 1981, plaintiff informed Dr. Hess that she was passing fecal matter and flatulence through her vaginal opening. After a vaginal examination, Dr. Hess diagnosed the existence of a rectovaginal fistula at the site of the episiotomy performed by Dr. Elfers. A rectovaginal fistula is an abnormally formed canal or passage leading from the rectum to the vagina. (Stedman's Medical Dictionary 530-31 (5th ed. 1982).) A fistulous opening is formed by "the failure in the healing process of a penetrating wound." (2 Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder (MB) No. 609, at F-52 (1984).) Dr. Hess referred plaintiff to Dr. Lewis Trupin, a licensed Illinois gynecological specialist practicing in Champaign. Dr. Trupin examined plaintiff in June of 1981. Plaintiff subsequently underwent surgery at Burnham City Hospital in July of 1981. Dr. Trupin repaired the fistula and the third degree laceration in her rectal tissue allegedly resulting from an obstetrical injury during the episiotomy and delivery of plaintiff's child.

On February 14, 1983, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint in the circuit court of Champaign County, [111 Ill.2d 236] seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained by her as a result of negligent medical diagnosis and treatment by the defendants. Count I of the complaint, which was directed against Dr. Hess, alleged that he negligently failed to properly diagnose the presence of, or the formation of, two rectovaginal fistulae following child delivery on July 3, 1979, failed to use proper techniques in the presence of plaintiff's complaints, delayed in taking necessary steps to arrive at a proper diagnosis of plaintiff's condition of ill-being, and failed to refer plaintiff to a properly qualified gynecological specialist capable of diagnosing her condition. Count II was directed against Dr. Elfers, and count III was against the hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to counts II and III, holding that the statute of limitations had run. The appellate court affirmed. That issue has not been raised in this court.

On September 8, 1983, Dr. Hess filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1005), on the ground that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action and that he was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The motion was supported by his own affidavit. The affidavit set forth the specific instances in which Dr. Hess diagnosed and treated plaintiff for gynecological problems following the delivery of her child in July of 1979. The affidavit stated that the plaintiff did not present any symptoms suggestive of a rectovaginal fistula until February 12, 1981. After maintaining that Dr. Hess was familiar with the standard of care applicable to general practitioners in the Rantoul

Page 870

[95 Ill.Dec. 308] area for the years 1979 through 1981, the affidavit asserted that because an examination for a rectovaginal fistula is quite painful, the standard of care in Rantoul did not require a general practitioner to perform such an examination absent [111 Ill.2d 237] symptoms suggestive of that disorder. Finally, the affidavit concluded with an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Dr. Hess' diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff's gynecological problems conformed to the applicable standard of care for general practitioners in the Rantoul area in the years 1979 through 1981.

Dr. Hess' motion for summary judgment dealt solely with his freedom from negligence, and it did not raise the issue that plaintiff's complaint was filed on February 14, 1983, two years and two days following the discovery of Dr. Hess' alleged negligence. However, on September 9, 1983, Dr. Hess filed a supplement to his previously filed motion for summary judgment raising the statute of limitations defense. This issue was resolved by the circuit court in favor of plaintiff upon explanation by plaintiff's counsel that the statute of limitations tolled on February 12, 1983, a Saturday. Pursuant to section 1.11 of the act on statutory construction, the last day for filing the complaint was extended to Monday, February 14, 1983. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 1, par. 1012.) Plaintiff's filing against Dr. Hess was within the limitation period.

In response to Dr. Hess' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff filed objections based on a counteraffidavit of William D. Matviuw, M.D. The affidavit stated that if called as a witness in the case, Dr. Matviuw could and would testify competently to matters in his affidavit. The affidavit further stated that he was familiar with "the minimal standards of acceptable medical care, diagnosis, and treatment for Carol L. Purtill's condition of ill-being as it existed" and that those minimal standards "were uniform throughout the United States wherever patients similar to Carol L. Purtill were examined, cared for and treated for the condition of ill-being similar to that suffered by Carol L. Purtill." After indicating that he had reviewed plaintiff's medical records pertaining to [111 Ill.2d 238] the diagnosis, care, and treatment plaintiff received from Dr. Hess between 1979 and 1981, the affidavit offered Dr. Matviuw's expert opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that such diagnosis, care, and treatment were not in accordance with these uniform minimum standards and that this deviation from the accepted standard of care resulted in injury to the plaintiff.

Finally, the affidavit set forth specific instances in which Dr. Matviuw contended that Dr. Hess was negligent in the diagnosis and treatment of Carol Purtill. Dr....

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917 practice notes
  • Banco Popular v. Beneficial Systems, Inc., No. 1-01-0247.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 4, 2002
    ...BPT and BPM, as the moving parties, were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996); Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240-44, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986); see also McBride v. Commercial Bank of Champaign, 101 Ill.App.3d 760, 764, 57 780 N.E.2d 1......
  • Cordeck Sales v. Construction Systems, No. 1-06-3702.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 31, 2008
    ...935, 829 N.E.2d 860 (2005). Although summary judgment has been deemed a "drastic means of disposing of litigation" (Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986)), it is nonetheless an appropriate mechanism to employ to expeditiously dispose of a lawsuit when ......
  • Statewide Ins. v. Houston General Ins. Co., No. 1-07-1798.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 14, 2009
    ...and affidavits must be construed most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986). "[The opponent to summary judgment] need not disprove facts produced by [the moving party], but ......
  • Garland v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Docket Nos. 1–11–2121
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 12, 2013
    ...of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.’ ” Morris, 197 Ill.2d at 35, 257 Ill.Dec. 656, 754 N.E.2d 314 (quoting Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court is to determine whether a gen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
914 cases
  • Banco Popular v. Beneficial Systems, Inc., No. 1-01-0247.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • November 4, 2002
    ...BPT and BPM, as the moving parties, were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996); Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240-44, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986); see also McBride v. Commercial Bank of Champaign, 101 Ill.App.3d 760, 764, 57 780 N.E.2d 1......
  • Cordeck Sales v. Construction Systems, No. 1-06-3702.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 31, 2008
    ...935, 829 N.E.2d 860 (2005). Although summary judgment has been deemed a "drastic means of disposing of litigation" (Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986)), it is nonetheless an appropriate mechanism to employ to expeditiously dispose of a lawsuit when ......
  • Statewide Ins. v. Houston General Ins. Co., No. 1-07-1798.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 14, 2009
    ...and affidavits must be construed most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986). "[The opponent to summary judgment] need not disprove facts produced by [the moving party], but ......
  • Garland v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Docket Nos. 1–11–2121
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 12, 2013
    ...of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.’ ” Morris, 197 Ill.2d at 35, 257 Ill.Dec. 656, 754 N.E.2d 314 (quoting Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 95 Ill.Dec. 305, 489 N.E.2d 867 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the circuit court is to determine whether a gen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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