Purvis v. City of Atlanta

• Decision Date: 29 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:14–CV–03701–AT.
• Citation: 142 F.Supp.3d 1337
• Parties: Chris PURVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ATLANTA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

142 F.Supp.3d 1337

Chris PURVIS, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF ATLANTA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:14–CV–03701–AT.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Signed Sept. 29, 2015.

Jordan Alexander Johnson, The Law Offices of Jordan "Alex" Johnson, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Akua Damali Coppock, City of Atlanta Law Department, Atlanta, GA, Robert N. Godfrey, Tamara Nikki Baines, LaShawn W. Terry, City of Atlanta, Department of Law, Atlanta, GA, Kaye Woodard Burwell, Melody–Angelique P. Bray, Office of the Fulton County Attorney, Atlanta, GA, Walter B. Yarbrough, Office of the County Attorney, Atlanta, GA, Ashley Jenell Moore Palmer, Fulton County Attorney's Office, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

AMY TOTENBERG

, District Judge.

In this action, Plaintiff Chris Purvis asserts state and federal causes of action against Defendants City of Atlanta; Fulton County, Georgia; and Fulton County Sheriff Theodore Jackson, in his individual and official capacities (Fulton County and Sheriff Jackson are referred to as the "Fulton County Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that he was lawfully arrested by a City of Atlanta police officer for drinking in public and then unlawfully held by the City of Atlanta and Fulton County for an additional five to six days on an invalid warrant. Pending before the Court are Defendants' respective Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 3, 15].¹ For the following reasons, the City's Motion [Doc. 3] is GRANTED and the Fulton County Defendants' Motion [Doc. 15] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

The Court derives this factual background from the allegations in the Amended Complaint, which the Court accepts as true on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

On or about October 26, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested by a City of Atlanta police officer for drinking in public. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) He was not brought before a judicial officer within 72 hours of his arrest. (Id. ¶ 6.) Instead, he was held by the City of Atlanta "for between 4 and 5 days." (Id. ) Plaintiff was told he was being held "due to an outstanding warrant from Fulton County," (id. ¶ 7), to which Plaintiff repeatedly responded that the warrant was no longer valid. (Id. ¶ 8.)

After being held by the City, Plaintiff was transferred to the custody of Fulton County and held by Fulton County officers for an additional day. (Id. ¶ 7.) Again, he told his captors that the warrant was no longer valid. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff was released after one day in the custody of Fulton County because the warrant really was, as Plaintiff had maintained, invalid. (Id. ¶ 9.)

"Plaintiff lost financial opportunities due to his unlawful detention, as well as suffered damages, pain, and distress." (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes claims against the City of Atlanta, Fulton County, and Theodore Jackson, Sheriff of Fulton County, in his official and individual capacities, for unlawful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also includes pendent state law claims to vindicate his rights under the Georgia Constitution and other Georgia laws. Plaintiff's specific allegations include Defendants' breaches of the duty to update prison records, the duty to timely bring an arrested individual before a judicial officer, the duty to release an arrestee as soon as he is processed, the duty to train and supervise employees on all of the above duties, and the Defendants' maintenance of policies and practices that violate all of the above duties.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

. A pleading fails to state a claim if it does not contain allegations that support recovery under any recognizable legal theory. 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1216 (3d ed.2002) ; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the pleading in the non-movant's favor and accepts the allegations of facts therein as true. See Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir.1993). The pleader need not have provided "detailed factual allegations" to survive dismissal, but the "obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). In essence, the pleading "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claims against Fulton County and the City of Atlanta

Plaintiffs seeking to hold a municipality liable under § 1983

cannot rely upon the theory of respondeat superior, but must "identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's injury." McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) ; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) ; and Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir.1999) ). "This threshold identification of a custom or policy ‘ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.’ " Id. at 1290(quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)

); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 ("[A] municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.") (emphasis in original).

Thus, to hold Fulton County or the City of Atlanta liable, Plaintiff must show that the County or City itself, acting through an agent with final authority, was responsible for an official policy or custom of "depriving liberty and property ... without probable cause," and that the policy or custom was the driving force behind the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See, e.g., id.; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–95, 98 S.Ct. 2018

. Plaintiffs may do this either by: (1) identifying "an official policy or a widespread practice or custom that, although not authorized by express municipal policy, is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law [,]" or (2) pointing "to a single decision made by a municipal official if that municipal official is the final policymaker for the municipality with respect to the subject matter in question." Bunyon v. Burke Cty., 306 F.Supp.2d 1240, 1250 (S.D.Ga.2004), aff'd sub nom., Bunyon v. Burke Cty., Ga., 116 Fed.Appx. 249 (11th Cir.2004) ; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 793 (11th Cir.1989) ("Under this theory of municipal liability, the first step of the inquiry is to identify those individuals whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit.").

To survive dismissal "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). The plausibility standard "calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Plaintiff's allegations that he was individually wronged do not alone establish a pattern or practice on the part of the County or the City arising out of an official policy or custom so as to state a plausible claim against either Defendant. Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1050–53 (11th Cir.2014)

; Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 at n. 6 (11th Cir.2003) (en banc). Furthermore, as Plaintiff's contentions regarding the City's policy and practices are couched in conclusory, formulaic terms, the Court is not bound to accept these allegations as a valid basis for stating a claim supporting City liability. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31 34 (alleging that the City "has a policy, practice, or custom arising to the level of a policy of arresting and detaining people without first checking the validity of warrants," and alleging that the City's alleged violations are "frequent, pervasive, and not random or isolated incidents").) See Oxford Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1187–88 (11th Cir.2002) (stating that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts[,] or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal"). The same goes for Plaintiff's threadbare allegations that the County and the City "each have a policy, practice, or custom arising to the level of a policy of not updating records in their computer systems." (Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Nor does the Complaint contain allegations sufficient to identify a single decision made by a final policymaker for the County or the City resulting in the systemic failure to update computer records or failure to ascertain the validity of warrants prior to arresting and holding individuals pursuant to such warrants. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Fulton County and the City of Atlanta are therefore GRANTED. If discovery reveals an official policy or custom, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend his Amended Complaint, provided that this motion is made within 75 days of the commencement of discovery and...