Purvis v. Clarksville Montgomery Cnty. Cmty. Action Head Start

• Decision Date: 20 August 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-1161
• Parties: SONIA MAXWELL PURVIS, Plaintiff, v. CLARKSVILLE MONTGOMERY COUNTY COMMUNITY ACTION HEAD START, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

SONIA MAXWELL PURVIS, Plaintiff, v. CLARKSVILLE MONTGOMERYCOUNTY COMMUNITY ACTIONHEAD START, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-1161

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

August 20, 2020

Judge Trauger/Frensley

Jury Demand

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending in this case is the Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 5) filed by Defendants Clarksville Montgomery County Community Action Head Start; Felecia Bagwell, individually; Paris Carnell, individually; Leslie Chiodini, individually; and Sonda Finley, individually (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has not responded in opposition, and the time within which she was required to do so has expired. LR 7.01(a)(3). This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. Docket No. 4.

For the reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with respect to individual Defendants Felecia Bagwell, Paris Carnell, Leslie Chiodini, and Sonda Finley; that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to Defendant Clarksville Montgomery County Community Action Head Start; and that Plaintiff be ORDERED to file an amended complaint with the Clerk of Court providing a more definite statement of her claims and underlying factual allegations pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(e), within 21 days of this Report and Recommendation being adopted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 17, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Docket No. 1-1, p. 2. The EEOC Charge alleged discrimination based on retaliation and disability, and the narrative portion reads as follows:

I was hired by the above[-]named employer as a Teacher's Assistant around April 1999.

Around August 7, 2018, I had an accident in the workplace that aggravated my disability, I sought medical treatment at the time of incident. Around Mid-August a workplace incident was filed, and I was referred to the company doctor for an assessment of my Injuries. August 16, 2018, [sic] I met with the company doctor for our scheduled assessment. During my visit, I was accused of allegedly faking my Injuries and the doctor requested I provide medical documents from all my medical care providers regarding my workplace accident. On September 28, 2018, I provided my employer with the requested documents with work restrictions and was told there were no available positions to accommodate my needs. At the conclusion of the meeting, HR could only give me the remaining balance of my FMLA effective October 1, 2018. On November 28, 2018, I allegedly resigned for not being able to return to work.

I believe I have been discriminated against for requesting a reasonable accommodation and discharged in retaliation, In violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008.

Docket No. 1-1, p. 2.

On September 23, 2019, the EEOC closed the case and issued Plaintiff a "Right-to-Sue" letter, which Plaintiff attached to her complaint, demonstrating she exhausted available administrative remedies. Docket No. 1-1, p. 1. On December 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a complaint initiating this action. Docket No. 1.

On February 3, 2020, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, or alternatively, for a More Definite Statement (Docket No. 5), along with an accompanying Memorandum (Docket No. 6). Plaintiff has not filed a response or an amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(b).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff suffers from "Lupus SLE,"² and has been diagnosed since at least July 2015. Docket No. 1, pp. 4, 11, 15, 24-25, 40. In a "Medical Certification" form on Defendant's letterhead, healthcare provider Margarita V. Barlow, APRN-BC, indicated that the Lupus would cause "episodic flare-ups which prevent the employee from performing [her] job functions." Docket No. 1, pp. 25. The healthcare provider stated the Lupus "can cause weakness, pain, difficulty with concentration [sic]." Id. "Lupus flare[-]ups may be random and require 24-48 hours of recovery time per episode." Id. The healthcare provider indicated that it was "medically necessary for the employee to be absent from work during the flare-ups," and estimated Plaintiff would have three flare-ups per month, precluding Plaintiff from working 1-2 days per episode. Id. The form is dated March 22, 2018. Id.

Since April 23, 2013, Plaintiff has also had the demonstrated ability to function at the "light physical demand level," as defined by the Dictionary of Occupational Titles promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor. Docket No. 1, pp. 19, 21. Plaintiff alleges she has been on "light duty" at her place of employment since April 23, 2013. Id. at 9, 38. She also alleges she has had "permanent restrictions" since May 21, 2013. Id. at 22, 38.

With this background in mind, the Court will turn to the facts giving rise to this lawsuit.On August 7, 2018, Plaintiff fell while walking on a ramp at her place of employment. Docket No. 1, pp. 4, 11, 14, 39.

After falling[,] I sat for about 15 [minutes] and decided I needed to be seen. My supervisor seemed upset that I changed my mind to be seen. I went to Dr's Care [sic] and saw Dr. Shippen, who suggested rest and very amt of restrictions [sic]. I received Robaxin and a back and shoulder brace to wear. [See Docket No. 1, p. 23.] I explained I was in a lot of pain. Dr. Shippen state[d] they don't put people off work; but my employer can. I informed my employer of how much [sic] I was [] in. I also told Paris Carnell I would not be there August 8, because of the medicine and pain. [] I also returned to Dr's Care [sic] because I had a reaction to the Robaxin. I was given a Toradol shot and voltren gel cream to rub on [the] hurt area.

Docket No. 1, p. 39.

Plaintiff subsequently "called out" to her employer on August 8th, 9th, and 10th to provide notice she would be medically unable to return to work. Id. at 4. However, her employer would only allow her to use FMLA leave time on the August 10 absence. Id.

I was seen by 3 different Dr's at Dr's Care and[,] even with me telling them of my pain due to flares that [exacerbated] from [the] fall to create Lupus flares, I was told my flares were not caused from my Lupus. I was given occurrences the month of August because my employer would not allow me to us[e] FMLA.

Docket No. 1, p. 11 (emphasis in original).

The month of August I received 9 occurrences. I fel[t] my employer was retaliating because I called OSHA and Building [sic] and codes was called [sic] to repair the ramp. I also was denied light duty because my employer states theire [sic] is no place for me in the Head Start Program and all they (my employer) could offer me was the remain[der] of my FMLA.

Id. at 12. See also Docket No. 1, pp. 9, 17.

Plaintiff underwent two other examinations in which a "Dr. Kent" saw Plaintiff and "insinuated [she] didn't injure [her]self." Docket No. 1, p. 15. The next month, however, Plaintiff received a "Child Care Provider Medical Report" from healthcare provider Margarita V. Barlow, APRN-BC, who indicated that Plaintiff "has a history of Lupus which increases her pain generally which [sic] can affect her ability to care for children physically. Docket No. 1, p. 10. The healthcareprovider recommended Plaintiff "have a light duty position that does not require excessive physical exertion/lifting." Id. Defendants acknowledged in a September 28, 2018 letter that they had received the Medical Report and concluded a "light duty" position was not available—despite the fact that Plaintiff has had light duty accommodations in the past, dating as far back as 2013. Id. at 9. At the time of the letter, Plaintiff had been working for Defendants for almost 20 years. Compare Docket No. 1, p. 9 (dated Sept. 28, 2018) with Docket No. 1-1, p. 2 ("I was hired . . . around April 1999").

"To have an injury and Lupus, SLE is pain people don't realize unless they experience it themselves." Docket No. 1, p. 15. Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's disabilities. Id. at 41. Plaintiff was discharged and is no longer employed by Defendants. Id. at 50. Plaintiff prays for lost wages and prejudgment interest, and generally for compensatory and punitive damages available under the ADA. Id. at 5-7, 13, 16.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2002). The court must determine only whether "the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims," not whether the Plaintiff can ultimately prove the facts alleged. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

Under Rule 8(a)(2), however, the complaint's allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To establish the "facial plausibility" required to "unlock the doors of discovery," the plaintiffcannot rely on "legal conclusions" or "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," but, instead, the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). "Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. According to the Supreme Court, "plausibility" occupies that wide space between "possibility" and "probability." Iqbal, 556 at 678. Any claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that a...