Purvis v. Texas A & M Univ.
| Decision Date | 08 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. G-10-520 |
| Parties | CAROLINE PURVIS, v. TEXAS A & M UNIVERSITY |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Before the Court, with the consent of the parties, is Defendant Texas A & M University's Motion to Dismiss. (Docket Entry ("Dkt.") No. 3). Plaintiff Caroline Purvis filed a Response to the Motion and, in the Response, requested leave to file an amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 5). The Court granted the request for leave (Dkt. No. 17) and Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint on June 30, 2011. (Dkt. No. 13). Defendant then filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 20). Despite having ample time to do so, Plaintiff filed no response to Defendant's Supplemental Motion. After careful consideration of the Motion and the Supplemental Motion, the response, and the applicable law, the Court now issues this Opinion and Order.
Plaintiff Caroline Purvis brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Texas A & M University ("the University"). Purvis' claims arise out of the University's decision to deny her re-admission to its Texas Maritime Academy ("the Academy"). (Dkt. No. 13).
By way of background, Purvis alleged in her Amended Complaint that she was admitted to the University for the 2005 Fall semester with the intention of majoring in Marine Transportation. (Id. at 2, ¶8). To further her goals, Purvis also applied to the Academy and was admitted to the institution in the Fall of 2005. (Id. at 2,¶ 9).
In July 2006, the Academy joined with the California Maritime Academy in Vallejo, California, for shipboard cadet training and students were required to have student health insurance through the University. (Id. at 3, ¶13). During her participation in this joint program, Purvis injured her back in July 2006, when she was on board the GOLDEN BEAR while it was docked in Zihuataejo, Mexico. (Id. at 3, ¶ 17). Dr. Garcia-Gallegos, M.D. treated Purvis for her injury.1
When the fall semester began at the University, Purvis remained under medical care. On October 9, 2006, Dr. Garcia-Gallegos wrote a letter to Dr. Bob Sindylek, Ed.D., LPC, director of counseling at the University, and advised him that Purvis was still under his care and that he was attempting to determine the cause of her neurological complaints. (Id. at 3, ¶ 18). Based on the letter to Dr. Sindylek, Purvis withdrew from the Academy on October 19, 2006, until such time as her medical condition resolved. (Id. at 4, ¶19). Purvis also withdrew from the Corp of Cadets several days later. (Id. at 4, ¶21). Despite withdrawing from the Academy and the Corp, Purvis was able to attend classes in General Studies.2 (Id. at 4, ¶24).
More than two years after she withdrew from the Academy, Purvis applied for re-admission into the program on April 19, 2009. (Id. at 4, ¶ 25). Purvis contends that only days after she applied, she visited the office of William McMullen, Interim Head of Maritime Transportation and, while in the next room, she claims to have overheard a conference call where the caller remarked that "Caroline had high grades" to which McMullen agreed, but he noted that he had "her UTMB medical records" and, while commenting on the sensitivity of the subject matter (Id. at 4, ¶¶27-28), concluded that she was not fit for the program. (Id. at 5, ¶ 29).
Several months later, on July 7, 2009, Purvis met with Dr. Sindylek. During the meeting Dr. Sindylek asked Purvis if she would undergo some testing for learning disabilities. (Id. at 5, ¶36). Purvis initially agreed to the testing and Dr. Sindylek scheduled an appointment for her with Dr. Rick Erte for July 28, 2009. (Id. at 5, ¶37). However, Purvis later declined to undergo the testing "because she felt that her disability", which she explained is an "auditory learning disability," "had nothing to do with the learning process" and it had never been an issue in her previous attendance at the University. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 38, 40).3
Purvis alleges that two days after her meeting with Dr. Sindylek, she received an email from Sarah Tombley, the Associate Director of Admissions, who explained that she would not be re-admitted to the Academy because Dr. Sindylek had not approved he; Tombley suggested that she should explore other options, such as Maritime Administration. (Id. at 6, 42). Purvis filed a complaint with the University on July 23, 2009, but she asserts that nothing resulted from her complaint. (Id. at 7, ¶46).
On July 23, 2009, Purvis received a formal denial letter from William W. Pickavance, Rear-Admiral and Superintendent of the Academy ("Pickavance"). In the letter, Pickavance informed Purvis that her application for re-admission to the Academy was denied until she could provide proof of overall health and fitness. (Id. at 5, ¶31). Purvis alleges that she was perplexed by this reason because she had already provided the University a July 31, 2007, release from her chiropractor, Dr. Duchon, who opined that "[she] had sufficiently recovered from her lumbar spine injury to fully perform all duties required of her." In addition to Dr. Duchon's release, Purvis alleges that she submitted releases from a doctor at UTMB. (Id. at 5, ¶¶33-35; at 8, ¶56).
Purvis then proceeded to file a number of complaints against the University for denying her re-admission to the Academy program, but she maintains that the University never ruled on any of her complaints. (Id. at 7, ¶¶ 47, 48). Instead, Purvis asserts that on August 21, 2009, she received an email from the University denying her re-admission. Purvis contends that the University also forwarded her a "August 12, 2009 letter/memo" which explained that her application for re-admission was denied because "there were inconsistencies between [her] records on file with the institution and her current physical form which was attached to the application for readmission." (Id. at 7-8, ¶¶51-52). In particular, the "letter/memo" detailed that in her application she responded that she had not suffered from impaired range of motion or impaired balance or coordination", but this was inconsistent with the University's records that revealed that she had previously reported a physical disability due to a ruptured disc and that Pickavance considered this omission in her application for re-admission to be misleading. (Id. at 8, ¶53). On August 25, 2009, Purvis received a formal letter from Pickavance that reiterated the denial of her application for re-admission into the program. (Id. at 7, ¶¶49-50).
Purvis contends that the University's "new reason for [the] denial of [her] admission" is nothing more than a ruse4 and she insists the real reason that she was denied re-admission to the Academy was because the University perceived her has suffering from a disability, in particular, an "auditory learning disability." Purvis also insists that, in denying her re-admission to the Academy, the University discriminated against her on the basis of gender because, unlike her, similarly situated male students were re-admitted to the Academy when they recovered from injuries.
Based on these grounds, Purvis brings claims against Defendant alleging the following violations: (1) sexual discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title IX") (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.); (2) Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act ("Section 504") (29 U.S.C.§ 794); and (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("Title II"). Defendant Texas A & M University filed a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 3), to which Plaintiff responded; and then, after Plaintiff amended her Complaint, Defendant filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 20), to which Plaintiff filed no response. The Motions are now ripe for adjudication.
In its Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant University initially moves for dismissal of Purvis's ADA claim based on sovereign immunity. In the alternative, Defendant moves for dismissal of all the claims against it on the basis that Purvis does not adequately state claims upon which relief can be granted. The Court will begin by addressing the jurisdictional issue raised and then proceed to address Defendant's contentions that Purvis has failed to state claims against it.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution has been interpreted as a bar to suits brought against states or state agencies by one of its citizens unless the state specifically waives its immunity or Congress, in enacting a particular statute, intentionally abrogates the states' sovereign immunity. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). In the present case, the Defendant University is a state instrumentality and, hence, as a general rule, it cannot be sued unless it has unequivocally waived immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated state immunity. See TEX. EDUC.CODE §§ 86.02; 87.201; Will, 491 U.S. at 66; see also, Chacko v. Texas A&M Univ., 960 F.Supp. 1180, 1198 (S.D.Tex. 1997); Zentgraf v. Texas A&M Univ., 492 F.Supp. 265, 271-72 (S.D.Tex. 1980). However, with regard to her ADA claim, Purvis maintains that Congress has abrogated state immunity.
The ADA provides that "[a] State shall not be immune" from suits under the Act because of sovereign immunity (42 U.S.C. § 12202); however, the Supreme Court has made clear that this waiver is not absolute because Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity only where it "act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Bd of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Within the context of ADA claims, the Court has determined that a State's immunity is waived only in limited contexts. See id. In particular, the Court has, thus far, determined that immunity is only abrogated in cases implicating issues regarding access to courts (Tenn. v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)),...
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