Purvis v. Williams, 88,286.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 88,286.,88,286.
• Citation: 73 P.3d 740,276 Kan. 182
• Parties: L. JOHN PURVIS, Appellant, v. STEVE WILLIAMS, ROB MANES, and ROB LADNER, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

276 Kan. 182

73 P.3d 740

L. JOHN PURVIS, Appellant, v. STEVE WILLIAMS, ROB MANES, and ROB LADNER, Appellees.

No. 88,286.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Opinion filed July 25, 2003.

Penny D. Moylan, of Bennett, Hendrix & Moylan, of Topeka, argued the cause, and Mark L. Bennett, of the same firm, was with her on the briefs for appellant.

M. J. Willoughby, assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, attorney general, was with her on the brief for appellee. The opinion of the court was delivered by

BRAZIL, S.J.:

Plaintiff, L. John Purvis, a former conservation officer with the Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks, brought an employment discrimination suit against department officials in their individual and official capacities (Defendants). He claimed Defendants, in terminating his employment, (1) violated 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) of the federal Rehabilitation Act; (2) violated federal civil rights law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); and (3) discharged him in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Kansas Civil Service System and for exercising rights afforded to handicapped individuals. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered a memorandum decision and order dismissing all three claims. Jurisdiction is pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c), transfer by court's motion.

On appeal, Purvis argues that the trial court erred in ruling that (1) he could not maintain an action under the Rehabilitation Act against the Defendants in their individual capacities; (2) sovereign immunity precludes suit in a state court under the Rehabilitation Act against the Defendants in their official capacities; (3) he failed to state a valid 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action; and (4) he could not maintain an action for retaliatory discharge because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

We affirm.

The parties agree that facts from Purvis' original petition are relevant. They are summarized as follows:

In July 1992, the Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks (the Department) hired Purvis as a conservation officer. On May 14, 1999, the Department terminated Purvis' employment. Purvis alleged in his complaint, without specifying, that he had a disability or handicap and that the Department terminated him solely because of his disability or handicap. Purvis also alleged he was a permanent employee of the Kansas Civil Service System with the right to access the protections afforded by the system.

Purvis claims that he received several satisfactory or excellent performance evaluation ratings. In August 1997, he took a leave of absence for medical reasons. He claims his supervisor, Rob Ladner, and the Department, were aware of his medical problems. In December 1997, Purvis requested shared leave pursuant to K.A.R. 1-9-23. The Department denied this request and required Purvis to return to work.

Following his return to work, Purvis claims the Defendants imposed conditions and restrictions upon him which were not necessary to the completion or performance of his job duties. Thereafter, in October 1998, Purvis received his first unsatisfactory performance rating. Approximately 6 months later, he received a second unsatisfactory rating. Shortly thereafter, on April 16, 1999, defendant Ladner, Purvis' supervisor, recommended that the Department terminate Purvis' employment.

On May 14, 2001, Purvis filed a three-count suit naming Ladner, Steve Williams, and Rob Manes as defendants, in both their individual and official capacities. He asserted claims under 29 U.S.C. § 794 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the common-law theory of retaliatory discharge. Defendants note in their brief that the petition does not allege that Purvis exhausted any administrative remedies before filing suit.

When Purvis was terminated, Williams was the secretary of the Department, Manes was the assistant secretary of operations for the Department, and Ladner was the regional supervisor. Defendants, through the attorney general, filed a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. After subsequent pleadings in response and reply, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings as to all three claims.

Common to all issues is that they arise from the district court's decision granting judgment on the pleadings. A motion for judgment on the pleadings requires the trial court to determine whether, upon the admitted facts, the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. Jack v. City of Wichita, 23 Kan. App. 2d 606, 607-08, 933 P.2d 787 (1997) (citing Tabor v. Lederer, 205 Kan. 746, 748, 472 P.2d 209 [1970]). If successful, the motion can dispose of the case without a trial because the pleadings frame the issues in such a way that the disposition of the case is a matter of law on the facts alleged or admitted, leaving no real triable issue. Clear Water Truck Co., Inc. v. M. Bruenger & Co., Inc., 214 Kan. 139, 140, 519 P.2d 682 (1974). The motion operates as an admission by movant of all fact allegations in the opposing party's pleadings. 214 Kan. at 140.

The district court cites the standard for summary judgment; however, neither party contends the district court relied on matters outside the pleadings. Thus, there was no need to consider the motion as one for summary judgment. K.S.A. 60-212(c).

PURVIS' ACTION UNDER THE REHABILITATION ACT AGAINST DEFENDANTS IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES

Standard of Review

The district court disposed of the Rehabilitation Act claim against Defendants in their individual capacities by determining that the plain or ordinary meaning of the statute does not create personal liability. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. Babe Houser Motor Co. v. Tetreault, 270 Kan. 502, 506, 14 P.3d 1149 (2000). On this question the court is not bound by the decision of the trial court. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986). Although the issue involves a federal statute, it is within the power of the court to interpret it, absent any otherwise binding court ruling. In re Estate of Tubbs, 21 Kan. App. 2d 395, 403, 900 P.2d 865, rev. denied 258 Kan. 858 (1995) (citing 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 78.)

The Rehabilitation Act

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) prohibits discrimination against the disabled by recipients of federal funds. The provision is enforceable through a private cause of action with remedies as prescribed in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2000), which prohibits racial discrimination in federally funded programs and activities. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 184-85, 153 L. Ed. 2d 230, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002). The Rehabilitation Act states:

"No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).

Under the Act, a "program or activity" is defined as the operations of "a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or local government." 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A).

To state a cause of action of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, Purvis was required to allege the following elements in his petition: (1) He is handicapped within the meaning of the Act; (2) that he is otherwise qualified to perform the job; (3) that he was discharged because of his handicap; and (4) that his employer is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Kinsella v. Rumsfeld, 320 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2003).

Discussion

Purvis argued below that Defendants are liable under the Rehabilitation Act in their individual capacities because they act as instrumentalities of the state of Kansas. The district court rejected this argument by construing the Rehabilitation Act and determining that had Congress intended to include individual officials within the definition of "program or activity" as set forth in subsection (b)(1)(A), Congress would have inserted the appropriate language into the Act. In concluding Defendants, either in their individual or official capacities, did not fit within any categories of the definition, the district court further noted that the Act refers to a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

Our Court of Appeals, in In re Estate of Tubbs, 21 Kan. App. 2d at 404, collected authorities setting forth principles to guide a state court in construing federal statutes:

"Where possible in construing federal statutes, state courts should seek direction from the decisions of federal courts interpreting similar language. See Lytle v. Southern Ry.-Carolina Division, 171 S.C. 221, 224, 171 S.E. 42, cert. denied 290 U.S. 645 (1933), 90 A.L.R. 915. Courts should assume in the absence of indications to the contrary that Congress intends the words in its enactments to carry their ordinary, contemporary, and common meanings. Pioneer Investment v. Brunswick, 507 U.S. 380, 386, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74, 113 S. Ct. 1489 (1993). The unambiguous meaning of the words used within a statute must be regarded as conclusive in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177, 122 L. Ed. 2d 525, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993)."

The term at issue in the present case is "instrumentality." Employing a definitional analysis, Black's Law Dictionary 802 (7th ed. 1999), defines "instrumentality" as a thing used to achieve an end or purpose, or a means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished. The American Heritage Dictionary 681 (8th ed. 1971), defines "instrumentality" as the quality or circumstance of being instrumental. That same source defines "instrumental" as serving as an...